Cyriel M. A. Pennartz
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029315
- eISBN:
- 9780262330121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029315.003.0008
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
This chapter argues that brain systems must meet several 'hard' requirements to qualify as conscious, while other requirements are 'soft' in that they are important for sustaining normal, daily-life ...
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This chapter argues that brain systems must meet several 'hard' requirements to qualify as conscious, while other requirements are 'soft' in that they are important for sustaining normal, daily-life awareness but not strictly necessary for having the most basic form of conscious experience. The hard requirements include, first, the ability to interpret (or reconstruct) sensory inputs as having particular qualities or content, within a rich repertoire of modalities or (sub)modalities, such as visual motion, shape, depth and color. Second, this process of attributing sensory “feel” or meaning to inputs occurs in a dynamic or stable state, depending on the constancy of variables governing the sensory flux. Projection of interpreted sensory inputs into an external, perspectival space (vision) or body map (somatosensation) is seen as a relatively basic process, but patient studies indicate that core consciousness does not strictly depend on this ability, as applies as well to normal requirements on the grouping of similar features and binding of different submodalities into objects. Also the “unity” of consciousness and self-awareness are not classified as an essential feature but rather as a constantly maintained “illusion” of the healthy brain empowered by proper multimodal and motor alignment.Less
This chapter argues that brain systems must meet several 'hard' requirements to qualify as conscious, while other requirements are 'soft' in that they are important for sustaining normal, daily-life awareness but not strictly necessary for having the most basic form of conscious experience. The hard requirements include, first, the ability to interpret (or reconstruct) sensory inputs as having particular qualities or content, within a rich repertoire of modalities or (sub)modalities, such as visual motion, shape, depth and color. Second, this process of attributing sensory “feel” or meaning to inputs occurs in a dynamic or stable state, depending on the constancy of variables governing the sensory flux. Projection of interpreted sensory inputs into an external, perspectival space (vision) or body map (somatosensation) is seen as a relatively basic process, but patient studies indicate that core consciousness does not strictly depend on this ability, as applies as well to normal requirements on the grouping of similar features and binding of different submodalities into objects. Also the “unity” of consciousness and self-awareness are not classified as an essential feature but rather as a constantly maintained “illusion” of the healthy brain empowered by proper multimodal and motor alignment.
Cyriel M.A. Pennartz
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029315
- eISBN:
- 9780262330121
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029315.001.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
Although science has made considerable progress in discovering the neural basis of cognition, how consciousness arises remains elusive. In this book, Pennartz analyzes which aspects of conscious ...
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Although science has made considerable progress in discovering the neural basis of cognition, how consciousness arises remains elusive. In this book, Pennartz analyzes which aspects of conscious experience can be peeled away to access its core: the relationship between brain processes and the qualitative nature of consciousness. Pennartz traces the problem back to its historical foundations and connects early ideas to contemporary computational neuroscience. What can we learn from neural network models, and where do they fall short in bridging the gap between neurons and conscious experiences? How can neural models of cognition help us define requirements for conscious processing in the brain? These questions underlie Pennartz’s examination of the brain’s anatomy and neurophysiology. This analysis is not limited to visual perception but broadened to include other sensory modalities and their integration. Formulating a representational theory, Pennartz outlines properties that complex neural structures must express to process information consciously. This theoretical framework is constructed using empirical findings from neuroscience and from theoretical arguments such as the ‘Cuneiform Room’ and the ‘Wall Street Banker’. Positing that qualitative experience is a multimodal and multilevel phenomenon at its roots, Pennartz places this body of theory in the wider context of mind-brain philosophy.Less
Although science has made considerable progress in discovering the neural basis of cognition, how consciousness arises remains elusive. In this book, Pennartz analyzes which aspects of conscious experience can be peeled away to access its core: the relationship between brain processes and the qualitative nature of consciousness. Pennartz traces the problem back to its historical foundations and connects early ideas to contemporary computational neuroscience. What can we learn from neural network models, and where do they fall short in bridging the gap between neurons and conscious experiences? How can neural models of cognition help us define requirements for conscious processing in the brain? These questions underlie Pennartz’s examination of the brain’s anatomy and neurophysiology. This analysis is not limited to visual perception but broadened to include other sensory modalities and their integration. Formulating a representational theory, Pennartz outlines properties that complex neural structures must express to process information consciously. This theoretical framework is constructed using empirical findings from neuroscience and from theoretical arguments such as the ‘Cuneiform Room’ and the ‘Wall Street Banker’. Positing that qualitative experience is a multimodal and multilevel phenomenon at its roots, Pennartz places this body of theory in the wider context of mind-brain philosophy.
Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262036115
- eISBN:
- 9780262339773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036115.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 7 begins to puts REC positive story into action. It opens by questioning the value of appealing to a priori intuitions in trying to understand the character of perceiving. Focusing on ...
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Chapter 7 begins to puts REC positive story into action. It opens by questioning the value of appealing to a priori intuitions in trying to understand the character of perceiving. Focusing on explanatory concerns, it revisits Predictive Processing or PPC proposals about perceiving and defuses arguments that the explanatory punch of PPC requires characterizing perceptual processes and products in representational terms. Instead the chapter shows how REC can successfully appropriate the main apparatus of PPC to explain perception. It demonstrates that mental representations are not needed to explain how intramodal and intermodal forms of perceiving integrate. The chapter concludes by showing how contentless forms of perceiving can connect with contentful attitudes, enabling us to make sense of a range of perceptual phenomena – including our capacity to attune to optical effects and the ways in which we respond to visual illusions.Less
Chapter 7 begins to puts REC positive story into action. It opens by questioning the value of appealing to a priori intuitions in trying to understand the character of perceiving. Focusing on explanatory concerns, it revisits Predictive Processing or PPC proposals about perceiving and defuses arguments that the explanatory punch of PPC requires characterizing perceptual processes and products in representational terms. Instead the chapter shows how REC can successfully appropriate the main apparatus of PPC to explain perception. It demonstrates that mental representations are not needed to explain how intramodal and intermodal forms of perceiving integrate. The chapter concludes by showing how contentless forms of perceiving can connect with contentful attitudes, enabling us to make sense of a range of perceptual phenomena – including our capacity to attune to optical effects and the ways in which we respond to visual illusions.
