Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response ...
More
Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and offers a robust free will defence. Anselm holds that ‘character determinism’, the necessitation of a choice by the agent's character, does not undermine free will as long as the agent can be held responsible for his character.Less
Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and offers a robust free will defence. Anselm holds that ‘character determinism’, the necessitation of a choice by the agent's character, does not undermine free will as long as the agent can be held responsible for his character.
Katherin Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190611200
- eISBN:
- 9780190611224
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose a se, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it ...
More
Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose a se, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it is entirely up to him which option he pursues. Katherin Rogers shows that the Anselmian theory subscribes to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In the recent literature, the main challenge to this principle originates with Harry Frankfurt, who challenges PAP by offering counterexamples in which a “controller” sees to it that an agent does not actually confront open options. Yet, as Frankfurt supposes, even a libertarian ought to judge that the agent is free and responsible. This challenge has evoked extensive debate in the last several decades. The Anselmian version of PAP is immune to these Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and his argument can be adapted by other species of libertarian.Less
Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose a se, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it is entirely up to him which option he pursues. Katherin Rogers shows that the Anselmian theory subscribes to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In the recent literature, the main challenge to this principle originates with Harry Frankfurt, who challenges PAP by offering counterexamples in which a “controller” sees to it that an agent does not actually confront open options. Yet, as Frankfurt supposes, even a libertarian ought to judge that the agent is free and responsible. This challenge has evoked extensive debate in the last several decades. The Anselmian version of PAP is immune to these Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and his argument can be adapted by other species of libertarian.
