This chapter argues that Evans was unsuccessful in his attempts to establish that in order to have the idea of an objective world one must also have the idea of a spatial world. It doubts his suggestion that the Kantian thesis cannot be defended without showing that the idea of space is implicitly involved in the very idea of existence unperceived. A different and better approach was suggested by Kant in the first Critique. According to Kant, it is the perception of space rather than the idea of space that should be seen as necessary for objective experience. The chapter considers the respects in which this version of the Kantian thesis fares better than Evans's account of the link between space and objectivity. It rejects Kant's idealist explanation of this link. It outlines an explanation that does not depend on Kant's idealism.

This volume brings together new chapters on assertion by leading epistemologists and philosophers of language. The chapters are arranged into two sections. The chapters in the first section address the question of what an assertion is. MacFarlane surveys and evaluates the various possible theories, leaning towards a commitment view. Kölbel defends a view that combines a commitment approach with Stalnaker's 'essential effect' as a necessary condition. At the centre of Pagin's proposal is the notion of an utterance being made 'prima facie because it is true'.
Cappelen promotes a debunking view according to which the category of assertion is superfluous. Robert Stalnaker shows how de se content can be incorporated into his theory of assertion. The chapters in the second section focus on the idea that there is an epistemic norm of assertion. The contributions by Brown and Lackey question sufficiency: knowing that \( p \) puts one in a good enough epistemic position to assert that \( p \). Kvanvig questions necessity: one is in a good enough epistemic position to assert that \( p \) only if one knows that \( p \). Goldberg argues that if there is a necessary epistemic condition on appropriate assertion then this can explain certain prominent features of testimony. Greenough considers how a relativist should best specify the epistemic norms for assertion. Maitra questions Williamson’s suggestion that the intimate connection between the notion of assertion and the epistemic norms governing it can be understood on analogy with the rules of a game.

The Searchlight View
George Sher

in Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness
Published in print: 2009 Published Online: September 2009
Publisher: Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.003.0001
Item type: chapter

This chapter raises the question of how we are to understand the epistemic condition for responsibility. It introduces the searchlight view, which asserts that agents are responsible only for those features and results of their acts of which they are aware when they perform the acts, and it documents that view's prominence. It then suggests that the searchlight view is problematic because it draws on a conception of the responsible agent that is closely linked to the first-personal perspective while purporting to specify a necessary condition for the applicability of a concept—responsibility—whose natural context is third-personal. The chapter ends with an outline of the book's main arguments.

Against Deflationary Interpretations
Lucy Allais

in Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism and his Realism
Published in print: 2015 Published Online: September 2015
Publisher: Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747130.003.0004
Item type: chapter
This chapter argues against deflationary interpretations which hold that Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and appearances is epistemological or methodological, rather than metaphysical. It focuses on Henry Allison’s notion of epistemic conditions, and argues that this notion cannot do justice either to the mind-dependence of appearances or to the claim that we cannot cognize things as they are in themselves. It is argued that Kant needs his notion of things as they are in themselves to do metaphysical work, in particular in resolving the Antinomies, and that this requires a commitment to there actually being a way things are as they are in themselves.

Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland (eds)

Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, and it is high time for a full volume on the topic. The chapters in this volume address the following central questions. Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one’s culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one’s action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one’s quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?

The Epistemic Condition on Moral Blameworthiness
Peter A. Graham (ed.)
It is often said that there is an epistemic condition on a person’s being morally blameworthy for something. The epistemic condition, the chapter argues, is a theoretical epiphenomenon: for those A-ings for which one is morally blameworthy, most fundamentally, there is no particular epistemic relation one must stand in to one’s A-ing for one to be morally blameworthy for it. The thought that there is an epistemic condition on moral blameworthiness is a consequence of a failure to appreciate that what people are most fundamentally morally blameworthy for are not their actions or even the consequences of their actions. Rather, what people are most fundamentally morally blameworthy for are their attitudes to and mental bearing toward those things of intrinsic value around them. Once this is recognized, the epistemic condition simply falls away.

