Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response ...
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Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and offers a robust free will defence. Anselm holds that ‘character determinism’, the necessitation of a choice by the agent's character, does not undermine free will as long as the agent can be held responsible for his character.Less
Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and offers a robust free will defence. Anselm holds that ‘character determinism’, the necessitation of a choice by the agent's character, does not undermine free will as long as the agent can be held responsible for his character.
Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198743972
- eISBN:
- 9780191803963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743972.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. ...
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Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. If M foresees that S chooses B on his own, M does nothing. S lacks options, but isn’t he free? The “dilemma defense” raises problems concerning foresight, but “blockage” (Mele and Robb) and “buffered” (Hunt) FSCs attempt to circumvent this defense. This chapter introduces a timeline and four theses, including the grounding principle. Anselmian FSCs are impossible since no one foresees what an agent will choose absent the agent’s choice. But an agent who chooses A (logically) cannot be made to choose B instead. Blockage cases fail, too, and buffered cases deny the “torn condition.” One possibility in which a divine manipulator might control the outcome of an agent’s a se choice—Rewind—is considered, but rejected.Less
Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. If M foresees that S chooses B on his own, M does nothing. S lacks options, but isn’t he free? The “dilemma defense” raises problems concerning foresight, but “blockage” (Mele and Robb) and “buffered” (Hunt) FSCs attempt to circumvent this defense. This chapter introduces a timeline and four theses, including the grounding principle. Anselmian FSCs are impossible since no one foresees what an agent will choose absent the agent’s choice. But an agent who chooses A (logically) cannot be made to choose B instead. Blockage cases fail, too, and buffered cases deny the “torn condition.” One possibility in which a divine manipulator might control the outcome of an agent’s a se choice—Rewind—is considered, but rejected.
Katherin Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190611200
- eISBN:
- 9780190611224
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose a se, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it ...
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Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose a se, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it is entirely up to him which option he pursues. Katherin Rogers shows that the Anselmian theory subscribes to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In the recent literature, the main challenge to this principle originates with Harry Frankfurt, who challenges PAP by offering counterexamples in which a “controller” sees to it that an agent does not actually confront open options. Yet, as Frankfurt supposes, even a libertarian ought to judge that the agent is free and responsible. This challenge has evoked extensive debate in the last several decades. The Anselmian version of PAP is immune to these Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and his argument can be adapted by other species of libertarian.Less
Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose a se, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it is entirely up to him which option he pursues. Katherin Rogers shows that the Anselmian theory subscribes to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In the recent literature, the main challenge to this principle originates with Harry Frankfurt, who challenges PAP by offering counterexamples in which a “controller” sees to it that an agent does not actually confront open options. Yet, as Frankfurt supposes, even a libertarian ought to judge that the agent is free and responsible. This challenge has evoked extensive debate in the last several decades. The Anselmian version of PAP is immune to these Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and his argument can be adapted by other species of libertarian.
