Ronald N. Giere
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199753628
- eISBN:
- 9780199950027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753628.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
The question that frames this chapter is how humans have managed to learn such amazing things as the age of the universe. After briefly reviewing logical, methodological, historical, and social ...
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The question that frames this chapter is how humans have managed to learn such amazing things as the age of the universe. After briefly reviewing logical, methodological, historical, and social approaches to this question, the chapter focuses on contributions of the cognitive study of science. This leads to a comparison of the cognitive study of science and the psychology of science, which study how fundamental cognitive mechanisms operate in the context of generating scientific knowledge. There is, however, a second way humans use their psychological powers in the pursuit of knowledge, namely, by designing material and symbolic artifacts that greatly increase their cognitive powers. The resulting physical-computational-human systems have been incorporated into the cognitive sciences as “distributed cognitive systems.” The chapter proposes adoption of an agent-centered approach, in which ever more ubiquitous distributed cognitive systems can be fully cognitive without being fully computational.Less
The question that frames this chapter is how humans have managed to learn such amazing things as the age of the universe. After briefly reviewing logical, methodological, historical, and social approaches to this question, the chapter focuses on contributions of the cognitive study of science. This leads to a comparison of the cognitive study of science and the psychology of science, which study how fundamental cognitive mechanisms operate in the context of generating scientific knowledge. There is, however, a second way humans use their psychological powers in the pursuit of knowledge, namely, by designing material and symbolic artifacts that greatly increase their cognitive powers. The resulting physical-computational-human systems have been incorporated into the cognitive sciences as “distributed cognitive systems.” The chapter proposes adoption of an agent-centered approach, in which ever more ubiquitous distributed cognitive systems can be fully cognitive without being fully computational.
Ilona Roth (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264195
- eISBN:
- 9780191734540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264195.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Imagination is one of the most distinctive characteristics of human thought. The supreme powers of flexibility, supposition and inventiveness that are its hallmarks, whether in science, technology, ...
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Imagination is one of the most distinctive characteristics of human thought. The supreme powers of flexibility, supposition and inventiveness that are its hallmarks, whether in science, technology, business or the visual, literary and performing arts, are highly prized in contemporary societies. Yet in the fields of psychology and cognitive science, where we might expect to find the topic ‘centre-stage’, there has been comparatively little work. This volume addresses this omission by bringing together the theories and methods of these disciplines with other perspectives offering important insights into the imagination. The fifteen chapters address key questions about the imaginative workings of the mind, including how the capacity for imagination evolved, how it is expressed and what roles it plays in children’s thinking, what psychological processes and brain mechanisms are involved, and how imagination operates in universal cultural phenomena such as music, fiction and religion, which are both the fruits of and the ‘fuel’ for imaginative minds. The exceptional interdisciplinary scope of the volume, and its exploration and juxtaposition of different forms of imaginative cognition, offer an engaging and innovative take on the topic, bringing together approaches from psychology, cognitive science, anthropology and evolutionary studies with philosophy and the humanities. The contributors demonstrate their own imaginative flair in a varied collection of essays about this most elusive and special human capacity.Less
Imagination is one of the most distinctive characteristics of human thought. The supreme powers of flexibility, supposition and inventiveness that are its hallmarks, whether in science, technology, business or the visual, literary and performing arts, are highly prized in contemporary societies. Yet in the fields of psychology and cognitive science, where we might expect to find the topic ‘centre-stage’, there has been comparatively little work. This volume addresses this omission by bringing together the theories and methods of these disciplines with other perspectives offering important insights into the imagination. The fifteen chapters address key questions about the imaginative workings of the mind, including how the capacity for imagination evolved, how it is expressed and what roles it plays in children’s thinking, what psychological processes and brain mechanisms are involved, and how imagination operates in universal cultural phenomena such as music, fiction and religion, which are both the fruits of and the ‘fuel’ for imaginative minds. The exceptional interdisciplinary scope of the volume, and its exploration and juxtaposition of different forms of imaginative cognition, offer an engaging and innovative take on the topic, bringing together approaches from psychology, cognitive science, anthropology and evolutionary studies with philosophy and the humanities. The contributors demonstrate their own imaginative flair in a varied collection of essays about this most elusive and special human capacity.
Arthur B. Markman and Kristin L. Wood
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195381634
- eISBN:
- 9780199870264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381634.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
In order to streamline design processes, it is crucial to understand where new ideas come from. This chapter starts by outlining the ways that designers can generate novel solutions to problems. The ...
