This chapter looks at how people develop into ethical beings, with special emphasis on Lawrence Kohlberg's moral-development theory. It explores ethical development in the professions, including journalism. Just as medical professionals develop proficiency in areas unique to their work, such as ensuring patient confidentiality and avoiding harm, journalists develop special expertise in such topics as ensuring privacy, avoiding plagiarism and deception, and keeping promises. New journalists find that organizations, codes, and colleagues continue to shape their moral fiber. The chapter also examines the current research on the most important influences on journalists' quality of ethical reasoning. Above and beyond things such as religion and education, moral development for journalists is influenced by factors such as professional autonomy and experience with investigative reporting.

The inculcation of patriotism is often construed as a curb on the development of critical reason, and hence, as repugnant to any conception of political education that valorizes autonomy. This view of patriotic education, recently defended by William Galston, is shown to rest on illiberal premises about the role of emotions in public life. A form
of liberal patriotic education, derived from Rawls's account of moral development, that escapes the pitfalls of Galston's account is delineated.

Shame and Moral Development: The Incontinent, the Continent, the Naturally Virtuous, and the Properly Virtuous
Howard J. Curzer

in Aristotle and the Virtues

Aristotle’s moral development path has six stages. At each stage the learner gains a different component of virtue at the prompting of a different catalyst, but those who lack the relevant catalyst remain fixated or regress. The many become generous-minded; the generous-minded become incontinent; and the incontinent become continent by performing virtuous acts prompted by (1) threat of punishment, (2) shame, and (3) remorse, respectively. The continent become naturally virtuous by (4) listening to the right music. The naturally virtuous become properly virtuous by (5) being taught which character traits are conducive to happiness. Thus the properly virtuous gain the knowledge of why virtuous acts are virtuous. An important Aristotelian observation is that people progress at different rates with respect to different spheres. A person can be simultaneously incontinent with respect to sensual pleasure and virtuous with respect to physical risk, for example.

Explaining Value
Gilbert Harman

Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self-defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person’s values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter,
are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?

Hume’s Free-Standing Sentimentalism
Michael L. Frazer

in The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today
Published in print: 2010 Published Online: September 2010
Item type: chapter

This chapter argues that Hume provides a free-standing ethics built from a psychologically holistic account of moral reflection. The chapter begins with Hume’s description of how sympathy gives rise to our unrefined moral sentiments. In order to support stable, widely shared moral standards, our initial moral sentiments then undergo a considerable process of refinement and correction. Mature, corrected moral sentiments then have genuine authority over our evaluations and behavior. The reflective stability of a mind governed by such sentiments, Hume argues, is a necessary component of human happiness. Far from advocating a form of moral skepticism, Hume’s sentimentalist ethics is intended to help us better commit ourselves to genuine virtue, while rejecting both our own immediate inclinations and the false virtues we may mistakenly endorse.

Political Conflict and Moral Reasoning in Northern Ireland
Ferguson Neil

in On Behalf of Others: The Psychology of Care in a Global World
Published in print: 2009 Published Online: February 2010
Item type: chapter

The decline of moral constraints in a society suffering from intra-state conflict and experiences of violence on an everyday basis is explored in this chapter. Here the author focuses on the moral development of Catholic and Protestant youth in Northern Ireland. The scope of the chapter is to assess whether partisan solutions that violate moral social standards associated with in-group loyalty are employed by Northern Irish youths. The findings show that the major factor that impacts on moral reasoning is not the conflict between Irish Catholics and British
Protestants, but the conflict between those who show strong group loyalty and those who seek a culture of coexistence. The findings of the cross-national comparison between Northern Irish and British students indicate a comparatively normal moral development of the former group. This is probably due to the developing peace process that seems to have reduced the general stress level on moral reasoning.

Ethical Decision Making in School Mental Health
James C. Raines and Nic T. Dibble

There are three essential differences between this book and most others in the field of ethics. First, instead of focusing on specific issues, it focuses on the process of ethical decision-making. Second, instead of writing for a specific profession, it is written for all mental health professionals working in elementary and secondary schools. Finally, most other books on ethics assume that they are writing for the individual ethical agent, it argues that the best ethical decisions are made in collaboration with others. The book examines a seven-step process for resolving difficult ethical dilemmas in schools: (i) knowing yourself and your professional responsibilities, (ii) analyzing the predicament, (iii) seeking consultation, (iv) identifying courses of action, (v) managing clinical concerns, (vi) implementing the decision, and (vii) reflecting on the process. Each chapter contains real-life scenarios based on real practice or actual cases in the public domain, ethical guidelines for addressing key points, exercises, and relevant internet sites.

