Blondel approaches the question of party decline by asking to what extent it is a product of semi-legal or illegal practices adopted by parties. At first glance it seems that the answer should be positive—the discovery of corruption or the distribution of favours by parties has made them the target of mass media attacks that have fed into increasing citizen dissatisfaction with or disaffection from parties; Blondel, however, adopts a more cautious and conditional stance, noting that negative electoral consequences of illegal or semi-legal practices have been inconsistent among countries with significant levels of corruption. Develops a series of analytical distinctions and empirical generalizations focusing on the concepts of party government and patronage, which starts by noting that the most basic linkages between governments and their supporting parties involve policies and appointments, and that traditional parliamentary theory neglects patronage as one important aspect of these linkages. In order to speculate about the origins of cross-national differences in the extent of patronage, Blondel develops a classification scheme based upon two dimensions: the first is derived from the various types of party-government relationships—adversarial, consensual, and conciliatory; the second involves the extent of parliamentary support for the government; in addition to these dimensions, a distinction is made between those parliamentary settings in which parties are, in general terms, dependent upon the government, those in which parties predominate over the government, and those in which the government and its supporting party/ies are linked in a situation of mutual interdependence. These typologies show that patronage is extensive and widely distributed in ‘partitocratic’ countries, is less common in Westminster-type majoritarian polities, is greatly reduced in ‘conciliatory’ systems, and has grown notably since the 1980s, but only
in the first two of these categories; suggests that this increase is because favours, bribes, and corruption are utilized as a partial substitute for the unfulfilment of over-ambitious government programme commitments; argues that an assessment of the effects of patronage also requires a differentiation among types of party government.

The British Prime Minister: The British Prime Minister: Much More Than ‘First Among Equals’
Richard Heffernan and Paul Webb

in The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies

Reviews a wide range of evidence to demonstrate three things. First, election campaigns have become more candidate-centered, with parties offering leaders greater prominence in their election campaigns and the media devoting greater attention to them. This development seems to have taken place since 1960, which coincides with the spread of mass access to television in Britain, and the erosion of class politics. Second, today’s major-party leaders are in significant ways more strongly placed to exert intra-party power than they were in 1980, much as we might expect of electoral-professional organizations. Third, and perhaps most important, it seems likely that the potential for prime ministerial power within the state’s political executive has been enhanced because of structural changes that have generated a larger and more integrated ‘executive office’ under his or her control since 1970.
Of course, these developments have occurred in the context of a highly partified form of parliamentarism. Thus, it is not contended simply that Prime Ministers have become completely indistinguishable from Presidents, but rather, that a number of changes have occurred that are mutually consistent with the working logic of presidentialism.

Building Party Government
Petr Kopecký

in Party Politics in New Democracies

Page 2 of 12
This chapter examines the rise of political parties in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Topics discussed include party systems, party legitimacy, party organizational strength, and the role of the party in the process of government. It is shown that both countries display behavioural and institutional features which provide for a strong form of party government. The parties control political recruitment; directly or indirectly, they are largely in charge of setting the agenda of the mass media; they enjoy their own autonomous power base; they control proceedings in parliaments; in the absence of strong challengers, they also enjoy a near monopoly over political representation. However, both countries also represent their own version of the generic model of party government, both in terms of its particular configuration of behavioural and institutional features, as well as in terms of its temporal development.

A Presidentializing Party State? A Presidentializing Party State?
The Federal Republic of Germany

Thomas Poguntke

in The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies

Published in print: 2005 Published Online: April 2005
DOI: 10.1093/0199252017.003.0003
Item type: chapter

The political process of the Federal Republic has always been characterized by two seemingly contradictory attributes. Germany was said to be a Chancellor democracy and party state at the same time. Yet, this chapter shows that both features are not mutually exclusive. While political parties continue to occupy a central position in the political process of the Federal Republic, particularly when as regards political recruitment, they have been weakened when it comes to controlling the chief executive and the legislative process. The specific nature of German cooperative federalism furnishes the Chancellor with a central role in the decision-making process that makes him structurally more independent of his own party and of his coalition partners. This tendency has been augmented by the growing resources for the chancellor’s office, the internationalization of politics, the increasing tendency of the electronic media to focus on leaders, and the general decline of cleavage-based politics. At the same time, political parties have become leadership-dominated. While there are clear tendencies towards the presidentialization of the political process in the Federal Republic, parties continue to control the access to the chief executive office, and they still hold the power to remove their leaders.
Ministerial Responsibility
R. A. W. Rhodes, John Wanna, and Patrick Weller
in Comparing Westminster

