Kathleen V. Wilkes
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240808
- eISBN:
- 9780191680281
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing ...
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This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity and dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science.Less
This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity and dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science.
L. Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236047
- eISBN:
- 9780191679179
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the ...
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This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.Less
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693702
- eISBN:
- 9780191741265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book brings together a number of diverse strands of contemporary research that have focused on knowledge ascriptions. One such strand is the ‘linguistic turn’ according to which knowledge ...
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This book brings together a number of diverse strands of contemporary research that have focused on knowledge ascriptions. One such strand is the ‘linguistic turn’ according to which knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language, together with the best linguistic theory of such ascriptions, provide important evidence for epistemological theorizing. Another is the ‘cognitive turn’ in which research in cognitive science is invoked to shed light on the nature of knowledge ascriptions. Finally, recent years have witnessed a ‘social turn’ within which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions are considered in relation to the growing field of social epistemology. This introductory chapter discusses each of these three turns. It then presents an overview of the subsequent chapters.Less
This book brings together a number of diverse strands of contemporary research that have focused on knowledge ascriptions. One such strand is the ‘linguistic turn’ according to which knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language, together with the best linguistic theory of such ascriptions, provide important evidence for epistemological theorizing. Another is the ‘cognitive turn’ in which research in cognitive science is invoked to shed light on the nature of knowledge ascriptions. Finally, recent years have witnessed a ‘social turn’ within which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions are considered in relation to the growing field of social epistemology. This introductory chapter discusses each of these three turns. It then presents an overview of the subsequent chapters.
Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147667
- eISBN:
- 9780199785865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147669.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the most important issue for the cognitive science of reasoning is whether deduction provides a computational-level theory of a substantial amount of everyday, commonsense ...
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This chapter argues that the most important issue for the cognitive science of reasoning is whether deduction provides a computational-level theory of a substantial amount of everyday, commonsense thought. The chapter is organized as follows. It begins by outlining what deduction is, in abstract terms, and then considers various ways in which it can be related to human reasoning, using the framework of D. Marr's levels of explanation. Three sophisticated lines of arguments are developed from epistemology, AI, and the psychology of reasoning. Each argument supports the conclusion that deduction has no significant role in commonsense reasoning. The implications of rejecting deduction for the cognitive science of human reasoning are considered.Less
This chapter argues that the most important issue for the cognitive science of reasoning is whether deduction provides a computational-level theory of a substantial amount of everyday, commonsense thought. The chapter is organized as follows. It begins by outlining what deduction is, in abstract terms, and then considers various ways in which it can be related to human reasoning, using the framework of D. Marr's levels of explanation. Three sophisticated lines of arguments are developed from epistemology, AI, and the psychology of reasoning. Each argument supports the conclusion that deduction has no significant role in commonsense reasoning. The implications of rejecting deduction for the cognitive science of human reasoning are considered.
Bede Rundle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236917
- eISBN:
- 9780191679414
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236917.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book challenges the quasi-mechanical view of human action that is dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind. A materialist view of the mind and a causal theory of action fit together ...
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This book challenges the quasi-mechanical view of human action that is dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind. A materialist view of the mind and a causal theory of action fit together conveniently: the notion of action as caused by thoughts and desires allows philosophers to accommodate explanations of action within a framework that is congenial to scientific understanding, and the conception of mind as physical enables them to make sense of causal transactions between the two domains. This book offers an alternative approach. Compelling reasons are given for demoting causation and for shifting the emphasis to the role played by behaviour in accounts of thought, belief, desire, intention, freedom, and other key concepts. The book's approach sheds fresh light not only on human behaviour but also on animal mentality, and has important implications for the feasibility of current programmes in cognitive science.Less
This book challenges the quasi-mechanical view of human action that is dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind. A materialist view of the mind and a causal theory of action fit together conveniently: the notion of action as caused by thoughts and desires allows philosophers to accommodate explanations of action within a framework that is congenial to scientific understanding, and the conception of mind as physical enables them to make sense of causal transactions between the two domains. This book offers an alternative approach. Compelling reasons are given for demoting causation and for shifting the emphasis to the role played by behaviour in accounts of thought, belief, desire, intention, freedom, and other key concepts. The book's approach sheds fresh light not only on human behaviour but also on animal mentality, and has important implications for the feasibility of current programmes in cognitive science.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138795
- eISBN:
- 9780199833252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138791.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Some definitions of naturalistic epistemology exclude the possibility of a priori warrant, but a more plausible definition leaves room for it. The general approach to warrant favored here is ...
