This chapter addresses the issue of contact problems through the lens of the best interests of the child, an approach that is now dominant in the developed world. It begins with a discussion of the critical role of custody evaluators and mental health experts in cases involving parent-child contact problems. It then turns to a discussion of the legal responses to a postseparation rejection of a parent by a child that the court concludes is not justified—that is, to cases of alienation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of suggestions for how the family justice system should be structured to allow the most effective responses to children's resistance to parent contact, including a discussion of case management and the need for early identification, and appropriate and effective intervention.

Generalizing to Other Forms of Consequentialism
Paul Hurley

in Beyond Consequentialism

This chapter lays out several variants upon standard act consequentialism, including indirect act consequentialism, rule consequentialism, evaluator-relative consequentialism, and non-foundational consequentialism. It is argued that the arguments against standard act consequentialism developed in previous chapters extend to these other forms of consequentialism as well. A distinctive set of challenges is posed by non-foundational variants, which take the
ultimate foundations for consequentialist normative moral principles to be supplied by something other than impersonal value. It is shown in Section 8.5 that the arguments provided in earlier chapters generate a presumption against the success of any such non-foundational arguments for consequentialism. These general arguments are then applied to specific versions of non-foundational consequentialism that have been developed by Brad Hooker, David Cummiskey, and Derek Parfit.

Consequentializing and Deontologizing
Paul Hurley

in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 3
Published in print: 2013 Published Online: January 2014
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.003.0007

That many values can be consequentialized — incorporated into a ranking of states of affairs — is often taken to support the view that apparent alternatives to consequentialism are in fact forms of consequentialism. Such consequentializing arguments take two very different forms. The first is concerned with the relationship between morally right action and states of affairs evaluated evaluator-neutrally, the second with the relationship between what agents ought to do and outcomes evaluated evaluator-relatively. This chapter challenges the consequentializing arguments for both forms of consequentialism. The plausibility of the evaluator-neutral consequentializing of certain values, it is argued, in fact establishes the implausibility of an evaluator-neutral consequentialist account of such values. The problems that beset this evaluator-neutral consequentializing argument do not beset its evaluator-relative counterpart. The chapter demonstrates that evaluator-relatively consequentialized theories can also readily be ‘deontologized’, located within an alternative evaluative framework that is congenial to the articulation of nonconsequentialist moral theories.

Doing Valuable Time
Cheshire Calhoun

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We are evaluators. We pursue what we take to be valuable, strive to live meaningfully, judge whether our present circumstances are good
enough, and have standards for what we are willing to take an interest in rather than be bored by. We are also temporally oriented beings. We anticipate particular future events, previsaging them in imagination, and we live in the present under a general sense of what the future will be like. We often imagine how the temporal unfolding of events might have proceeded otherwise. And we understand our own life’s time as something to be spent and open to our choices about how to spend it. This is a book about the connection between these two features of human persons. It is also a book about the difficulties evaluators face in doing valuable time and the different ways we as evaluators connect and disconnect ourselves from our present and future. The author explores the nature of meaningful living, the motivating interest we take in our futures and lose in depression, how hope works to sustain difficult pursuits, the value of committing ourselves to having a particular future, the inevitability of boredom with the present, and the possibilities for being content with the imperfect present.

Conclusion
Cheshire Calhoun

in Doing Valuable Time: The Present, the Future, and Meaningful Living

Published in print: 2018 Published Online: February 2018
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Item type: chapter

This brief conclusion reviews central themes of the book. One central theme is living meaningfully. The book defends the view that meaningful living consists in spending your life’s time on ends that you take yourself, in your best judgment, to have reason to value and thus to use yourself up on. Meaningful living depends not only on what characterizes one’s whole life, but also on one’s actual time expenditures. The book argues that locking in the future by making commitments is not essential to meaningful living; it also explores the connections between meaningful living and boredom. A second theme of the book concerns the difficulties in living life as a temporal evaluator: the vulnerabilities to demoralization, estrangement, boredom, loss of practical hope and basal hopefulness, discontentment, and meaninglessness at the temporally local level. A third theme is the way our lives as evaluators are shaped in important ways by the personal, the nonrational, and optional styles.
Evaluating social cohesion
Helen Sullivan

in Promoting social cohesion: Implications for policy and evaluation
Published in print: 2011 Published Online: March 2012
Publisher: Policy Press
Item type: chapter

This chapter addresses the evaluation of social cohesion. It first determines some key evaluation challenges posed by the proposed definition of social cohesion. The chapter then situates these challenges in ongoing debates about the merits of different approaches to evaluation and highlights the potential contribution of recent developments in ‘theory-based evaluation’. Drawing on theory of change (ToC), it explores how these challenges may be met and the implications for evaluators. Three important debates have dominated evaluation research and practice. They concern the approach to evaluation, the methods used in evaluation, and the relationship between the evaluator and those being evaluated. The application of a ToC approach to the evaluation of social cohesion is also considered. There is an important relationship between evaluator and ‘subject’ in ToCs. Under New Labour, evaluation's profile was raised and it was acknowledged as a key element in the government's focus on ‘evidence-based policy making’.