Published in print: 2009 Published Online: September 2009
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563494.003.0005
Item type: chapter

This chapter examines how elite political actors are held to account. It examines collective responsibility, individual ministerial responsibility, and their personal accountability for actions not directly related to their duties as ministers. Governments confronted the dilemmas posed by the arrival of ‘responsible party government’. The constitutional conventions creaked under the impact of party self-interest. The shared responses to improvise to meet whatever political exigencies confronted the government. So, notions of cabinet solidarity were relaxed to accommodate dissent, ministerial resignations became prime ministerial tactical calculations of political dispensability, and prime ministers found other ways to renew their ministries to ensure turnover. However, such improvization prompted outrage, and calls for a return to responsible government. So, governments sought refuge in new codes. Today, we still operate with ‘heroic’ notions of ministers, yet they are embedded in a web of accountabilities, constantly negotiating their way through overlapping and multiple demands.

Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies
Petr Kopecký, Peter Mair, and Maria Spirova (eds)

Published in print: 2012 Published Online: September 2012
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599370.001.0001
Item type: book

This volume brings together insights from the worlds of party politics and public administration in order to analyse the role of political parties in public appointments across contemporary Europe. Based on extensive new data gathered through expert interviews in fifteen European countries, this book offers the first systematic comparative assessment of the scale of party patronage and its role in sustaining modern party governments. Among the key findings are: first, patronage appointments tend to be increasingly dominated by the party in public office rather than being used or controlled by the party organization outside parliament. Second, rather than using appointments as rewards, as used to be the case in more clientelistic systems in the past, parties
are now more likely to emphasize appointments that can help them to manage the infrastructure of government and the state. In this way, patronage becomes an organizational rather than an electoral resource. Third, patronage appointments are increasingly sourced from channels outside of the party, thus helping to make parties look increasingly like network organizations, primarily constituted by their leaders and their personal and political hinterlands.

Institutional Explanations for Political Support
Pippa Norris

in Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government

Published in print: 1999 Published Online: November 2003
Item type: chapter

Substantial cross-national variations have been demonstrated in political support/institutional confidence; the aim of this chapter is to investigate why these major differences between countries exist. It identifies at least three separate schools of thought seeking to explain this phenomenon: the role of cultural values, government performance, and political institutions. Comparisons are made among a broad range of political systems, drawing on the 1981–4, 1990–1 and 1995–7 World Values Surveys, the Latinobarometer and the Eurobarometer, and various support hypotheses are advanced (support for the party in government; dependence on level of democratization; differences between presidential and parliamentary systems (executive structure); variation with party system; differences between federal and unitary state structures; and variation with electoral system) and tested. The findings indicate that institutional confidence is most likely to be highest in parliamentary democracies characterized by plurality electoral systems, two-party or moderate multi-party systems, and unitary states, and that these relationships are confirmed even after controlling for differences in levels of economic development and post-material values; social background and education are also related to institutional confidence, while the influence of socioeconomic status and gender are very modest. The results replicate one of the main theoretical principles of Anderson and Guillory (1997)—that winners express more confidence in the system than losers, and they also show that majoritarian institutions tend to produce greater institutional confidence than consociational arrangements.
Appointments to Public Administration in Norway: No Room for Political Parties?

Elin Haugsgjerd Allern

in Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies

Published in print: 2012 Published Online: Oxford University Press September 2012 DOI: 10.1093/poacprofoso/9780199599370.003.0014


Item type: chapter

This chapter systematically explores the issue of party patronage in Norway—a country where the role of parties, including partisanship, in connection with public appointments is traditionally assumed in comparative literature to be very limited or non-existent. The key question is to what extent, within public administration and semi-public institutions, political parties—de jure and de facto—control the allocation of positions. The assessment also distinguishes between the minister, the cabinet, and the party as appointing political agent, and maps the agent’s motivations and selection criteria. Overall, the chapter demonstrates that appointments to relatively few but important positions within the state administration are related to government, but less to party government, in Norway. Politicians appoint, but the room for party patronage is scant. The findings are discussed in the light of the general institutional and party (system) characteristics traditionally assumed to shape the role of parties in public appointments.

