Jason Baehr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199604074
- eISBN:
- 9780191729300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of ...
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The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of Thomas Hurka (2002) and Robert Adams (2007) are shown to have certain significant similarities to a personal worth account, but also to have certain defects that are not shared by this account. The personal worth account is then contrasted with a naturalistic account of intellectual virtue inspired by Rosalind Hursthouse's (1999) theory of moral virtue, Julia Driver's (2000) consequentialist account of intellectual virtue, and Linda Zagzebski's (1996) motivational account of intellectual virtue. Substantive objections are raised against each of these conceptions. The result is a further defense of the personal worth conception of intellectual virtue.Less
The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of Thomas Hurka (2002) and Robert Adams (2007) are shown to have certain significant similarities to a personal worth account, but also to have certain defects that are not shared by this account. The personal worth account is then contrasted with a naturalistic account of intellectual virtue inspired by Rosalind Hursthouse's (1999) theory of moral virtue, Julia Driver's (2000) consequentialist account of intellectual virtue, and Linda Zagzebski's (1996) motivational account of intellectual virtue. Substantive objections are raised against each of these conceptions. The result is a further defense of the personal worth conception of intellectual virtue.
Ben Bradley
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199357703
- eISBN:
- 9780199357734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in ...
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This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in question is virtue consequentialism—roughly, the idea that virtues are good because of the good consequences they bring. Versions of the view can be found in the works of Julia Driver, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. This chapter argues that the only tenable variant of virtue consequentialism is contrastivism: the idea that a character trait is or is not a virtue only in comparison with another trait. The problem is that if this view is right, then virtues cannot be used in evaluating either people or outcomes. So if virtue ought to play a role in such evaluation, then virtue consequentialism ought to be rejected.Less
This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in question is virtue consequentialism—roughly, the idea that virtues are good because of the good consequences they bring. Versions of the view can be found in the works of Julia Driver, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. This chapter argues that the only tenable variant of virtue consequentialism is contrastivism: the idea that a character trait is or is not a virtue only in comparison with another trait. The problem is that if this view is right, then virtues cannot be used in evaluating either people or outcomes. So if virtue ought to play a role in such evaluation, then virtue consequentialism ought to be rejected.