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In order to streamline design processes, it is crucial to understand where new ideas come from. This chapter starts by outlining the ways that designers can generate novel solutions to problems. The many chapters in this volume explore a variety of different paths to innovation. To put these chapters into perspective, this chapter starts with a broad discussion of the nature of innovation. Then, it highlights the contributions of each of the chapters both for their basic research on the design process as well as for their suggestions about how to create new tools to support innovation.Less
In order to streamline design processes, it is crucial to understand where new ideas come from. This chapter starts by outlining the ways that designers can generate novel solutions to problems. The many chapters in this volume explore a variety of different paths to innovation. To put these chapters into perspective, this chapter starts with a broad discussion of the nature of innovation. Then, it highlights the contributions of each of the chapters both for their basic research on the design process as well as for their suggestions about how to create new tools to support innovation.
E. J. Capaldi and Robert W. Proctor
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199753628
- eISBN:
- 9780199950027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753628.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
There has always been a close association between psychology and the philosophy of science. Although some individuals over the past 200 years have suggested that psychology had little to offer ...
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There has always been a close association between psychology and the philosophy of science. Although some individuals over the past 200 years have suggested that psychology had little to offer philosophy (Kant and Popper), many more have expressed a contrary opinion. The chapter shows that psychology influenced philosophy of science mainly through four areas: perception in the form of psychophysics (on Mach, Peirce, and James) and in the form of Gestalt psychology (on Carnap, Hanson, and Kuhn), animal behavior in the form of behaviorism (on Russell, Bergmann, and the logical positivists), and cognitive psychology (on Popper, Giere, and Thagard). On the basis of the present findings, the conclusion is reached that better understanding of science is considerably dependent on knowing how the mind works, which is an idea as old as the British empiricists and the Würzburg school and as young as contemporary cognitive science.Less
There has always been a close association between psychology and the philosophy of science. Although some individuals over the past 200 years have suggested that psychology had little to offer philosophy (Kant and Popper), many more have expressed a contrary opinion. The chapter shows that psychology influenced philosophy of science mainly through four areas: perception in the form of psychophysics (on Mach, Peirce, and James) and in the form of Gestalt psychology (on Carnap, Hanson, and Kuhn), animal behavior in the form of behaviorism (on Russell, Bergmann, and the logical positivists), and cognitive psychology (on Popper, Giere, and Thagard). On the basis of the present findings, the conclusion is reached that better understanding of science is considerably dependent on knowing how the mind works, which is an idea as old as the British empiricists and the Würzburg school and as young as contemporary cognitive science.
Karl S. Rosengren, Sarah K. Brem, E. Margaret Evans, and Gale M. Sinatra (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199730421
- eISBN:
- 9780199949557
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730421.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This book presents new ideas for why the acceptance and understanding of evolution and related concepts is so difficult for both children and adults. Drawing from diverse fields, the contributors ...
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This book presents new ideas for why the acceptance and understanding of evolution and related concepts is so difficult for both children and adults. Drawing from diverse fields, the contributors include the foremost researchers and practitioners in the study of children’s cognitive development, science education, teaching of evolution, and the design and evaluation of formal and informal instruction of evolution. The book brings together a unique collection of researchers, educators, and practitioners, who met and discussed many of the ideas incorporated in this volume at regional and national meetings funded by the National Science Foundation. The chapters and the overall book integrate cutting edge ideas that emerged from these meetings.Less
This book presents new ideas for why the acceptance and understanding of evolution and related concepts is so difficult for both children and adults. Drawing from diverse fields, the contributors include the foremost researchers and practitioners in the study of children’s cognitive development, science education, teaching of evolution, and the design and evaluation of formal and informal instruction of evolution. The book brings together a unique collection of researchers, educators, and practitioners, who met and discussed many of the ideas incorporated in this volume at regional and national meetings funded by the National Science Foundation. The chapters and the overall book integrate cutting edge ideas that emerged from these meetings.
Keith E. Stanovich
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199230167
- eISBN:
- 9780191696442
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Building upon work which considers the implications dual-process theory for the great rationality debate in cognitive science, this chapter advances that discussion, first by discussing additions and ...