What it is to Possess a Reason
Errol Lord

in The Importance of Being Rational
Published in print: 2018 Published Online: July 2018
Item type: chapter

It is a truism that in order to possess a reason, one must stand in a privileged epistemic relation with that reason. Most of the literature on possession is about this condition. This chapter defends a view about the epistemic condition. It does this by considering three different divisions between views about the epistemic condition and arguing via process of elimination that the epistemic condition is being in a position to know. Along the way arguments are given against the E = K thesis and the view that reasons explanations are non-factive. Initial connections between possession and correctly responding to reasons are forged.

Introduction
Jan Willem Wieland (ed.)
in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Published in print: 2017 Published Online: July 2017
Item type: chapter

This Introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. Its main goal is to offer a framework that contextualizes the chapters that follow. Section 1
discusses the main concepts of ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. Section 2 asks why agents should inform themselves. Section 3 describes what is taken to be the core agreement among the main participants in the debate. Section 4 explains how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. Section 5 provides an overview of the main responses to the regress argument. Section 6 addresses the question of why blameless ignorance excuses. Section 7 describes further issues that are addressed in the book. Section 8 concludes with some discussion of future directions the debate might take.

The Triumph of Tracing
Neal A. Tognazzini

in Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value
Published in print: 2012 Published Online: May 2015
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Item type: chapter

This chapter focuses on the notion of tracing in the theory of moral responsibility. Tracing states that individuals' moral responsibility can be traced back to an action of which they had control. It also presents Manuel Vargas' case that explains the tension between the idea of tracing and the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. The chapter argues that each of Vargas' case fails to satisfy at least one of his contentions. If tracing cannot be proven true, this would seem to be a devastating challenge to some theories like Kane's and Fischer's. However, as the chapter applies similar analysis to some intriguing examples presented by Angela Smith, the notion of tracing remains valid.

Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
Gunnar Björnsson (ed.)
in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Published in print: 2017 Published Online: July 2017
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Item type: chapter

This chapter combines the familiar Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depend on the agent’s quality of will with an independently motivated account of responsibility as grounded in a normal explanatory relation between agential qualities and objects of responsibility. The resulting “explanatory quality of will condition” on moral responsibility
is then further motivated by being shown to account for the effects on moral blame and credit of justifications, excuses, and undermined control in cases where agents are fully aware of what they are doing. Having been independently motivated, the explanatory quality of will condition is then applied to cases involving lack of awareness. Though this condition involves no explicit epistemic condition on responsibility, it is shown how it accounts for the degrees to which lack of awareness can excuse.

Consciousness in Locke’s Theory of Knowledge
Shelley Weinberg
in Consciousness in Locke
Published in print: 2016 Published Online: March 2016
Item type: chapter

Chapter 3, in three parts, provides a structurally integrated account of a yet uncultivated aspect of Locke’s epistemology: how we have knowledge of individual things, namely our own ideas and ourselves (part I), and external world objects (part II). Although Locke defines knowledge generally as the perception of an agreement, or relation, of ideas, in each of these cases of knowing an individual thing there seems to be only one idea. The apparent tension dissolves once consciousness is seen as a constituent of a more complex perceptual state that helps to forge the agreement perceived constituting knowledge in each case. Emphasis on the subjective experience of thinking reveals how these forms of knowledge are achieved. Part III expands that analysis and the role consciousness plays by showing how Locke’s response to the challenge of external world skepticism includes both psychological and normative epistemic conditions on knowledge.

