Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545995
- eISBN:
- 9780191719929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops and defends a new account of essentially indexical, de se, or self-locating belief with the aim of using it in later chapters to clarify the analogy between self-locating ...
More
This chapter develops and defends a new account of essentially indexical, de se, or self-locating belief with the aim of using it in later chapters to clarify the analogy between self-locating information and phenomenal information. The account is a modified version of David Lewis's analysis of self-locating information in terms of centered possible worlds, which are abstract objects consisting of a possible world plus a designated person and time in the world. It is argued that the modified analysis is better able than Lewis's to account for the way knowledge and belief change over time, and for one person's knowledge and belief about the knowledge and belief of others. The analysis is applied to two famous examples from the literature on essentially self-locating belief — David Lewis's case of the two omniscient gods, and Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The chapter concludes with an appendix that sketches some of the formal details.Less
This chapter develops and defends a new account of essentially indexical, de se, or self-locating belief with the aim of using it in later chapters to clarify the analogy between self-locating information and phenomenal information. The account is a modified version of David Lewis's analysis of self-locating information in terms of centered possible worlds, which are abstract objects consisting of a possible world plus a designated person and time in the world. It is argued that the modified analysis is better able than Lewis's to account for the way knowledge and belief change over time, and for one person's knowledge and belief about the knowledge and belief of others. The analysis is applied to two famous examples from the literature on essentially self-locating belief — David Lewis's case of the two omniscient gods, and Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The chapter concludes with an appendix that sketches some of the formal details.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198810346
- eISBN:
- 9780191847332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198810346.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is argued, following David Lewis, that we should model a cognitive state by a set of centered possible worlds, since this is required to represent the believer’s self-locating or indexical ...
More
It is argued, following David Lewis, that we should model a cognitive state by a set of centered possible worlds, since this is required to represent the believer’s self-locating or indexical knowledge and belief. But it is also argued, contra Lewis, that we should take the contents of belief to be propositions, represented by sets of uncentered possible worlds, since this is required to give a perspicuous account of agreement and disagreement of different agents, and of change of belief over time. Reconciling these two thoughts requires a defense of Propositionality: roughly, the thesis that any ignorance of where one is in the world is also ignorance about what the world in itself is like. This thesis is defended against some criticisms, and motivated by an externalist picture of knowledge and intentionality.Less
It is argued, following David Lewis, that we should model a cognitive state by a set of centered possible worlds, since this is required to represent the believer’s self-locating or indexical knowledge and belief. But it is also argued, contra Lewis, that we should take the contents of belief to be propositions, represented by sets of uncentered possible worlds, since this is required to give a perspicuous account of agreement and disagreement of different agents, and of change of belief over time. Reconciling these two thoughts requires a defense of Propositionality: roughly, the thesis that any ignorance of where one is in the world is also ignorance about what the world in itself is like. This thesis is defended against some criticisms, and motivated by an externalist picture of knowledge and intentionality.
