Lydia Andler
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012744
- eISBN:
- 9780262258593
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012744.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Created one year before the 1992 Rio summit, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is mandated to fund projects designed to promote global environmental protection. In 1994, it was restructured in ...
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Created one year before the 1992 Rio summit, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is mandated to fund projects designed to promote global environmental protection. In 1994, it was restructured in response to strong criticism from nongovernmental organizations and developing countries, and today, has a unique institutional structure that includes a small secretariat headquartered in Washington, DC. This chapter examines the autonomous influence of the GEF secretariat as a bureaucracy and the factors underlying such influence. After providing an overview of the GEF secretariat’s organizational structure and activities, the chapter analyzes its cognitive, normative, and executive influences. It also discusses the secretariat’s resources, competences, and embeddedness, along with its organizational expertise, organizational culture, and organizational leadership.Less
Created one year before the 1992 Rio summit, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is mandated to fund projects designed to promote global environmental protection. In 1994, it was restructured in response to strong criticism from nongovernmental organizations and developing countries, and today, has a unique institutional structure that includes a small secretariat headquartered in Washington, DC. This chapter examines the autonomous influence of the GEF secretariat as a bureaucracy and the factors underlying such influence. After providing an overview of the GEF secretariat’s organizational structure and activities, the chapter analyzes its cognitive, normative, and executive influences. It also discusses the secretariat’s resources, competences, and embeddedness, along with its organizational expertise, organizational culture, and organizational leadership.
Jessica F. Green
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691157580
- eISBN:
- 9781400848669
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691157580.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines why states decided to delegate key monitoring tasks to private actors in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. It first provides an overview of the ...
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This chapter examines why states decided to delegate key monitoring tasks to private actors in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. It first provides an overview of the origins of the CDM before discussing the involvement of the Global Environment Facility, the World Bank, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the CDM. It also presents three reasons behind delegated authority in the CDM, and specifically why private actors were selected to serve as the “atmospheric police” of the CDM. First, the private sector had relatively long-standing experience in the intricacies of measuring carbon offsets. Second, powerful states agreed that this market mechanism should be part of the Protocol, and that a third-party verifier was needed to monitor the quality of offset projects. Finally, there was a focal institution, the CDM Executive Board, to screen and oversee agents.Less
This chapter examines why states decided to delegate key monitoring tasks to private actors in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. It first provides an overview of the origins of the CDM before discussing the involvement of the Global Environment Facility, the World Bank, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the CDM. It also presents three reasons behind delegated authority in the CDM, and specifically why private actors were selected to serve as the “atmospheric police” of the CDM. First, the private sector had relatively long-standing experience in the intricacies of measuring carbon offsets. Second, powerful states agreed that this market mechanism should be part of the Protocol, and that a third-party verifier was needed to monitor the quality of offset projects. Finally, there was a focal institution, the CDM Executive Board, to screen and oversee agents.