BOTTOM-UP AND DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES
Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen

This chapter surveys bottom-up approaches to the development of artificial moral agents. These approaches apply methods from machine learning, Kohlberg's theory of moral development, and techniques from artificial life (Alife) and evolutionary robotics, such as evolution through genetic algorithms, to the goal of facilitating the emergence of moral capacities from general aspects of intelligence. Such approaches hold
out the prospect that moral behavior is a self-organizing phenomenon in which cooperation and a shared set of moral instincts (if not a “moral grammar”) might emerge – this despite the logic of game theory which seems to suggest only self-interested rationality can prevail in an evolutionary contest. A primary challenge for bottom-up approaches is how to provide sufficient safeguards against learning or evolving bad behaviors as well as good.

A Framework for the Psychology of Norms
Chandra Sekhar Sripada and Stephen Stich

in The Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition
Published in print: 2007 Published Online: May 2007
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0017
Published Online: May 2007

Human social life is regulated by an extensive network of informal social rules and principles often called norms. This chapter offers an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes underlying norms that integrates findings from a number of disciplines, and can serve as a framework for future research. It begins by discussing a number of social-level and individual-level generalizations about norms that place constraints on possible accounts of norm psychology. After proposing its own model of the psychological processes by which norms are acquired and utilized, it discusses a number of open questions about the psychology of norms. These include questions about the role of social learning, emotions, and various reasoning processes in norm psychology.

Emotionism
Jesse J. Prinz

in The Emotional Construction of Morals
Published in print: 2009 Published Online: October 2011
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.003.0001
Published Online: October 2011

Moral judgements are anything but indifferent and this is exemplified in this chapter through the comparison of asking opinion about capital punishment in which a common answer would be the feeling that it is unjustifiable. If it is turned into the question of one's feeling about trees, the answer would probably not be that one feels they photosynthesize. Ethical theorists, on the other hand, are prepared to reject the contrast as the claim that emotions figure into morality can be defined in various
ways. There are two distinct emotionist theses and these are discussed in the present chapter arguing first that identifying moral properties cannot be made without referring to an emotion or class of emotions. Philosophical arguments are considered in favor of emotionism, although the cases presented are not intended to be demonstrative proof that the ontology and epistemology of morals can be implicated by emotions.

**Darwin et al. on Developmental Optimization**

David Loye

in *Evolution, Early Experience and Human Development: From Research to Practice and Policy*

Published in print: 2012 Published Online: January 2013


Item type: chapter

There exists a disastrous discrepancy between the prevailing Darwinism of survival of the fittest and selfishness above all and implications for science, and education about the fact that Darwin actually wrote only twice of survival of the fittest but 95 times about love, and only 12 times about selfishness but 92 times about moral development, in The Descent of Man. It shows how reclamation of Darwin's “lost theory” reveals new relevance to the works of Bowlby, Erickson, Damon, de Waal, Harlow, Hoffman, Lewontin, Narvaez, Oliner, Rest, Schore, Yarrow, Montessori, Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Seldin and Epstein, in moral development and education; to Maslow's classic study of self-actualizers as moral exemplars; to the global ethic “movement” of theologian Hans Kung; to the development of the Global Sounding measure and companion moral code by Loye; and to the work of cultural transformation theorist Eisler identifying the child developmental impact of partnership versus domination systems.

**Aristotle and the Virtues**

Howard J. Curzer

Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May 2012


Item type: book

Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics is hot. Yet Aristotle’s accounts of the individual virtues remain opaque, for most contemporary commentators of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics have focused upon other matters. By contrast, this book takes Aristotle’s detailed description of the individual virtues to be central to his ethical
Aristotle’s Painful Path to Virtue: The Many and the Generous-Minded

Howard J. Curzer

According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks that people learn to identify virtuous acts by being told which acts are virtuous, habitually performing these acts, and taking pleasure in performing them. This chapter raises several objections to Burnyeat’s interpretation, including the surprising observation that Aristotle stipulates that virtuous acts are not typically pleasant for learners or even for virtuous people. According to Aristotle, pain rather than pleasure drives moral progress. People come to desire virtuous acts through internalizing punishment, that is, learning to feel shame at wrongdoing. Shame not only emphasizes that certain acts in certain situations are wrong, it also sets people thinking about which acts should be performed, instead. Shame is felt with respect to acts done by others, and acts under consideration, as well as acts done. The pain of vicarious, retrospective, and prospective shame develops the ability to identify virtuous acts.
Introduction
Howard J. Curzer

in Aristotle and the Virtues

Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May 2012
Item type: chapter

This chapter contains a few methodological remarks and a brief survey of the rest of the book.

