Bumba Mukherjee
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226358789
- eISBN:
- 9780226358956
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226358956.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter starts by providing the foundation for the book’s central theoretical model that explores the link between democratization and trade reforms in developing countries. The chapter builds ...
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This chapter starts by providing the foundation for the book’s central theoretical model that explores the link between democratization and trade reforms in developing countries. The chapter builds on this foundation to understand how political competition over office by political parties in the context of new democratic institutions affects trade policy given certain labor market conditions. The theoretical model then uses the logic of game-theory to analyze how labor market conditions affects the domestic balance of political power between labor and capital in a newly democratized regime and how this in turn influences the design of trade policy by political parties (including the ruling party) in this regime. The model is then extended to understand when and how the adoption of trade reforms in new democracies may decrease the likelihood of electoral malpractices in these regimes and thus foster democratic consolidation.Less
This chapter starts by providing the foundation for the book’s central theoretical model that explores the link between democratization and trade reforms in developing countries. The chapter builds on this foundation to understand how political competition over office by political parties in the context of new democratic institutions affects trade policy given certain labor market conditions. The theoretical model then uses the logic of game-theory to analyze how labor market conditions affects the domestic balance of political power between labor and capital in a newly democratized regime and how this in turn influences the design of trade policy by political parties (including the ruling party) in this regime. The model is then extended to understand when and how the adoption of trade reforms in new democracies may decrease the likelihood of electoral malpractices in these regimes and thus foster democratic consolidation.