Party Patronage in Denmark: The Merit State with Politics ‘On the Side’

Carina Bischoff

in Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies

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Item type: chapter

This chapter investigates whether public appointments in Denmark really are as untainted by party politics as its reputation suggests. The evidence presented indicates that merit-based appointments are indeed a large part of the story. It is not the only one, however. In fact, the results indicate that a fairly sharp line can be drawn between the civil service on the one hand, and executing institutions and auxiliary institutions, such as councils and committees, on the other. In the former, the minister’s role is circumscribed and influence appears to be exercised on professional rather than political terms. In the latter, some sectors present a more blurry picture, as political motives blend with
professional criteria without replacing them. Moreover, it is notable that politics is most evident in appointments to auxiliary institutions. Finally, potential historical and institutional explanations for the existing balance between parties and the state in Denmark are discussed.

Party Supremacy and Hong Kong
Christine Loh

in Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong

Published in print: 2010 Published Online: September 2011
Publisher: Hong Kong University Press DOI: 10.5790/hongkong/9789888028948.003.0010
Item type: chapter

The key regime value of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that Hong Kong has to contend with is the supremacy of the party. In order to ensure the party's leadership in government, the CCP has a system whereby the party and government structures run in parallel to each other. In addition, there is a party group system that is embedded in each government body. When the term the Central Authorities (zhongyang) is used, it refers to this party-government structure at the top, which is situated in Beijing. The handling of Hong Kong affairs is demonstrated. Vladimir Lenin developed the party and state structures of communist states in the Soviet Union, and the Chinese party structure was modelled on Leninist lines. His legacy is specifically reported. Civil society is offering alternative visions and funding NGOs to put these versions into practice.

Economic crisis and political cold war, 1949–57
J. H. Whyte

in A New History of Ireland Volume VII: Ireland 1921-84

Published in print: 2003 Published Online: October 2011
Publisher: Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198217527.003.0010
Item type: chapter

In the Republic of Ireland, the years covered by this chapter were, by Irish standards, ones of exceptional political instability. There were three changes of government, and three general elections, in eight years. The inter-party government lasted only until 1951, when it lost ground at a general election and was replaced by Fianna Fáil. The incoming government was in its turn defeated in 1954 and replaced by the second inter-party government. The second inter-party government survived till 1957 when it was once again defeated by Fianna Fáil. A feature of all
these governments down to the general election of 1957 was that they relied on independents and had no safe majority in the dáil. But the most serious difficulty with which the government had to deal was what has gone down in history as ‘the mother-and-child scheme crisis’.

The Semi-Democratic Regime, 1929–1932
Harukata Takenaka

in Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan: Breakdown of a Hybrid Regime

This chapter demonstrates that between 1929 and 1932, under the Hamaguchi, the Second Wakatsuki, and the Inukai cabinets, the balance of power between the military and the party government shifted so decisively that the military succeeded in removing the party government from power in 1932, bringing an end to the semi-democratic regime. This was demonstrated by a series of crises that took place during this period: the signing of the London Naval Treaty in 1930; the March and October Incidents in 1931; the Manchurian Incident in 1931; and the May Fifteenth Incident in 1932. This chapter demonstrates that the party government could not constrain the military from taking over political power for two reasons. First, the semi-democratic regime lost its legitimacy because the party government could not effectively deal with economic problems while it revealed various political ones. Second, some party politicians acted semi-loyally to the regime.

The Semi-Democratic Regime, 1926–1929
Harukata Takenaka

in Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan: Breakdown of a Hybrid Regime

This chapter demonstrates how the semi-democratic regime gradually weakened between 1926 and 1929 under the First Wakatsuki cabinet and the Tanaka cabinet. The shift in the balance of power was clearly demonstrated by the assassination of Chang Tso-lin and—in the face of opposition from the army—the party government’s failure to penalize the officers associated with it. It examines how the assassination and the government’s reaction to it turned the tide between the military and the
This chapter then explores why the balance of power shifted toward the military, with particular reference to the legitimacy and semi-loyalty of political actors. It also considers how developments in this period affected the final breakdown of the semi-democratic regime in 1932.
parties have overlooked the ability of political parties to adapt to changing conditions in order to perform their crucial linkage functions. As the context of politics and societies have changed, so too have political parties. This text argues that the process of party government is alive and well in most contemporary democracies.