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Building upon work which considers the implications dual-process theory for the great rationality debate in cognitive science, this chapter advances that discussion, first by discussing additions and complications to dual-process theory and then by working through the implications of these ideas for our view of human rationality. It argues that System 2 needs to be understood in terms of two levels of processing: the algorithmic and the reflective.Less
Building upon work which considers the implications dual-process theory for the great rationality debate in cognitive science, this chapter advances that discussion, first by discussing additions and complications to dual-process theory and then by working through the implications of these ideas for our view of human rationality. It argues that System 2 needs to be understood in terms of two levels of processing: the algorithmic and the reflective.
Susan Carey
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195367638
- eISBN:
- 9780199867349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367638.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter considers the implications of the picture of conceptual development offered in this book for a theory of concepts. It introduces new material, placing work on the origin of concepts in ...
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This chapter considers the implications of the picture of conceptual development offered in this book for a theory of concepts. It introduces new material, placing work on the origin of concepts in the context of selected controversies from cognitive science and philosophy concerning the very nature of concepts.Less
This chapter considers the implications of the picture of conceptual development offered in this book for a theory of concepts. It introduces new material, placing work on the origin of concepts in the context of selected controversies from cognitive science and philosophy concerning the very nature of concepts.
Edward S. Reed
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195073010
- eISBN:
- 9780199846887
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195073010.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This book reorients modern psychology by finding a viable middle ground between the study of nerve cells and cultural analysis. The emerging field of ecological psychology focuses on the “human ...
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This book reorients modern psychology by finding a viable middle ground between the study of nerve cells and cultural analysis. The emerging field of ecological psychology focuses on the “human niche” and our uniquely evolved modes of action and interaction. Rejecting both mechanistic cognitive science and reductionistic neuroscience, the book offers a new psychology that combines ecological and experimental methods to help us better understand the ways in which people and animals make their way through the world. The book provides a comprehensive treatment of ecological psychology and a unique synthesis of the work of Darwin, neural Darwinism, and modern ecologists with James Gibson's approach to perception. The book presents detailed discussions on communication, sociality, cognition, and language—topics often overlooked by ecological psychologists. Other issues covered include ecological approaches to animal behaviour, neural mechanisms, perception, action, and interaction.Less
This book reorients modern psychology by finding a viable middle ground between the study of nerve cells and cultural analysis. The emerging field of ecological psychology focuses on the “human niche” and our uniquely evolved modes of action and interaction. Rejecting both mechanistic cognitive science and reductionistic neuroscience, the book offers a new psychology that combines ecological and experimental methods to help us better understand the ways in which people and animals make their way through the world. The book provides a comprehensive treatment of ecological psychology and a unique synthesis of the work of Darwin, neural Darwinism, and modern ecologists with James Gibson's approach to perception. The book presents detailed discussions on communication, sociality, cognition, and language—topics often overlooked by ecological psychologists. Other issues covered include ecological approaches to animal behaviour, neural mechanisms, perception, action, and interaction.
Lawrence Weiskrantz and Martin Davies (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199233151
- eISBN:
- 9780191696596
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233151.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
In recent years consciousness has become a significant area of study in the cognitive sciences. This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. The book stems from the Chichele ...
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In recent years consciousness has become a significant area of study in the cognitive sciences. This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. The book stems from the Chichele lectures held at All Souls College in Oxford, and features contributions from a ‘who's who’ of authorities from both philosophy and psychology. The result is an interdisciplinary volume which tackles some of the biggest and most impenetrable problems in consciousness. The book includes chapters considering the apparent explanatory gap between science and consciousness, our conscious experience of emotions such as fear, and of willed actions by ourselves and others. It looks at subjective differences between two ways in which visual information guides behaviour, and scientific investigation of consciousness in non-human animals. It looks at the challenges that the mind-brain relation presents for clinical practice as well as for theories of consciousness. The book draws on research from philosophy, experimental psychology, functional imaging of the brain, neuropsychology, neuroscience, and clinical neurology.Less
In recent years consciousness has become a significant area of study in the cognitive sciences. This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. The book stems from the Chichele lectures held at All Souls College in Oxford, and features contributions from a ‘who's who’ of authorities from both philosophy and psychology. The result is an interdisciplinary volume which tackles some of the biggest and most impenetrable problems in consciousness. The book includes chapters considering the apparent explanatory gap between science and consciousness, our conscious experience of emotions such as fear, and of willed actions by ourselves and others. It looks at subjective differences between two ways in which visual information guides behaviour, and scientific investigation of consciousness in non-human animals. It looks at the challenges that the mind-brain relation presents for clinical practice as well as for theories of consciousness. The book draws on research from philosophy, experimental psychology, functional imaging of the brain, neuropsychology, neuroscience, and clinical neurology.
Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262529365
- eISBN:
- 9780262335492
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and ...
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This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science—claims that have since become highly influential. Through this cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, the book introduced a new form of cognitive science called “enaction,” in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book's arguments were powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience. This revised edition includes introductions that clarify central arguments of the work and discuss and evaluate subsequent research that has expanded on the themes of the book, including the renewed theoretical and practical interest in Buddhism and mindfulness. A preface by the originator of the mindfulness-based stress-reduction program, contextualizes the book and describes its influence on his life and work.Less
This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science—claims that have since become highly influential. Through this cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, the book introduced a new form of cognitive science called “enaction,” in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book's arguments were powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience. This revised edition includes introductions that clarify central arguments of the work and discuss and evaluate subsequent research that has expanded on the themes of the book, including the renewed theoretical and practical interest in Buddhism and mindfulness. A preface by the originator of the mindfulness-based stress-reduction program, contextualizes the book and describes its influence on his life and work.
Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199216093
- eISBN:
- 9780191695971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216093.003.0022
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter aims to reflect on themes and points of difference raised in the book; consider relationships between this work and broader developments in the cognitive sciences; and to give some ...
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This chapter aims to reflect on themes and points of difference raised in the book; consider relationships between this work and broader developments in the cognitive sciences; and to give some personal views concerning possible future directions for the field. It draws out themes which discuss: the meaning of rational analysis; whether probability is what the brain is computing; the relation between models of ‘low-high’ and ‘high-level’ cognition; and the relation of probability to traditional concepts in cognitive science namely, logic and structured mental representations.Less
This chapter aims to reflect on themes and points of difference raised in the book; consider relationships between this work and broader developments in the cognitive sciences; and to give some personal views concerning possible future directions for the field. It draws out themes which discuss: the meaning of rational analysis; whether probability is what the brain is computing; the relation between models of ‘low-high’ and ‘high-level’ cognition; and the relation of probability to traditional concepts in cognitive science namely, logic and structured mental representations.
Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262529365
- eISBN:
- 9780262335492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter describes cognitive science. In its widest sense, the term cognitive science is used to indicate that the study of mind is in itself a worthy scientific pursuit. At this time, cognitive ...
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This chapter describes cognitive science. In its widest sense, the term cognitive science is used to indicate that the study of mind is in itself a worthy scientific pursuit. At this time, cognitive science is not yet established as a mature science. It does not have a clearly agreed upon sense of direction and a large number of researchers constituting a community. Rather, it is really more of a loose affiliation of disciplines than a discipline of its own. Interestingly, an important pole is occupied by artificial intelligence—thus, the computer model of the mind is a dominant aspect of the entire field. The other affiliated disciplines are generally taken to consist of linguistics, neuroscience, psychology, sometimes anthropology, and the philosophy of mind. Each discipline would give a somewhat different answer to the question of what is mind or cognition, an answer that would reflect its own specific concerns.Less
This chapter describes cognitive science. In its widest sense, the term cognitive science is used to indicate that the study of mind is in itself a worthy scientific pursuit. At this time, cognitive science is not yet established as a mature science. It does not have a clearly agreed upon sense of direction and a large number of researchers constituting a community. Rather, it is really more of a loose affiliation of disciplines than a discipline of its own. Interestingly, an important pole is occupied by artificial intelligence—thus, the computer model of the mind is a dominant aspect of the entire field. The other affiliated disciplines are generally taken to consist of linguistics, neuroscience, psychology, sometimes anthropology, and the philosophy of mind. Each discipline would give a somewhat different answer to the question of what is mind or cognition, an answer that would reflect its own specific concerns.
Max Coltheart
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199228768
- eISBN:
- 9780191696336
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228768.003.0006
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter analyses developments in cognitive science during the past fifty years from a personal perspective. It describes psychology issues and topics that were of personal interest to the author ...
