Kripke Saul A.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199730155
- eISBN:
- 9780199918430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter focuses on the perplexities some philosophers have felt concerning the simple first person pronoun “I.” It considers the views of David Kaplan, Frege, and David Lewis. It argues that the ...
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This chapter focuses on the perplexities some philosophers have felt concerning the simple first person pronoun “I.” It considers the views of David Kaplan, Frege, and David Lewis. It argues that the first person use of “I” does not have a Fregean sense, at least if this means that it has a definition. But it might be a paradigmatic case of fixing a reference by means of a description: it is a rule of the common language that each of us fixes the reference of “I” by the description “the subject.” However, since each of us speaks a natural language, and not an imaginary “scientific language” spoken by no one, for each of us the referent can be different.Less
This chapter focuses on the perplexities some philosophers have felt concerning the simple first person pronoun “I.” It considers the views of David Kaplan, Frege, and David Lewis. It argues that the first person use of “I” does not have a Fregean sense, at least if this means that it has a definition. But it might be a paradigmatic case of fixing a reference by means of a description: it is a rule of the common language that each of us fixes the reference of “I” by the description “the subject.” However, since each of us speaks a natural language, and not an imaginary “scientific language” spoken by no one, for each of us the referent can be different.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the ...
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In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the importance of self‐ascribing attitudes (i.e. what he coins ‘de se’ attitudes), arguing that “the de se subsumes the de dicto, but not vice versa.” Along the way, a host of topics are discussed, including time‐slices of continuant persons, centered possible worlds, and decision theory.Less
In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the importance of self‐ascribing attitudes (i.e. what he coins ‘de se’ attitudes), arguing that “the de se subsumes the de dicto, but not vice versa.” Along the way, a host of topics are discussed, including time‐slices of continuant persons, centered possible worlds, and decision theory.
Hilan Bensusan
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- May 2022
- ISBN:
- 9781474480291
- eISBN:
- 9781399509732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474480291.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Chapter 1 presents indexicalism as idea that the world is ultimately best described in terms of indexical expressions like 'here', 'you', 'now', 'outside', 'same' or 'other'. Substantive descriptions ...
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Chapter 1 presents indexicalism as idea that the world is ultimately best described in terms of indexical expressions like 'here', 'you', 'now', 'outside', 'same' or 'other'. Substantive descriptions are appropriate to think things through only to the extent that they have an implicit indexicality. Indexical expressions are context-dependent and therefore thoroughly situated. Indexicalism is a paradoxico-metaphysics in the terms defined by Cogburn; it can also be seen as a critique of metaphysics if metaphysics aims at a general, substantive view of how things are and they are such that no substantive description is adequate. Indexicalism draws from elements of Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism – especially the notion of locus standi in the theory of measurement – of Levinas’ account of the asymmetric Other and of Perry and Kaplan’s work on demonstratives and implicit indexicality. An indexicalist image of things has no space for total, third-person views of everything. The postulated absolute is deictic.Less
Chapter 1 presents indexicalism as idea that the world is ultimately best described in terms of indexical expressions like 'here', 'you', 'now', 'outside', 'same' or 'other'. Substantive descriptions are appropriate to think things through only to the extent that they have an implicit indexicality. Indexical expressions are context-dependent and therefore thoroughly situated. Indexicalism is a paradoxico-metaphysics in the terms defined by Cogburn; it can also be seen as a critique of metaphysics if metaphysics aims at a general, substantive view of how things are and they are such that no substantive description is adequate. Indexicalism draws from elements of Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism – especially the notion of locus standi in the theory of measurement – of Levinas’ account of the asymmetric Other and of Perry and Kaplan’s work on demonstratives and implicit indexicality. An indexicalist image of things has no space for total, third-person views of everything. The postulated absolute is deictic.
