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This book brings together a number of diverse strands of contemporary research that have focused on knowledge ascriptions. One such strand is the ‘linguistic turn’ according to which knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language, together with the best linguistic theory of such ascriptions, provide important evidence for epistemological theorizing. Another is the ‘cognitive turn’ in which research in cognitive science is invoked to shed light on the nature of knowledge ascriptions. Finally, recent years have witnessed a ‘social turn’ within which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions are considered in relation to the growing field of social epistemology. This introductory chapter discusses each of these three turns. It then presents an overview of the subsequent chapters.

Some definitions of naturalistic epistemology exclude the possibility of a priori warrant, but a more plausible definition leaves room for it. The general approach to warrant favored here is two‐stage reliabilism, which is reformulated from earlier papers. The present proposal is that belief‐forming processes of a “ratiocinative” sort may be a priori warranters if they are reliable, free of perceptual experience, and part of one's basic cognitive architecture. Cognitive science is relevant to determining the possibility of a priori warranters because it can shed light on the availability of belief‐forming processes that might meet the foregoing requirements. A review of scientific findings on arithmetic cognition suggests that these requirements are indeed met.

Is cognitive science relevant to metaphysics? The realist metaphysician aiming to describe the objective structure of reality itself may think that cognitive science is largely irrelevant. But Goldman argues that cognitive science is relevant, insofar as some arguments in metaphysics are premised on intuitions, and cognitive science is relevant to assessing both what people find intuitive, and whether a given intuition should be respected or debunked. This is persuasive. But Goldman’s picture would benefit from two adjustments (or perhaps just elaborations). First, the relevance of cognitive science is not specific to metaphysics, but rather generic to any intellectual inquiry that invokes intuitions. Secondly—and more importantly—metaphysics itself plays a crucial role alongside cognitive science in assessing intuitions. For a crucial part of assessment is determining which intuitions should be respected and which debunked, and that involves determining whether the intuition is tracking reality. So rather than being situated as in danger of being debunked, metaphysics should be situated as a needed partner in the very project of debunking.

This chapter argues that empirical findings in cognitive science can play a significant evidential role in an optimal methodology for metaphysics. It does not propose any radical metaphysical methodology or any wholesale replacement of traditional methods. Rather, it offers a supplement to traditional methods. The chapter proposes a general template (or two) for metaphysical methodology under which cognitive scientific considerations might become routine or commonplace factors in realist metaphysics, not just isolated or occasional factors. This template is applied to four problems in metaphysics: the passage of time, moral value, natural kinds, and theism.

This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the metaphysics of mind, but this volume mainly concerns the relevance of cognitive science to phenomena that are not themselves mental. The volume is thus a departure from standard analytical metaphysics. Among the issues on which results from cognitive science are brought to bear are the metaphysics of time, of morality, of meaning, of modality, of objects, and of natural kinds, as well as whether God exists. Some chapters point out how results from cognitive science can be deployed to debunk certain intuitions, and some point out how results can be deployed to help vindicate certain intuitions.

This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reformed” way.

Many philosophers insist that the revisionary metaphysician—i.e., the metaphysician who offers a metaphysical theory which conflicts with folk intuitions—bears a special burden to explain why certain folk intuitions are mistaken. This chapter shows how evidence from cognitive science can help the revisionist discharge this explanatory burden. Focusing on composition and persistence, it argues that empirical evidence indicates that the folk operate with a promiscuous teleomentalist view of composition and persistence. The folk view deserves to be debunked. This illustrates one key role cognitive science can play in metaphysics; namely by helping the revisionary metaphysician discharge the explanatory burden of providing a plausible explanation of how the folk have gone wrong.

Parts of philosophy employ intuitions or intuitive judgments, and this intuitional methodology is the subject of recent criticism, especially by experimental philosophers. Is the methodology sound or shoddy? Does it provide reliable evidence; and if so, what is it evidence of? Further questions concern the nature of the methodology. Is it fundamentally a priori, or does it have a different nature? (And how should we characterize the a priori? What alternative epistemic “natures” should be considered?) Cognitive science—an empirical science, obviously—has an important role to play in addressing these questions. The method involves, in large part, psychological processes by which intuitors (either philosophers themselves or their non-philosophical respondents) arrive at classification judgments. Since classification judgment are applications of concepts in the respondents’ minds, the nature and soundness (e.g., reliability) of the concept application process is a central issue; and this is a topic within the purview of cognitive science.

This chapter develops a style of argument that realists can use to defend the methodological propriety of appealing to a given range of intuitions. Unbunking arguments are an epistemically positive analogue of debunking arguments, and they revolve around the claim that the processes dominantly responsible for beliefs about a given domain are reliable. However, processes cannot always be assessed for accuracy with respect to the relevant domain, so this chapter also develops the cross-domain strategy, which involves arguing that processes known to be reliable in one domain are similarly reliable with respect to a different domain. The chapter ends by unbunking our metaphysical intuitions about mutual supervenience by way of a cross-domain strategy that draws on cognitive scientific research into our ability to track correlations.

Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot be explained without reference to the objects themselves. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. Just as with moral beliefs, the adaptive value of our object beliefs can be explained without assuming that the beliefs are accurate. The chapter then explores the prospects for another sort of vindication of our object beliefs—which involves “bootstrapping” from our experiences of midsized objects—and defends bootstrapping maneuvers against a variety of objections. Finally, an explanatory constraint on bootstrapping is articulated and defended, and a variety of attempts to respond to debunking arguments are shown to run afoul of the constraint.

First, a theoretical background to the volume’s topic, extended epistemology, is provided by a brief outline of its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent and more egalitarian thinking in the cognitive sciences about the nature of human cognizing and its bounds—viz., the so-called ‘extended cognition’ program, and the related idea of an ‘extended mind’—has important and interesting ramifications in epistemology. Second, an overview is provided of the papers included as chapters in the volume. The sixteen contributions are divided (broadly) into two categories: those that engage with foundational issues to do with extended epistemology, and those that pursue applications of extended epistemology to new areas of research.