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This chapter analyses developments in cognitive science during the past fifty years from a personal perspective. It describes psychology issues and topics that were of personal interest to the author of this chapter. These include a paper titled ‘A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity’ and Donald Broadbent's Perception and Communication, which not only used flowcharts to express models of cognition but also made a clear and explicit statement of cognitive science as abstracting computational procedures from the physical systems that implement them.Less
This chapter analyses developments in cognitive science during the past fifty years from a personal perspective. It describes psychology issues and topics that were of personal interest to the author of this chapter. These include a paper titled ‘A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity’ and Donald Broadbent's Perception and Communication, which not only used flowcharts to express models of cognition but also made a clear and explicit statement of cognitive science as abstracting computational procedures from the physical systems that implement them.
Keith Oatley
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198522379
- eISBN:
- 9780191688577
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198522379.003.0017
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter aims to discuss the function of consciousness within a broad framework of cognitive science and phenomenology, and to relate these two approaches to each other. This chapter's treatment ...
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This chapter aims to discuss the function of consciousness within a broad framework of cognitive science and phenomenology, and to relate these two approaches to each other. This chapter's treatment of the role of consciousness, while sharing the computational approach, is quite different. It proposes a tentative taxononomy, partly of the typical phenomenology and content of consciousness. The chapter distinguishes four aspects of consciousness, two involuntary and two voluntary. The latter are built on the former and serve the functions of developing plans and goals based on a model of the self. This chapter emphasizes the social construction of consciousness, providing persuasive illustrations. The bringing together of the domain of emotions with insights from the artificial intelligence metaphor is an exciting enterprise.Less
This chapter aims to discuss the function of consciousness within a broad framework of cognitive science and phenomenology, and to relate these two approaches to each other. This chapter's treatment of the role of consciousness, while sharing the computational approach, is quite different. It proposes a tentative taxononomy, partly of the typical phenomenology and content of consciousness. The chapter distinguishes four aspects of consciousness, two involuntary and two voluntary. The latter are built on the former and serve the functions of developing plans and goals based on a model of the self. This chapter emphasizes the social construction of consciousness, providing persuasive illustrations. The bringing together of the domain of emotions with insights from the artificial intelligence metaphor is an exciting enterprise.
Roberto G. de Almeida and Lila R. Gleitman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190464783
- eISBN:
- 9780190464806
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190464783.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by ...
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What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by leading cognitive scientists as they examine the work of one of cognitive science’s most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor. Newly commissioned chapters by Noam Chomsky, Tom Bever, Merrill Garrett, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Zenon Pylyshyn, Janet Fodor, Randy C. Gallistel, Ernie Lepore, Mary C. Potter, Lila R. Gleitman, and others, put in perspective Fodor’s contribution to cognitive science by focusing on three main themes: the nature of concepts, the modularity of language and vision, and the language of thought. This is a one-of-a-kind series of essays on cognitive science and on Fodor. In this volume, Chomsky contrasts his view of modularity with that of Fodor’s; Bever discusses the nature of consciousness, particularly regarding language perception; Garrett reassesses his view of modularity in language production; Pylyshyn presents his view of the connection between visual perception and conceptual attainment; Gallistel proposes what the biological bases of the computational theory of mind might be; and Piattelli-Palmarini discusses Fodor’s views on conceptual nativism. These and many other key figures of cognitive science are brought together, for the first time, to discuss their work in relation to that of Fodor’s, who is responsible for advancing many of cognitive science’s most important hypotheses. This volume—for students and advanced researchers of cognitive science—is bound to become one of the classics in the field.Less
What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by leading cognitive scientists as they examine the work of one of cognitive science’s most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor. Newly commissioned chapters by Noam Chomsky, Tom Bever, Merrill Garrett, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Zenon Pylyshyn, Janet Fodor, Randy C. Gallistel, Ernie Lepore, Mary C. Potter, Lila R. Gleitman, and others, put in perspective Fodor’s contribution to cognitive science by focusing on three main themes: the nature of concepts, the modularity of language and vision, and the language of thought. This is a one-of-a-kind series of essays on cognitive science and on Fodor. In this volume, Chomsky contrasts his view of modularity with that of Fodor’s; Bever discusses the nature of consciousness, particularly regarding language perception; Garrett reassesses his view of modularity in language production; Pylyshyn presents his view of the connection between visual perception and conceptual attainment; Gallistel proposes what the biological bases of the computational theory of mind might be; and Piattelli-Palmarini discusses Fodor’s views on conceptual nativism. These and many other key figures of cognitive science are brought together, for the first time, to discuss their work in relation to that of Fodor’s, who is responsible for advancing many of cognitive science’s most important hypotheses. This volume—for students and advanced researchers of cognitive science—is bound to become one of the classics in the field.
