Mathew Humphrey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599514
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242674.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Environmental political philosophy has generally been framed around the differing axiologies of ecocentrism (nature‐centred) and anthropocentric (human‐centred) forms of ethics. This book seeks to ...
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Environmental political philosophy has generally been framed around the differing axiologies of ecocentrism (nature‐centred) and anthropocentric (human‐centred) forms of ethics. This book seeks to challenge the political relevance of this philosophical dispute with respect to the problem of nature preservation as public policy. A detailed analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of both ecocentric and ‘ecological humanist’ positions shows that the ‘embedded humanism’ within ecocentric arguments offers an opportunity to move beyond the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide. Furthermore, a principle of ‘strong irreplaceability’ with regard to natural goods can provide the basis for a political argument for nature preservation that is compatible with both human‐centred and nature‐centred concerns.Less
Environmental political philosophy has generally been framed around the differing axiologies of ecocentrism (nature‐centred) and anthropocentric (human‐centred) forms of ethics. This book seeks to challenge the political relevance of this philosophical dispute with respect to the problem of nature preservation as public policy. A detailed analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of both ecocentric and ‘ecological humanist’ positions shows that the ‘embedded humanism’ within ecocentric arguments offers an opportunity to move beyond the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide. Furthermore, a principle of ‘strong irreplaceability’ with regard to natural goods can provide the basis for a political argument for nature preservation that is compatible with both human‐centred and nature‐centred concerns.
Sylvia Berryman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198835004
- eISBN:
- 9780191876561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198835004.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. ...
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Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. Rather, we find, in Eudemian Ethics, a contrary case for a distinction between the natural good and the practical good. Given Aristotle’s well-known emphasis on the nature of action, and his practice of beginning normative treatises from the nature of action, we can see implicit in this focus an argument that, for rational agents, the fact that we aim at some good commits us to seeking the genuine or true good. This chapter argues that an apparent fallacy in the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics yields—if properly understood—an insistence that rational agency requires consideration of the truly best goal.Less
Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. Rather, we find, in Eudemian Ethics, a contrary case for a distinction between the natural good and the practical good. Given Aristotle’s well-known emphasis on the nature of action, and his practice of beginning normative treatises from the nature of action, we can see implicit in this focus an argument that, for rational agents, the fact that we aim at some good commits us to seeking the genuine or true good. This chapter argues that an apparent fallacy in the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics yields—if properly understood—an insistence that rational agency requires consideration of the truly best goal.
