Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545995
- eISBN:
- 9780191719929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops and defends a new account of essentially indexical, de se, or self-locating belief with the aim of using it in later chapters to clarify the analogy between self-locating ...
More
This chapter develops and defends a new account of essentially indexical, de se, or self-locating belief with the aim of using it in later chapters to clarify the analogy between self-locating information and phenomenal information. The account is a modified version of David Lewis's analysis of self-locating information in terms of centered possible worlds, which are abstract objects consisting of a possible world plus a designated person and time in the world. It is argued that the modified analysis is better able than Lewis's to account for the way knowledge and belief change over time, and for one person's knowledge and belief about the knowledge and belief of others. The analysis is applied to two famous examples from the literature on essentially self-locating belief — David Lewis's case of the two omniscient gods, and Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The chapter concludes with an appendix that sketches some of the formal details.Less
This chapter develops and defends a new account of essentially indexical, de se, or self-locating belief with the aim of using it in later chapters to clarify the analogy between self-locating information and phenomenal information. The account is a modified version of David Lewis's analysis of self-locating information in terms of centered possible worlds, which are abstract objects consisting of a possible world plus a designated person and time in the world. It is argued that the modified analysis is better able than Lewis's to account for the way knowledge and belief change over time, and for one person's knowledge and belief about the knowledge and belief of others. The analysis is applied to two famous examples from the literature on essentially self-locating belief — David Lewis's case of the two omniscient gods, and Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The chapter concludes with an appendix that sketches some of the formal details.
Robert Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198713265
- eISBN:
- 9780191781711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A defense of a thesis about self-locating attitudes that Clas Weber has labeled “Propositionalism”: to be ignorant of where in the world one is, what time it is, or who one is is always to be ...
More
A defense of a thesis about self-locating attitudes that Clas Weber has labeled “Propositionalism”: to be ignorant of where in the world one is, what time it is, or who one is is always to be ignorant of what possible world is actual. The thesis is articulated in the context of David Lewis’s “centered worlds” model of self-locating or indexical attitudes. It is argued that the underlying issue concerns, not just the analysis of a distinctive kind of self-locating attitude, but the nature of intentionality. It is argued that in a sense all attitudes are self-locating since their content is explained in terms of the way the agent is situated in his or her environment.Less
A defense of a thesis about self-locating attitudes that Clas Weber has labeled “Propositionalism”: to be ignorant of where in the world one is, what time it is, or who one is is always to be ignorant of what possible world is actual. The thesis is articulated in the context of David Lewis’s “centered worlds” model of self-locating or indexical attitudes. It is argued that the underlying issue concerns, not just the analysis of a distinctive kind of self-locating attitude, but the nature of intentionality. It is argued that in a sense all attitudes are self-locating since their content is explained in terms of the way the agent is situated in his or her environment.