Lance Rips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195183054
- eISBN:
- 9780199865109
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183054.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This book addresses how we are able to think about abstract possibilities: How can we think about math, despite the immateriality of numbers, sets, and other mathematical entities? How are we able to ...
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This book addresses how we are able to think about abstract possibilities: How can we think about math, despite the immateriality of numbers, sets, and other mathematical entities? How are we able to think about what might have happened if history had taken a different turn? Questions like these turn up in nearly every part of cognitive science, and they are central to our human position of having only limited knowledge concerning what is or might be true. Because we cannot experience hypothetical or future events or abstract concepts, we cannot use our ordinary sense of perception or memory to think about these subjects, so what underlies our ability to make these assumptions? The book explores people's beliefs about possibilities as they arise in the context of basic concepts, including numbers, causality, and reasons. It argues that beliefs about these concepts cannot be meaningfully reduced to perceptual information, remembered instances, or probabilities. It also claims that analogies to cognitive perception models are equally unhelpful in understanding what makes thinking of possibilities possible. Instead, the book makes the case that our abilities here depend on the intrinsic hardwiring of the human mind.Less
This book addresses how we are able to think about abstract possibilities: How can we think about math, despite the immateriality of numbers, sets, and other mathematical entities? How are we able to think about what might have happened if history had taken a different turn? Questions like these turn up in nearly every part of cognitive science, and they are central to our human position of having only limited knowledge concerning what is or might be true. Because we cannot experience hypothetical or future events or abstract concepts, we cannot use our ordinary sense of perception or memory to think about these subjects, so what underlies our ability to make these assumptions? The book explores people's beliefs about possibilities as they arise in the context of basic concepts, including numbers, causality, and reasons. It argues that beliefs about these concepts cannot be meaningfully reduced to perceptual information, remembered instances, or probabilities. It also claims that analogies to cognitive perception models are equally unhelpful in understanding what makes thinking of possibilities possible. Instead, the book makes the case that our abilities here depend on the intrinsic hardwiring of the human mind.
Katherine Nelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195169539
- eISBN:
- 9780199847204
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195169539.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter presents an overview of the concepts of representation in cognitive psychology and developmental psychology. It then discusses theories based on levels of representation and their ...
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This chapter presents an overview of the concepts of representation in cognitive psychology and developmental psychology. It then discusses theories based on levels of representation and their development in childhood. The chapter begins with the function of representation in human cognition as conceptualized by cognitive psychologist and psycholinguist George Miller, who declared that language serves the representational function for humans that is otherwise served for non-language creatures. But it leaves open the question of how—if at all—representation is managed by nonhumans or by non-language using humans, such as pre-linguistic infants and very young children. These questions reflect contentious issues in cognitive science based on different computational models of symbolic processing and neural network processing. Specific alleged domains such as space, number, object knowledge, and theory of mind are integrated in the knowledge structures of the early years and serve as background to the pragmatics of everyday life, organized in terms of domains of practice.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the concepts of representation in cognitive psychology and developmental psychology. It then discusses theories based on levels of representation and their development in childhood. The chapter begins with the function of representation in human cognition as conceptualized by cognitive psychologist and psycholinguist George Miller, who declared that language serves the representational function for humans that is otherwise served for non-language creatures. But it leaves open the question of how—if at all—representation is managed by nonhumans or by non-language using humans, such as pre-linguistic infants and very young children. These questions reflect contentious issues in cognitive science based on different computational models of symbolic processing and neural network processing. Specific alleged domains such as space, number, object knowledge, and theory of mind are integrated in the knowledge structures of the early years and serve as background to the pragmatics of everyday life, organized in terms of domains of practice.
Martin V. Butz and Esther F. Kutter
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198739692
- eISBN:
- 9780191834462
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739692.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures, Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Science has come a long way – even the old Greeks have put forward intricate thoughts about what our minds can know and what seems inaccessible. This chapter addresses the historical ...
