Achim Stephan
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199583621
- eISBN:
- 9780191723483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Many problems that have been discussed in the philosophy of mind have been discussed from an emergentist's perspective. But there is little consideration, if any, of the problem of free will. This ...
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Many problems that have been discussed in the philosophy of mind have been discussed from an emergentist's perspective. But there is little consideration, if any, of the problem of free will. This chapter aims to shed some new light on this old problem by approaching it from the perspective of emergentism, where both diachronic and synchronic aspects will play a role. Leading questions are, for example, whether or not the capacity of having a free will can be reductively explained, or whether the ‘emergence’ of this capacity could have been predicted, in principle. To reflect on these questions one has to distinguish various explications of what the capacity of having a free will really is.Less
Many problems that have been discussed in the philosophy of mind have been discussed from an emergentist's perspective. But there is little consideration, if any, of the problem of free will. This chapter aims to shed some new light on this old problem by approaching it from the perspective of emergentism, where both diachronic and synchronic aspects will play a role. Leading questions are, for example, whether or not the capacity of having a free will can be reductively explained, or whether the ‘emergence’ of this capacity could have been predicted, in principle. To reflect on these questions one has to distinguish various explications of what the capacity of having a free will really is.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198743958
- eISBN:
- 9780191803956
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743958.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the fact that one cannot rationally accept both theological determinism and the libertarian conception of free will, and asks which of the two is preferable. The main reason to ...
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This chapter examines the fact that one cannot rationally accept both theological determinism and the libertarian conception of free will, and asks which of the two is preferable. The main reason to opt for theological determinism is that it provides an uncontroversial route to a strong notion of divine providence. The only proposal for securing such a conception of providence absent theological determinism is Molinism, and its status is uncertain. Libertarianism would provide us with basic desert moral responsibility, and also a promising response to the problem of evil. But theistic religion can do without basic desert moral responsibility, and responses to the problem of evil that essentially involve free will on the libertarian conception turn out to be ineffective when it comes to horrendous evils. Accordingly, this chapter contends that theological determinism is preferable, and regards the libertarian conception of free will as dispensable.Less
This chapter examines the fact that one cannot rationally accept both theological determinism and the libertarian conception of free will, and asks which of the two is preferable. The main reason to opt for theological determinism is that it provides an uncontroversial route to a strong notion of divine providence. The only proposal for securing such a conception of providence absent theological determinism is Molinism, and its status is uncertain. Libertarianism would provide us with basic desert moral responsibility, and also a promising response to the problem of evil. But theistic religion can do without basic desert moral responsibility, and responses to the problem of evil that essentially involve free will on the libertarian conception turn out to be ineffective when it comes to horrendous evils. Accordingly, this chapter contends that theological determinism is preferable, and regards the libertarian conception of free will as dispensable.
Brian Leiter
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780199696505
- eISBN:
- 9780191876288
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199696505.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book offers both a reading and defense of Nietzsche’s moral psychology, drawing on both empirical psychological results and contemporary philosophical positions and arguments. Among the views ...
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This book offers both a reading and defense of Nietzsche’s moral psychology, drawing on both empirical psychological results and contemporary philosophical positions and arguments. Among the views explained and defended are: anti-realism about all value, including epistemic value; a kind of sentimentalism about evaluative judgment; epiphenomenalism about certain conscious mental states, including those involved in the conscious experience of willing; and radical skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. Psychological research, from Daniel Wegner’s work on the experience of willing to the famed Minnesota Twin studies, is marshalled in support of the Nietzschean picture of moral psychology. Nietzschean views are brought into dialogue with contemporary philosophical views defended by, among many others, Harry Frankfurt, T.M. Scanlon, Gary Watson, and Derk Pereboom. Nietzsche emerges not simply as a museum piece from the history of ideas, but as a philosopher and psychologist who exceeds David Hume for insight into human nature and the human mind, one who repeatedly anticipates later developments in empirical psychology, and continues to offer sophisticated and unsettling challenges to much conventional wisdom in philosophy.Less
This book offers both a reading and defense of Nietzsche’s moral psychology, drawing on both empirical psychological results and contemporary philosophical positions and arguments. Among the views explained and defended are: anti-realism about all value, including epistemic value; a kind of sentimentalism about evaluative judgment; epiphenomenalism about certain conscious mental states, including those involved in the conscious experience of willing; and radical skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. Psychological research, from Daniel Wegner’s work on the experience of willing to the famed Minnesota Twin studies, is marshalled in support of the Nietzschean picture of moral psychology. Nietzschean views are brought into dialogue with contemporary philosophical views defended by, among many others, Harry Frankfurt, T.M. Scanlon, Gary Watson, and Derk Pereboom. Nietzsche emerges not simply as a museum piece from the history of ideas, but as a philosopher and psychologist who exceeds David Hume for insight into human nature and the human mind, one who repeatedly anticipates later developments in empirical psychology, and continues to offer sophisticated and unsettling challenges to much conventional wisdom in philosophy.