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Some definitions of naturalistic epistemology exclude the possibility of a priori warrant, but a more plausible definition leaves room for it. The general approach to warrant favored here is two‐stage reliabilism, which is reformulated from earlier papers. The present proposal is that belief‐forming processes of a “ratiocinative” sort may be a priori warranters if they are reliable, free of perceptual experience, and part of one's basic cognitive architecture. Cognitive science is relevant to determining the possibility of a priori warranters because it can shed light on the availability of belief‐forming processes that might meet the foregoing requirements. A review of scientific findings on arithmetic cognition suggests that these requirements are indeed met.Less
Some definitions of naturalistic epistemology exclude the possibility of a priori warrant, but a more plausible definition leaves room for it. The general approach to warrant favored here is two‐stage reliabilism, which is reformulated from earlier papers. The present proposal is that belief‐forming processes of a “ratiocinative” sort may be a priori warranters if they are reliable, free of perceptual experience, and part of one's basic cognitive architecture. Cognitive science is relevant to determining the possibility of a priori warranters because it can shed light on the availability of belief‐forming processes that might meet the foregoing requirements. A review of scientific findings on arithmetic cognition suggests that these requirements are indeed met.
Renee Elio (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147667
- eISBN:
- 9780199785865
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147669.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rationality. While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a ...
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This book addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rationality. While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unified cognitive map, this book offers novel, even paradoxical, views of the relationship. The book considers what constitutes human rationality, behavior, and intelligence, while covering diverse areas of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science.Less
This book addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rationality. While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unified cognitive map, this book offers novel, even paradoxical, views of the relationship. The book considers what constitutes human rationality, behavior, and intelligence, while covering diverse areas of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science.
Jonathan Schaffer
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190639679
- eISBN:
- 9780190639709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Is cognitive science relevant to metaphysics? The realist metaphysician aiming to describe the objective structure of reality itself may think that cognitive science is largely irrelevant. But ...
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Is cognitive science relevant to metaphysics? The realist metaphysician aiming to describe the objective structure of reality itself may think that cognitive science is largely irrelevant. But Goldman argues that cognitive science is relevant, insofar as some arguments in metaphysics are premised on intuitions, and cognitive science is relevant to assessing both what people find intuitive, and whether a given intuition should be respected or debunked. This is persuasive. But Goldman’s picture would benefit from two adjustments (or perhaps just elaborations). First, the relevance of cognitive science is not specific to metaphysics, but rather generic to any intellectual inquiry that invokes intuitions. Secondly—and more importantly—metaphysics itself plays a crucial role alongside cognitive science in assessing intuitions. For a crucial part of assessment is determining which intuitions should be respected and which debunked, and that involves determining whether the intuition is tracking reality. So rather than being situated as in danger of being debunked, metaphysics should be situated as a needed partner in the very project of debunking.Less
Is cognitive science relevant to metaphysics? The realist metaphysician aiming to describe the objective structure of reality itself may think that cognitive science is largely irrelevant. But Goldman argues that cognitive science is relevant, insofar as some arguments in metaphysics are premised on intuitions, and cognitive science is relevant to assessing both what people find intuitive, and whether a given intuition should be respected or debunked. This is persuasive. But Goldman’s picture would benefit from two adjustments (or perhaps just elaborations). First, the relevance of cognitive science is not specific to metaphysics, but rather generic to any intellectual inquiry that invokes intuitions. Secondly—and more importantly—metaphysics itself plays a crucial role alongside cognitive science in assessing intuitions. For a crucial part of assessment is determining which intuitions should be respected and which debunked, and that involves determining whether the intuition is tracking reality. So rather than being situated as in danger of being debunked, metaphysics should be situated as a needed partner in the very project of debunking.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198729242
- eISBN:
- 9780191796258
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that empirical findings in cognitive science can play a significant evidential role in an optimal methodology for metaphysics. It does not propose any radical metaphysical ...
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This chapter argues that empirical findings in cognitive science can play a significant evidential role in an optimal methodology for metaphysics. It does not propose any radical metaphysical methodology or any wholesale replacement of traditional methods. Rather, it offers a supplement to traditional methods. The chapter proposes a general template (or two) for metaphysical methodology under which cognitive scientific considerations might become routine or commonplace factors in realist metaphysics, not just isolated or occasional factors. This template is applied to four problems in metaphysics: the passage of time, moral value, natural kinds, and theism.Less
This chapter argues that empirical findings in cognitive science can play a significant evidential role in an optimal methodology for metaphysics. It does not propose any radical metaphysical methodology or any wholesale replacement of traditional methods. Rather, it offers a supplement to traditional methods. The chapter proposes a general template (or two) for metaphysical methodology under which cognitive scientific considerations might become routine or commonplace factors in realist metaphysics, not just isolated or occasional factors. This template is applied to four problems in metaphysics: the passage of time, moral value, natural kinds, and theism.
