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Direct Perceptual Realism II: Non‐Conceptual Content

Robert Hanna

in Kant, Science, and Human Nature

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199285549
eISBN:
9780191713965
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter explores the ‘direct’ aspect of direct perceptual realism, and in particular, Kant's theory of non-conceptual perceptual content. A cognition is direct in the Kantian sense if and only ... More


Hausserl and the Linguistic Turn

Charles Parsons

in Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195139167
eISBN:
9780199833214
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019513916X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Parsons criticizes Dummett’s recent argument that Husserl was not an analytic philosopher because Husserl did not accept that a philosophical account of thought can be attained only through a ... More


Consciousness as Superficial and Falsifying

Paul Katsafanas

in The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780198737100
eISBN:
9780191800641
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Nietzsche’s argument that conscious states alone have conceptual content has consequences of great import for moral psychology. In particular, it leads Nietzsche to the claim that conscious states ... More


Ressentiment and the Possibility of Intentional Self-Deception

Peter Poellner

in Nietzsche on Mind and Nature

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780198722236
eISBN:
9780191789083
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722236.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that ressentiment should be understood as involving a process of intentional, albeit not reflectively strategic, self-deception about one’s own conscious mental states. The values ... More


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