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Cognitive Science has come a long way – even the old Greeks have put forward intricate thoughts about what our minds can know and what seems inaccessible. This chapter addresses the historical development of cognitive science. The fundamental homunculus and qualia problems are introduced, and tentative answers from embodied cognitive science are sketched-out. A look at biology emphasizes that our bodies and brains are evolutionarily shaped, making us ready to develop our minds. Psychologically, minds develop and adapt given environmental feedback, striving to optimize behavior. Only by means of constructive, generative processes, however, can a behavior-oriented “understanding” of the environment develop. These “understanding”-oriented structures also make our mind language ready. Finally, in order to comprehend how the human mind actually comes into being, based on the considered principles, it is necessary to pursue functional, computational, and where possible, algorithmic and hardware perspectives in the sense of David Marr’s three levels of understanding.Less
Cognitive Science has come a long way – even the old Greeks have put forward intricate thoughts about what our minds can know and what seems inaccessible. This chapter addresses the historical development of cognitive science. The fundamental homunculus and qualia problems are introduced, and tentative answers from embodied cognitive science are sketched-out. A look at biology emphasizes that our bodies and brains are evolutionarily shaped, making us ready to develop our minds. Psychologically, minds develop and adapt given environmental feedback, striving to optimize behavior. Only by means of constructive, generative processes, however, can a behavior-oriented “understanding” of the environment develop. These “understanding”-oriented structures also make our mind language ready. Finally, in order to comprehend how the human mind actually comes into being, based on the considered principles, it is necessary to pursue functional, computational, and where possible, algorithmic and hardware perspectives in the sense of David Marr’s three levels of understanding.
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262013840
- eISBN:
- 9780262269438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013840.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter reviews how human reasoning and decision making evolves from the cognitive sciences, challenging basic assumptions of objectivism-rationalism along with ethical models based on reason. ...
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This chapter reviews how human reasoning and decision making evolves from the cognitive sciences, challenging basic assumptions of objectivism-rationalism along with ethical models based on reason. It emphasizes the significance of effortless attention in human reasoning and suggests that virtue ethics is preferable to authoritative thinking. By examining an early text from China, entitled “Analects of Confucius,” the chapter demonstrates how effortless attention and action can be developed and incorporated into moral behavior. This text is an important source of evidence regarding the earliest examples of virtue ethic in world literature. These findings also reveal the presence of different human thinking systems that work on implicit and explicit levels, with knowledge operating at the implicit level.Less
This chapter reviews how human reasoning and decision making evolves from the cognitive sciences, challenging basic assumptions of objectivism-rationalism along with ethical models based on reason. It emphasizes the significance of effortless attention in human reasoning and suggests that virtue ethics is preferable to authoritative thinking. By examining an early text from China, entitled “Analects of Confucius,” the chapter demonstrates how effortless attention and action can be developed and incorporated into moral behavior. This text is an important source of evidence regarding the earliest examples of virtue ethic in world literature. These findings also reveal the presence of different human thinking systems that work on implicit and explicit levels, with knowledge operating at the implicit level.
Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262529365
- eISBN:
- 9780262335492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.003.0006
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter looks at Marvin Minsky's and Seymour Papert's recent proposal to study the mind as a society, which takes the patchwork architecture of cognition as a central element. Minsky and Papert ...
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This chapter looks at Marvin Minsky's and Seymour Papert's recent proposal to study the mind as a society, which takes the patchwork architecture of cognition as a central element. Minsky and Papert present a view in which minds consist of many “agents” whose abilities are quite circumscribed: each agent taken individually operates only in a microworld of small-scale or “toy” problems. This model of the mind as a society of numerous agents is intended to encompass a multiplicity of approaches to the study of cognition, ranging from distributed, self-organizing networks to the classical, cognitivist conception of localized, serial symbolic processing. The society of mind purports to be, then, something of a middle way in present cognitive science. This middle way challenges a homogenous model of the mind, whether in the form of distributed networks at one extreme or symbolic processers at the other extreme.Less
This chapter looks at Marvin Minsky's and Seymour Papert's recent proposal to study the mind as a society, which takes the patchwork architecture of cognition as a central element. Minsky and Papert present a view in which minds consist of many “agents” whose abilities are quite circumscribed: each agent taken individually operates only in a microworld of small-scale or “toy” problems. This model of the mind as a society of numerous agents is intended to encompass a multiplicity of approaches to the study of cognition, ranging from distributed, self-organizing networks to the classical, cognitivist conception of localized, serial symbolic processing. The society of mind purports to be, then, something of a middle way in present cognitive science. This middle way challenges a homogenous model of the mind, whether in the form of distributed networks at one extreme or symbolic processers at the other extreme.