Alvin I. Goldman and Brian P. McLaughlin
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190639679
- eISBN:
- 9780190639709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the ...
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This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the metaphysics of mind, but this volume mainly concerns the relevance of cognitive science to phenomena that are not themselves mental. The volume is thus a departure from standard analytical metaphysics. Among the issues on which results from cognitive science are brought to bear are the metaphysics of time, of morality, of meaning, of modality, of objects, and of natural kinds, as well as whether God exists. Some chapters point out how results from cognitive science can be deployed to debunk certain intuitions, and some point out how results can be deployed to help vindicate certain intuitions.Less
This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the metaphysics of mind, but this volume mainly concerns the relevance of cognitive science to phenomena that are not themselves mental. The volume is thus a departure from standard analytical metaphysics. Among the issues on which results from cognitive science are brought to bear are the metaphysics of time, of morality, of meaning, of modality, of objects, and of natural kinds, as well as whether God exists. Some chapters point out how results from cognitive science can be deployed to debunk certain intuitions, and some point out how results can be deployed to help vindicate certain intuitions.
Kathleen V. Wilkes
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240808
- eISBN:
- 9780191680281
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240808.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter offers a self-indulgent account of the different views of the person by Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science with its ‘computer model of mind’. It ...
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This chapter offers a self-indulgent account of the different views of the person by Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science with its ‘computer model of mind’. It suggests that people are returning to the Aristotelian model of the individual, knowingly or not; and that they are right in doing so. The models discussed provide a background in which scientific and philosophical theories and conjectures about human motivation can be built.Less
This chapter offers a self-indulgent account of the different views of the person by Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science with its ‘computer model of mind’. It suggests that people are returning to the Aristotelian model of the individual, knowingly or not; and that they are right in doing so. The models discussed provide a background in which scientific and philosophical theories and conjectures about human motivation can be built.
Mark Baker and Dean Zimmerman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190639679
- eISBN:
- 9780190639709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious ...
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This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reformed” way.Less
This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reformed” way.
David Rose
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190639679
- eISBN:
- 9780190639709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Many philosophers insist that the revisionary metaphysician—i.e., the metaphysician who offers a metaphysical theory which conflicts with folk intuitions—bears a special burden to explain why certain ...
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Many philosophers insist that the revisionary metaphysician—i.e., the metaphysician who offers a metaphysical theory which conflicts with folk intuitions—bears a special burden to explain why certain folk intuitions are mistaken. This chapter shows how evidence from cognitive science can help the revisionist discharge this explanatory burden. Focusing on composition and persistence, it argues that empirical evidence indicates that the folk operate with a promiscuous teleomentalist view of composition and persistence. The folk view deserves to be debunked. This illustrates one key role cognitive science can play in metaphysics; namely by helping the revisionary metaphysician discharge the explanatory burden of providing a plausible explanation of how the folk have gone wrong.Less
Many philosophers insist that the revisionary metaphysician—i.e., the metaphysician who offers a metaphysical theory which conflicts with folk intuitions—bears a special burden to explain why certain folk intuitions are mistaken. This chapter shows how evidence from cognitive science can help the revisionist discharge this explanatory burden. Focusing on composition and persistence, it argues that empirical evidence indicates that the folk operate with a promiscuous teleomentalist view of composition and persistence. The folk view deserves to be debunked. This illustrates one key role cognitive science can play in metaphysics; namely by helping the revisionary metaphysician discharge the explanatory burden of providing a plausible explanation of how the folk have gone wrong.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199695331
- eISBN:
- 9780191758218
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Parts of philosophy employ intuitions or intuitive judgments, and this intuitional methodology is the subject of recent criticism, especially by experimental philosophers. Is the methodology sound or ...
