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This chapter explores the anatomical and temporal origins of the experience of will. It examines issues of where the will arises by considering first the anatomy of voluntary action—how it differs from involuntary action and where in the body it appears to arise. The chapter then moves on to the sensation of effort in the muscles and mind during action to learn how the perception of the body influences the experience of will, and then looks directly at the brain sources of voluntary action through studies of brain stimulation. These anatomical travels are supplemented by a temporal itinerary, an examination of the time course of events in mind and body as voluntary actions are produced.

This chapter focuses on addressing different aspects of the determination of voluntary action, describes the cognitive basis of voluntary action, and examines the role of objectives in the ensuing action. It finds that the objectives or goals play a much more dominant indirect role in determining actions and can be described in terms of internal limitations that predefine response distributions and determine which of these are influenced by stimuli. The chapter also examines cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in optional control procedures that help to realize the objectives despite the presence of competing regular or emotional responses. It furthermore addresses the core issue of how cognitive control mechanisms are monitored.

This chapter examines consciousness as a social institution rather than a naturally given mental capacity. More specifically, it views consciousness as a matter of social construction and not as brute fact of nature. In this sense, consciousness is causally efficacious for the control of behavior, regardless of what the neuroscience suggests. The chapter considers whether consciousness causes behavior in the context of voluntary action, volition, and free will. It also discusses moral evaluation of action, how the concept of free will lines up with maxims of scientific psychology, the distinction between perception and reality, causal closure and determinism, indeterminism and waiving explanation, and action-decisions. The chapter concludes with broad perspectives on conscious experience and consciousness.

By focusing on the diamond industry, this chapter examines the Kimberley Process through the lens of the club approach to voluntary programs. It is observed that the commitment to enforce strict standards of the importation and exportation of diamonds without certification is largely due to a particular state’s participation in the Kimberley Process. The chapter gives a brief history of how the United Nations took action to attack these conflict diamonds and how the regulation of the supply of diamonds created an illusion of scarcity. An outline of the creation, benefits, and weaknesses of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is expounded on in the chapter, which concludes by asserting that the KPCS remains an innovative means of resolving social problems through voluntary action.