Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195395686
- eISBN:
- 9780199979295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395686.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The essay is divided into three parts. The first provides a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of such justification found in his writings. The ...
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The essay is divided into three parts. The first provides a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of such justification found in his writings. The second examines the different ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the second Critique. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant’s attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, and therefore independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that it is only our consciousness of standing under the moral law that justifies the assumption of freedom. It attempts to resolve this tension by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy. The third part reflects upon the ontological issues posed by these two types of practical justification.Less
The essay is divided into three parts. The first provides a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of such justification found in his writings. The second examines the different ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the second Critique. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant’s attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, and therefore independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that it is only our consciousness of standing under the moral law that justifies the assumption of freedom. It attempts to resolve this tension by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy. The third part reflects upon the ontological issues posed by these two types of practical justification.