Alternatives and Closing Remarks
Thomas L. Hafemeister

in Criminal Trials and Mental Disorders
Published in print: 2019 Published Online: September 2019
Publisher: NYU Press
Item type: chapter

The concluding chapter, Chapter 12, notes alternatives—such as diversion and mental health courts—to the commonly employed criminal justice proceedings that are being explored in the hope that they may be better suited for processing defendants with a mental disorder and thereby help to resolve some of the thorniest issues faced by the criminal justice system and society. It closes by reiterating the challenging nature of this field and stresses the important role that forensic mental health evaluators and their evaluations can play.
This chapter presents a conceptual framework for assessment. It summarizes some of the key concepts associated with assessment in the service of learning and develops the theoretical bases for the collection of practices which follow. The framework highlights three key concepts which underpin the collection: assessment tasks as learning tasks; student involvement in assessment; and the notion of feedback as ‘feedforward’.

Organizational Understandings
in The Evaluation Society

This chapter introduces three different models that help in the study of evaluation from the viewpoint of organizational theory. These three models are the institutionalized organization, the rational organization, and the learning organization. The institutionalized organization provides important contrast to the ideals of the rational and learning organizations, while the rational organization gives a primary ideal for the very occurrence of organization within today's society. Finally, learning organization zeroes in on the ideal that most evaluators share.

Epilogue
in The Evaluation Society

This concluding chapter identifies issues that are relevant for the work of evaluators and for the future of evaluation. It demonstrates how the analysis presented in this book highlights a type of thinking about evaluation; this thinking is shown to be an alternative to the current self-understanding of modern evaluation practices. Furthermore, it
shows that this line of thinking is not reserved for evaluators alone. This chapter reiterates that those who want to understand the expectations, norms, and values that evaluators and others knowingly (and at times, unknowingly) bring to evaluation should have a basic understanding of it first. More specifically, their understanding must focus on how evaluation is ordered, designed, and shaped by society and organization, the two primary principles of social order in modernity.

Introduction
Cheshire Calhoun

in Doing Valuable Time: The Present, the Future, and Meaningful Living
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Item type: chapter

This chapter introduces the topic of the book—the connection between being an evaluator and living temporally—and summarizes the succeeding chapters. Two preliminary topics are explored: what it means to be temporally oriented toward the future, and what it means to lead a life. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that the future has a qualitative content; and a distinction is drawn between a narrow sense of leading a life that concerns choosing what will characterize our lives as a whole and a broader sense of leading a life that concerns making choices that reflect one’s normative outlook. Leading a life in either sense involves spending time; the chapter distinguishes four categories of time expenditures: primary, filler, entailed, and norm-required.

Living with Boredom
Cheshire Calhoun

in Doing Valuable Time: The Present, the Future, and Meaningful Living
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Rejecting the standard focus on boredom as a cultural or personal problem, this chapter examines how boredom illuminates the kinds of problems that evaluators face just in being evaluators. The chapter explores five reasons for boredom: (1) loss of temporal meaning; (2) normative constraints; (3) disappointment with present value qualities given the standards of what is worth attending to that one sets for oneself; (4) value satiety when spending extended time with a particular
value quality exhausts one’s capacities to do anything more with it; and (5) leisure, whereby the agent is burdened with the task of finding things to do with herself.

New Consequentialism and the New Doing-Allowing Distinction
Paul Hurley

in Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems

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Item type: chapter

Intuitively, we sometimes have decisive reasons not to do certain things even though such restraint allows something worse overall to happen. Traditional consequentialists challenge the legitimacy of this distinction, but a new wave of evaluator-relative consequentialists endorses this commonsense doing-allowing distinction. This chapter demonstrates that such new wave consequentialists in fact shift their target to a new intuitive distinction, that we sometimes have decisive reasons not to do things even though such restraint allows an evaluator-relatively worse outcome to happen. The chapter argues that the appeal to a “teleological conception of reasons” (TCR) grounds the arguments against this new distinction; that the case for TCR is itself grounded in appeals to outcome-centered accounts of values, attitudes, and actions; that alternative accounts of values, attitudes, and actions do not support TCR; and that acceptance of such alternative accounts undermines the case for consequentialism at the deepest level.