Edwin Curley
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199971657
- eISBN:
- 9780199346127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199971657.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 1 addresses an early work of Spinoza’s that is not available to us. On July 27, 1656 Spinoza was put on cherem (Hebrew: “ban” or “excommunication”) by the lay leaders of the Portuguese Jewish ...
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Chapter 1 addresses an early work of Spinoza’s that is not available to us. On July 27, 1656 Spinoza was put on cherem (Hebrew: “ban” or “excommunication”) by the lay leaders of the Portuguese Jewish community of Amstyerdam. What was Spinoza’s reaction to the ban? In his Dictionary article on Spinoza, Pierre Bayle claimed that Spinoza had composed (but never printed) an apology for his departure from the synagogue and Judaism, which included many of the things that subsequently appeared in his “pernicious and detestable” Theological-Political Treatise. This chapter attempts to determine what this work might have contained, assuming that it existed, and what was Spinoza’s response to his excommunication.Less
Chapter 1 addresses an early work of Spinoza’s that is not available to us. On July 27, 1656 Spinoza was put on cherem (Hebrew: “ban” or “excommunication”) by the lay leaders of the Portuguese Jewish community of Amstyerdam. What was Spinoza’s reaction to the ban? In his Dictionary article on Spinoza, Pierre Bayle claimed that Spinoza had composed (but never printed) an apology for his departure from the synagogue and Judaism, which included many of the things that subsequently appeared in his “pernicious and detestable” Theological-Political Treatise. This chapter attempts to determine what this work might have contained, assuming that it existed, and what was Spinoza’s response to his excommunication.
Richard Rowland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198833611
- eISBN:
- 9780191872044
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198833611.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter motivates and defends a new buck-passing account of all moral notions in terms of reasons for action and reasons to make amends. According to this view, for an action to be wrong is for ...
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This chapter motivates and defends a new buck-passing account of all moral notions in terms of reasons for action and reasons to make amends. According to this view, for an action to be wrong is for there to be reasons for us not to perform and for us to have pro-attitudes towards our apologizing or otherwise making amends if we perform it. This chapter shows that this account evades various objections including Parfit and Scanlon’s to buck-passing accounts of morality. It argues that this account explains several features of the relationship between moral properties and reasons, is more informative than alternative views, is part of an illuminating account of the relationship between moral and non-moral obligations, and fits with and explains the distinctively but not necessarily exclusively social status of morality. The chapter argues that there are reasons to reject alternative views to a buck-passing account of morality. It also shows that analogues of the arguments that show that the buck-passing account of value should be accepted show that a buck-passing account of morality should be accepted. So, it is not possible to consistently be buck-passers about value but not about morality.Less
This chapter motivates and defends a new buck-passing account of all moral notions in terms of reasons for action and reasons to make amends. According to this view, for an action to be wrong is for there to be reasons for us not to perform and for us to have pro-attitudes towards our apologizing or otherwise making amends if we perform it. This chapter shows that this account evades various objections including Parfit and Scanlon’s to buck-passing accounts of morality. It argues that this account explains several features of the relationship between moral properties and reasons, is more informative than alternative views, is part of an illuminating account of the relationship between moral and non-moral obligations, and fits with and explains the distinctively but not necessarily exclusively social status of morality. The chapter argues that there are reasons to reject alternative views to a buck-passing account of morality. It also shows that analogues of the arguments that show that the buck-passing account of value should be accepted show that a buck-passing account of morality should be accepted. So, it is not possible to consistently be buck-passers about value but not about morality.
