Search Results

This chapter defines and introduces the conceptual category of ‘moral atheism’ — i.e. the denial of the existence of a deity with moral attributes — and distinguishes between two main versions of the position. A ‘weak moral atheist’ rejects the existence of a morally praiseworthy divinity; while a ‘strong moral atheist’ rejects the existence of a morally assessable divinity. The chapter also relates the category of moral atheism to early modern ways of thinking about religion, irreligion, and atheism. It introduces the main interpretive thesis of the book: the claim that Hume is a strong moral atheist. It also addresses a preliminary objection from the lack of explicit textual evidence.

This concluding chapter summarizes Hume's overall case for divine amorality and assesses the significance of his commitment to moral atheism, both for our wider understanding of his theoretical and practical philosophy, and for our understanding of the philosophical history of irreligion in the early modern period. It is argued that a proper understanding of Hume's commitment to moral atheism casts light on his general epistemology as well as the precise scope and force of his sceptical critique of traditional natural theology. Hume's moral atheism also has the important practical consequence of ruling out the fideistic proposal (found in Hamann, Jacobi, and Kant) that we might responsibly believe in or at least hope for a moral God even in the absence of knowledge.

This chapter defends the interpretation of Hume as a moral atheist against the objection that Hume's own mitigated scepticism rules out such dogmatic commitments in natural theology. According to this objection, Hume could be a moral agnostic, perhaps, but not a moral atheist. In response it is argued, by way of a series of examples taken from Hume's texts, that his scepticism does not in fact rule out all speculation about the deity. Since these examples include, inter alia, each of Hume's arguments for moral atheism, the chapter also provides a preview of his overall case for establishing divine amorality.

This is the second of two chapters examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. According to the argument, human passions, including our feelings of moral approval and disapproval, range only so far as the outer frontier of sense and imagination. Given Hume's sentimentalist metaphysics of morals, it follows that the projected properties of virtue and vice are confined to the immanent world, and cannot characterize any transcendental order beyond this permanent horizon: the deity cannot have any moral attributes. It is argued that Hume is committed to this argument, and that he is aware that he is so committed. The chapter also examines possible objections to the argument, and concludes that it is defensible on Hume's own terms.

This chapter documents and examines Hume's argument from motivation to moral atheism. The argument appeals to Hume's account of the passions as the engines of action along with a form of probabilistic reasoning about the likely character of any first cause or ultimate organizing principle responsible for the ordered universe. According to Hume, even though we know nothing positive about the distinctive intrinsic character of the deity, we can judge it highly unlikely that this ultimate being or principle has the sort of anthropomorphic sentimental psychology required to ground any responsiveness to moral concerns.

This is the first of two chapters documenting and examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. The argument appeals to Hume's account of the natural limits of our human passions, along with his sentimentalist metaphysics of morals, in order to conclude that the deity is beyond the projected, response-dependent world of moral properties. The chapter focuses on the first stage of the argument, Hume's claim that the deity is not the ‘natural object’ of any of our passions, including love, hate, gratitude, envy, and the rest. In Hume's view, none of our passions — none of our affective attitudes, none of our intentional feelings, emotions, or sentiments — can be directed toward this sort of transcendental being.