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Parts of philosophy employ intuitions or intuitive judgments, and this intuitional methodology is the subject of recent criticism, especially by experimental philosophers. Is the methodology sound or shoddy? Does it provide reliable evidence; and if so, what is it evidence of? Further questions concern the nature of the methodology. Is it fundamentally a priori, or does it have a different nature? (And how should we characterize the a priori? What alternative epistemic “natures” should be considered?) Cognitive science—an empirical science, obviously—has an important role to play in addressing these questions. The method involves, in large part, psychological processes by which intuitors (either philosophers themselves or their non-philosophical respondents) arrive at classification judgments. Since classification judgment are applications of concepts in the respondents’ minds, the nature and soundness (e.g., reliability) of the concept application process is a central issue; and this is a topic within the purview of cognitive science.Less
Parts of philosophy employ intuitions or intuitive judgments, and this intuitional methodology is the subject of recent criticism, especially by experimental philosophers. Is the methodology sound or shoddy? Does it provide reliable evidence; and if so, what is it evidence of? Further questions concern the nature of the methodology. Is it fundamentally a priori, or does it have a different nature? (And how should we characterize the a priori? What alternative epistemic “natures” should be considered?) Cognitive science—an empirical science, obviously—has an important role to play in addressing these questions. The method involves, in large part, psychological processes by which intuitors (either philosophers themselves or their non-philosophical respondents) arrive at classification judgments. Since classification judgment are applications of concepts in the respondents’ minds, the nature and soundness (e.g., reliability) of the concept application process is a central issue; and this is a topic within the purview of cognitive science.
Christopher Frugé
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190639679
- eISBN:
- 9780190639709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter develops a style of argument that realists can use to defend the methodological propriety of appealing to a given range of intuitions. Unbunking arguments are an epistemically positive ...
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This chapter develops a style of argument that realists can use to defend the methodological propriety of appealing to a given range of intuitions. Unbunking arguments are an epistemically positive analogue of debunking arguments, and they revolve around the claim that the processes dominantly responsible for beliefs about a given domain are reliable. However, processes cannot always be assessed for accuracy with respect to the relevant domain, so this chapter also develops the cross-domain strategy, which involves arguing that processes known to be reliable in one domain are similarly reliable with respect to a different domain. The chapter ends by unbunking our metaphysical intuitions about mutual supervenience by way of a cross-domain strategy that draws on cognitive scientific research into our ability to track correlations.Less
This chapter develops a style of argument that realists can use to defend the methodological propriety of appealing to a given range of intuitions. Unbunking arguments are an epistemically positive analogue of debunking arguments, and they revolve around the claim that the processes dominantly responsible for beliefs about a given domain are reliable. However, processes cannot always be assessed for accuracy with respect to the relevant domain, so this chapter also develops the cross-domain strategy, which involves arguing that processes known to be reliable in one domain are similarly reliable with respect to a different domain. The chapter ends by unbunking our metaphysical intuitions about mutual supervenience by way of a cross-domain strategy that draws on cognitive scientific research into our ability to track correlations.
C. A. J. Coady
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235514
- eISBN:
- 9780191597220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235518.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The eighteenth‐century Scots philosopher Thomas Reid's account of testimony is one of his most interesting and original contributions. Reid's analogy between the epistemic roles of perception and of ...
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The eighteenth‐century Scots philosopher Thomas Reid's account of testimony is one of his most interesting and original contributions. Reid's analogy between the epistemic roles of perception and of testimony is explored in this chapter and its consequences for the view that testimonial knowledge can be direct (or non‐inferential) are discussed. Coady also examines Reid's resort to epistemic first principles and his placing of reliance upon testimony amongst them.Less
The eighteenth‐century Scots philosopher Thomas Reid's account of testimony is one of his most interesting and original contributions. Reid's analogy between the epistemic roles of perception and of testimony is explored in this chapter and its consequences for the view that testimonial knowledge can be direct (or non‐inferential) are discussed. Coady also examines Reid's resort to epistemic first principles and his placing of reliance upon testimony amongst them.
J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198801764
- eISBN:
- 9780191840357
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198801764.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of ...