The Semi-Democratic Regime, 1918-1926
Harukata Takenaka

in Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan: Breakdown of a Hybrid Regime
Published in print: 2014 Published Online: January 2015
Item type: chapter

This chapter considers the relationship between the party government and the military from 1918 to 1926. It demonstrates that the party government did not face serious threats from the military; quite the contrary, it succeeded in containing it. The Hara cabinet achieved de facto subordination of supreme command of the military, party politicians continuously requested civilian ministers, and reduction of the army was implemented. The party government could take the upper hand against the military because the semi-democratic regime could claim a high level of legitimacy not only at an elite level, but also at the mass one.

Policymaking in Red and Blue
Matt Grossmann and David A. Hopkins

in Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats
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Item type: chapter

We examine party asymmetry in government, finding that Democratic officials treat the policymaking process as an attempt to address a catalog of social problems requiring government action, whereas Republicans view policy disputes as manifestations of a broader fight over the scope of government power. Because new policy alternatives are more likely to expand than contract government, Republicans focus on position-taking and retrenchment, whereas Democrats prioritize substantive policy changes. We review the history of the parties in government, including Democratic amendments to congressional rules in the 1970s, the decline in liberal policymaking, and the remaking of the Republican Party in the image of movement activists in the
1980s. Democrats have responded to conservative ideological critiques by advancing policies that incorporate markets, build incrementally on existing institutions, minimize bureaucracies, and decentralize responsibility. Republicans have thus succeeded in limiting visible expansions of central government but not in reducing the breadth of national policy.

Bruce I. Oppenheimer and Marc J. Hetherington

This chapter analyzes and contrasts the congressional struggle over energy legislation in the 1970s with the one of 2001–5. In doing so, it serves as a vehicle for evaluating the impact of changes that have occurred in U.S. governing parties as they have gone from relatively weak, ideologically diverse, noncohesive, overlapping organizing structures that granted their leaders limited powers to stronger, relatively ideologically homogeneous, highly cohesive (by historical standards) and polarized ones, willing to grant their leaders far greater authority and resources with which to mobilize their members. Among the questions addressed are the following: In what ways has the move to what has been labeled “conditional party government” affected the nature of coalition building in Congress? Have the effects been different in the Senate than in the House? What has been the impact on the nature of public policy? Does conditional party government result in the passage of legislation at median party positions, as opposed to at median chamber positions?

Party Policies and Policy Outputs
Russell J. Dalton, David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister

This chapter draws on OECD data to examine how the constellation of parties in office can impact on the policy outputs of the government.
It first describes how the party government model leads to parties functioning like unitary actors that produce nearly unanimous policy voting. It then outlines the literature on the role that parties can play in shaping policy, and looks at how we measure policy and its relationship to voters' and government positions on the Left-Right dimension. Finally, the chapter draws these themes together to determine what they tell us about how parties operate to attract votes, and the role of policy in the electoral equation.

Personality Politics in Single-Party and Coalition Governments
Solidea Formichelli

in Personality Politics?: The Role of Leader Evaluations in Democratic Elections
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Publisher: Oxford University Press
Item type: chapter

This chapter investigates the importance of government type (coalition or single-party government) in the strength of leader effects, across eighteen European Member States, in a period of time that ranges from 1990 to 2006. First a model is built to compare the explanatory power of an exclusively socio-political model of voting behaviour with one where leaders’ impact on voting behaviour is added to determine the significance of leader effects in the model. Then, the previous analysis is re-run controlling for the effects of the government type. This chapter proves how leaders’ evaluation affects voting behaviour and how this impact varies in different contexts. Not only, in fact, is leaders’ impact one of the main determining factors of voting behaviour, but this impact is significantly affected by the political context: higher in countries with a one-party system than in countries ruled by coalition governments.