The Developmental Relations between Perspective Taking and Prosocial Behaviors: A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Task-Specificity Hypothesis
Gustavo Carlo, George P. Knight, Meredith McGinley, Rebecca Goodvin, and Scott C. Roesch

in Self- and Social-Regulation: Exploring the Relations Between Social Interaction, Social Understanding, and the Development of Executive Functions

Published in print: 2010 Published Online: May 2010
Item type: chapter

Given the multidimensional nature of both perspective taking and prosocial behaviors, the authors advance an information processing position that attending to characteristics of tasks used to assess these constructs will clarify the nature of their associations. A meta-analysis is presented to address the task specificity hypothesis such that perspective taking and prosocial behavior are more strongly related with greater similarity in the task dimensions of emotionality, target protagonist, and context specificity. Results support this hypothesis; the magnitude of relations between perspective taking and prosocial behavior was independently predicted by each dimension, and higher task similarity on two dimensions substantially increased explained variance. Age differences in links between perspective taking and prosocial behavior were also found suggesting that effects are strongest in middle-childhood and adolescence. Implications are discussed for the study of social cognitions and moral behaviors.
Informed by Darwin's description of the "moral sense," this chapter addresses the characteristics of early life experience for young children as identified by the anthropologists for the environment of evolutionary adaptedness as part of social mammalian evolution (extensive breastfeeding, nearly constant touch, prompt response to needs, multiple adult caregivers and maternal social support, free play in nature, natural childbirth). The chapter examines how these characteristics may or may not be fundamental for optimal moral functioning.

Identifying Courses of Action
James C. Raines and Nic T. Dibble

Either-or dilemmas reduce the capacity of clinicians to manage ethical predicaments. Wise practitioners generate multiple courses of action prior to making a decision. It is important to consider the possible consequences to each course of action that is identified, including for all stakeholders. An important way to evaluate these different courses of action is to consider their congruence with commonly accepted moral principles. When working in pupil services, a professional's primary responsibility is to the student, however, there are also responsibilities that the practitioner has to the other stakeholders. Clinicians can help students improve their moral development by engaging them in ethical decision making, thus collaborative decision making should be the norm. In doing so, however, clinicians should assess the student's readiness to participate in ethical decision making. If students are too young, immature, cognitively delayed, or suffering from a mental illness, the practitioner should ensure parents are partners in the process.
The notion that “punishment works” is simply taken for granted as true, part of our existing mental model for dealing with other people. Here this chapter asks whether punishment actually is effective and under what conditions. In chronically stressed organizations, as leaders become more authoritarian and their efforts to correct problems are ineffective, leaders are likely to become increasingly punitive in an effort to exert control. But organizational practices that are perceived as unjust evoke a very human desire for vengeance. As in the case of the chronically stressed individual, shame, guilt, anger and a desire for justice can combine with unfortunate consequences for individuals and for the organization. When this is happening the organization may become both socially irresponsible and ethically compromised. The chapter explores what happens when good people do bad things, including when otherwise decent people stand around and watch unjust behavior and do nothing.

Social Hierarchy, Social Conflicts, and Moral Development

Elliot Turiel

This chapter offers a theoretical perspective on social and moral development, relevant to discussions of youth conflict and violence. Rejecting the idea that cultures have singular integrated patterns of moral functioning, it explains that a major source of conflict is social hierarchy characterized by dominant and subordinate positions, such as the positions of women and ethnic minority groups across many societies. The chapter reviews research examining conflicts across social developmental domains, in terms of the development of understandings of morality (harm, justice, and rights), social conventions, and personal prerogatives or entitlements. These categories of moral judgment are psycho-social practices that occur across cultures as sources of conflict, disagreement, and struggle. An example of the utility of this theory is its explanation, for example, of why children who are identified as
aggressive make moral judgments similar to those of other children but differ in their justifications about retaliation. Examples of group conflicts are also considered, including acts of violence stemming from social hierarchies and cultural practices, such as acts of conflict and resistance by women in contexts in India and Iran where women's freedom of movement and self-determination are much more restricted than men's.

Aristotle’s Losers: The Vicious, the Brutish, Natural Slaves, and TragicHeroes
Howard J. Curzer

in Aristotle and the Virtues
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Item type: chapter

Aristotle says, “We are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is but in order to become good.” Yet he thinks that some people cannot become good. Who are these people and why are they incorrigible? Aristotle presents a clear and credible picture of the types and causes of moral incorrigibility. His taxonomy of character flaws, moral vices, and personality disorders is reasonable and humane. His view of obstacles to moral improvement is simple, yet plausible. We can learn from Aristotle’s account. Aristotle notoriously endorses natural slavery. But this is not an endorsement of slavery. By limiting slavery to natural slaves and stipulating that natural slaves must be better off enslaved than free, Aristotle severely criticizes the exploitive slavery of his day, and proposes to replace it with a new, benign institution of involuntary commitment and care for people with certain mental illnesses.