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The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of socially extended epistemology is that epistemic states such as beliefs, justification, and knowledge can be collectively realized by groups or communities of individuals. Typical examples that are being studied in the literature include collective memory in old partners, problem-solving by juries, and the behaviors of hiring committees, scientific research teams, and intelligence agencies. This volume attempts to further our understanding of socially extended knowledge while also exploring its potential practical and societal impact by inviting perspectives not just from philosophy but from cognitive science, computer science, Web science, and cybernetics too. Contributions to the volume mostly fall within two broad categories: (i) foundational issues within socially extended epistemology (including elaborations on, defences and criticisms of core aspects of socially extended epistemology), and (ii) applications and new directions, where themes in socially extended epistemology are connected to these other areas of research. The volume is accordingly divided into two parts corresponding to these broad categories. The topics themselves are of great conceptual interest, and wider interdisciplinary perspectives suggest many connections with social concerns and policy-making.Less
The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of socially extended epistemology is that epistemic states such as beliefs, justification, and knowledge can be collectively realized by groups or communities of individuals. Typical examples that are being studied in the literature include collective memory in old partners, problem-solving by juries, and the behaviors of hiring committees, scientific research teams, and intelligence agencies. This volume attempts to further our understanding of socially extended knowledge while also exploring its potential practical and societal impact by inviting perspectives not just from philosophy but from cognitive science, computer science, Web science, and cybernetics too. Contributions to the volume mostly fall within two broad categories: (i) foundational issues within socially extended epistemology (including elaborations on, defences and criticisms of core aspects of socially extended epistemology), and (ii) applications and new directions, where themes in socially extended epistemology are connected to these other areas of research. The volume is accordingly divided into two parts corresponding to these broad categories. The topics themselves are of great conceptual interest, and wider interdisciplinary perspectives suggest many connections with social concerns and policy-making.
Daniel Z. Korman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190639679
- eISBN:
- 9780190639709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot ...
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Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot be explained without reference to the objects themselves. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. Just as with moral beliefs, the adaptive value of our object beliefs can be explained without assuming that the beliefs are accurate. The chapter then explores the prospects for another sort of vindication of our object beliefs—which involves “bootstrapping” from our experiences of midsized objects—and defends bootstrapping maneuvers against a variety of objections. Finally, an explanatory constraint on bootstrapping is articulated and defended, and a variety of attempts to respond to debunking arguments are shown to run afoul of the constraint.Less
Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot be explained without reference to the objects themselves. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. Just as with moral beliefs, the adaptive value of our object beliefs can be explained without assuming that the beliefs are accurate. The chapter then explores the prospects for another sort of vindication of our object beliefs—which involves “bootstrapping” from our experiences of midsized objects—and defends bootstrapping maneuvers against a variety of objections. Finally, an explanatory constraint on bootstrapping is articulated and defended, and a variety of attempts to respond to debunking arguments are shown to run afoul of the constraint.
J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198769811
- eISBN:
- 9780191822643
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198769811.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
One of the most important research programs in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition. In this area of study, features of a subject’s cognitive environment can, in certain ...
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One of the most important research programs in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition. In this area of study, features of a subject’s cognitive environment can, in certain conditions, become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea. The book brings together papers written by a range of distinguished and emerging academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of an extended epistemology. The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology as well as from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume examines the applications of this idea, and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include the relevance of Chinese philosophy, the ethical ramifications of extended epistemology, and its import to the epistemology of education, moral ethics, and emerging digital technologies.Less
One of the most important research programs in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition. In this area of study, features of a subject’s cognitive environment can, in certain conditions, become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea. The book brings together papers written by a range of distinguished and emerging academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of an extended epistemology. The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology as well as from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume examines the applications of this idea, and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include the relevance of Chinese philosophy, the ethical ramifications of extended epistemology, and its import to the epistemology of education, moral ethics, and emerging digital technologies.
J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198769811
- eISBN:
- 9780191822643
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
First, a theoretical background to the volume’s topic, extended epistemology, is provided by a brief outline of its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is ...
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First, a theoretical background to the volume’s topic, extended epistemology, is provided by a brief outline of its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent and more egalitarian thinking in the cognitive sciences about the nature of human cognizing and its bounds—viz., the so-called ‘extended cognition’ program, and the related idea of an ‘extended mind’—has important and interesting ramifications in epistemology. Second, an overview is provided of the papers included as chapters in the volume. The sixteen contributions are divided (broadly) into two categories: those that engage with foundational issues to do with extended epistemology, and those that pursue applications of extended epistemology to new areas of research.Less
First, a theoretical background to the volume’s topic, extended epistemology, is provided by a brief outline of its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent and more egalitarian thinking in the cognitive sciences about the nature of human cognizing and its bounds—viz., the so-called ‘extended cognition’ program, and the related idea of an ‘extended mind’—has important and interesting ramifications in epistemology. Second, an overview is provided of the papers included as chapters in the volume. The sixteen contributions are divided (broadly) into two categories: those that engage with foundational issues to do with extended epistemology, and those that pursue applications of extended epistemology to new areas of research.