Methodological Conservatism and the Epistemic Condition
Neil Levy (ed.)
in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Published in print: 2017 Published Online: July 2017
Item type: chapter

The claim that agents are morally responsible for actions the wrongness of which they fail to be aware of only if they are responsible for their occurrent ignorance strikes many philosophers as unacceptable, because it is too revisionary: it entails that many of the everyday judgments
that we are disposed to make are false. Agents satisfy these conditions too infrequently for our everyday judgments to be vindicated. These philosophers maintain that it is a theoretical virtue to preserve as many of our everyday judgments as possible. This chapter attempts to show that we ought not to strive to preserve as many of our everyday judgments about responsibility as we might think. It offers an error theory for why we are often disposed to judge that individuals are responsible when we are implicitly committed to thinking that they are not.

**Action, Ethics, and Responsibility: A Framework**
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein

in *Action, Ethics, and Responsibility*

Published in print: 2010 Published Online: August 2013
Item type: chapter

This book is largely focused on the issue of responsibility; its chapters discuss topics all significantly related to this issue, including metaphysics, action theory, ethics and moral theory, and the philosophy of law. One of the main topics in this chapter is the metaphysics of moral responsibility, in which two relevant conditions are necessary in order for a person to assume responsibility for an action. First, there is a freedom-relevant condition and, second, there is an epistemic condition. The former has always been controversial such that there exists no generally accepted view of its principles; the few uncontroversial ones will be the subject of discussion here. The “alternatives view” of free will, which states that an action is free only if the doer had alternative possibilities of action, is also examined here.

**Hard to Know**
Gwen Bradford (ed.)

in *Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition*

Published in print: 2017 Published Online: July 2017
Item type: chapter

It is a natural thought that if discerning some morally relevant factor would be exceptionally difficult, we are not to blame if we fail to recognize it. This chapter argues that difficulty per se does not shape the epistemic condition. According to the best account of difficulty, difficulty
is a matter of exerting effort. All other apparent kinds of difficulty can be explained by this unified account. Further, there is no stock set of what we may call effort-requiring features. Importantly, some of these effort-requiring features mitigate blameworthiness, whereas others do not. Effort-requiring features that reflect badly on the agent, for example, mitigate blameworthiness to a lesser extent than those that do not. Difficulty itself does not actually mitigate blameworthiness. In cases where difficulty does appear to mitigate blameworthiness, it is either the effort-requiring features that do so, or it is overriding considerations lost through sacrifice of effort.

On Knowing What’s Right and Being Responsible for It
Paulina Sliwa (ed.)

in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Published in print: 2017 Published Online: July 2017
Item type: chapter

The debate about whether moral responsibility has an epistemic condition has traditionally focused on whether and, if so, when moral ignorance can provide an excuse for wrong actions. This chapter takes up the question of moral responsibility for right actions. Its central claim is that whether an agent is morally responsible for her right action depends on whether she knows what the right thing is to do. The chapter’s argument for this appeals to considerations from the philosophy of action. It argues that moral knowledge matters to moral evaluations because it is a central ingredient in intentional action. Our knowledge of what the right and wrong thing is to do partly determines whether we do the right or wrong thing intentionally. Moral responsibility inherits its epistemic condition from the epistemic condition on intentional action.

Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability
Gunnar Björnsson

in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4
Published in print: 2017 Published Online: August 2017
Item type: chapter

Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This
paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it avoids some objections to quality of will accounts recently raised by Gideon Rosen. But an intuitive worry brought out by these objections remains. Section 4 spells out this remaining worry and argues that, like traditional metaphysical responsibility skepticism, it has its source in a non-standard explanatory perspective on action, suggesting that strategies for explaining away the intuitive pull of traditional skepticism are applicable in this case too.

Huckleberry Finn Revisited
Nomy Arpaly

Published in print: 2015 Published Online: June 2015
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Item type: chapter

This chapter argues that Huck Finn cases, or cases of inverse akrasia, give us reasons to believe that moral ignorance does not excuse from blame and that, therefore (1) theorists of moral responsibility are mistaken when they hold that one has to know that an action is wrong in order to be blameworthy for it and (2) the main intuition behind the view that there is something admirable about concern for doing the right thing de dicto is an illusion of sorts.