Rosalind Hursthouse
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247998
- eISBN:
- 9780191597756
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which ...
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On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which are usually given by the v‐rules—rules generated from the names of the virtues and vices such as ‘Do what is honest’, ‘Do not do what is dishonest’. That such rules may (apparently) conflict, leads to an exploration of the virtue ethics approach to resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic dilemmas. The second part is about the role of the emotions in virtue and vice, since it examines the inculcation of racism through the miseducation of the emotions. Kant and Aristotle are compared on the question of moral motivation, and a virtue ethics’ account of acting ‘from a sense of duty’ provided. The third part is on ‘the rationality of morality’ in relation to virtue ethics, the question of whether there is any ‘objective’ criterion for a certain character trait being a virtue. The standard neo‐Aristotelian premise that ‘A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well’ should be regarded as encapsulating two interrelated claims, namely, that the virtues benefit their possessor, and that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.) The second claim is defended in terms of a form of ethical naturalism—the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature—but a form that explicitly disavows any pretensions to being purely scientific.Less
On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which are usually given by the v‐rules—rules generated from the names of the virtues and vices such as ‘Do what is honest’, ‘Do not do what is dishonest’. That such rules may (apparently) conflict, leads to an exploration of the virtue ethics approach to resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic dilemmas. The second part is about the role of the emotions in virtue and vice, since it examines the inculcation of racism through the miseducation of the emotions. Kant and Aristotle are compared on the question of moral motivation, and a virtue ethics’ account of acting ‘from a sense of duty’ provided. The third part is on ‘the rationality of morality’ in relation to virtue ethics, the question of whether there is any ‘objective’ criterion for a certain character trait being a virtue. The standard neo‐Aristotelian premise that ‘A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well’ should be regarded as encapsulating two interrelated claims, namely, that the virtues benefit their possessor, and that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.) The second claim is defended in terms of a form of ethical naturalism—the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature—but a form that explicitly disavows any pretensions to being purely scientific.
Steven Sverdlik
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594948
- eISBN:
- 9780191725401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594948.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The deontic relevance of motives in virtue ethics is examined. Various types of virtue ethics are distinguished. Only some of them endorse the usage of the deontic concepts of obligation, wrongness, ...
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The deontic relevance of motives in virtue ethics is examined. Various types of virtue ethics are distinguished. Only some of them endorse the usage of the deontic concepts of obligation, wrongness, and permissibility. Hursthouse's neo‐Aristotelian theory is a type of virtue ethics that utilizes deontic concepts, but it yields a completely objective conception of deontic status. That is, motives never make a difference to the deontic status of an action. This is problematic. Michael Slote's non‐Aristotelian theory is examined next. In his theory a motive like malice is strongly wrong‐making: any action from malice is wrong. An example of a prosecutor acting from malice is considered. Slote's position that such a person necessarily acts wrongly is refuted. Further objections to his position are presented. Slote's recent position aligns him with Hursthouse. Virtue ethics oscillates between asserting that motives are never relevant deontically and asserting that some motives are strongly wrong‐making.Less
The deontic relevance of motives in virtue ethics is examined. Various types of virtue ethics are distinguished. Only some of them endorse the usage of the deontic concepts of obligation, wrongness, and permissibility. Hursthouse's neo‐Aristotelian theory is a type of virtue ethics that utilizes deontic concepts, but it yields a completely objective conception of deontic status. That is, motives never make a difference to the deontic status of an action. This is problematic. Michael Slote's non‐Aristotelian theory is examined next. In his theory a motive like malice is strongly wrong‐making: any action from malice is wrong. An example of a prosecutor acting from malice is considered. Slote's position that such a person necessarily acts wrongly is refuted. Further objections to his position are presented. Slote's recent position aligns him with Hursthouse. Virtue ethics oscillates between asserting that motives are never relevant deontically and asserting that some motives are strongly wrong‐making.
Nick Fotion
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199373529
- eISBN:
- 9780199373543
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199373529.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Although Slote and Hursthouse differ, as virtue theorists, in that the former is not a consequentialist while the latter is, they are both grand theorists. Jackson introduces religious commitments ...
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Although Slote and Hursthouse differ, as virtue theorists, in that the former is not a consequentialist while the latter is, they are both grand theorists. Jackson introduces religious commitments into the discussion. The three together make it clearer than before that theories in ethics are surprisingly varied.Less
Although Slote and Hursthouse differ, as virtue theorists, in that the former is not a consequentialist while the latter is, they are both grand theorists. Jackson introduces religious commitments into the discussion. The three together make it clearer than before that theories in ethics are surprisingly varied.
Ben Bradley
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199357703
- eISBN:
- 9780199357734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in ...
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This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in question is virtue consequentialism—roughly, the idea that virtues are good because of the good consequences they bring. Versions of the view can be found in the works of Julia Driver, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. This chapter argues that the only tenable variant of virtue consequentialism is contrastivism: the idea that a character trait is or is not a virtue only in comparison with another trait. The problem is that if this view is right, then virtues cannot be used in evaluating either people or outcomes. So if virtue ought to play a role in such evaluation, then virtue consequentialism ought to be rejected.Less
This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in question is virtue consequentialism—roughly, the idea that virtues are good because of the good consequences they bring. Versions of the view can be found in the works of Julia Driver, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. This chapter argues that the only tenable variant of virtue consequentialism is contrastivism: the idea that a character trait is or is not a virtue only in comparison with another trait. The problem is that if this view is right, then virtues cannot be used in evaluating either people or outcomes. So if virtue ought to play a role in such evaluation, then virtue consequentialism ought to be rejected.
Michael B. Gill
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714033
- eISBN:
- 9780191782480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and ...
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David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and there is no invariable ordering principle that tells us what to do when those ends conflict. Hume maintains, for instance, that the artificial virtue of justice can sometimes conflict with the natural virtues of benevolence. In some cases, justice will override benevolence, but in other cases, benevolence will override justice, and there are no rules we can rely on to determine which sort of case we are in. Hume’s sentimentalist account of the origins of moral judgment explains these features of morality, and Hume’s sentimentalist explanation of the pluralist character of morality is at least as powerful as the non-naturalist, intuitionist explanation developed by W. D. Ross.Less
David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and there is no invariable ordering principle that tells us what to do when those ends conflict. Hume maintains, for instance, that the artificial virtue of justice can sometimes conflict with the natural virtues of benevolence. In some cases, justice will override benevolence, but in other cases, benevolence will override justice, and there are no rules we can rely on to determine which sort of case we are in. Hume’s sentimentalist account of the origins of moral judgment explains these features of morality, and Hume’s sentimentalist explanation of the pluralist character of morality is at least as powerful as the non-naturalist, intuitionist explanation developed by W. D. Ross.
