Sir Harold Nicolson’s international thought, more specifically, his thinking on international order, diplomacy, a united Europe, world government, and global peace, was shaped by his upbringing in a diplomatic household, an Oxford classical education, and two decades as a diplomat in Europe and Asia Minor. Especially significant were his Foreign Office service in London during the First World War and his involvement in peacemaking at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Nicolson also made important contributions at the Lausanne Conference (1922–23), en poste in Germany between 1927 and 1929, and as an anti-appeasement MP prior to the Second World War. His fifty-year career, from the time of the Balkan Wars to Suez, represented an attempt to resolve the question of how best to secure international stability: through power politics, idealism, or an amalgam of realist and idealist approaches.

Sir Harold Nicolson’s approach to the questions of inter-war European security represented an evolution from an idealist outlook at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to a more measured degree of idealism during the late 1920s. As the 1930s advanced, and the League of Nations and action based on the principles of collective security proved unable to
quell the Japanese, Italian, and German aggression, Nicolson sought
to devise new methods of resolving the major questions of peace and
war. His solution was liberal realism, a fusion of idealism and realism. It
was an amalgam of Aristotelian and Thucydidean principles of statecraft
and diplomacy. By the late 1930s, with Germany rejecting reasonable
revisions of the Treaty of Versailles, he began to believe that war could
only be avoided if the democracies and the USSR initiated a cohesive
strategy of alliance diplomacy while pursuing dialogue with the dictators.
The Munich Agreement of 1938 and the steady unravelling of Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement finally convinced
Nicolson that war was inevitable.

Communication between hosts and social parasites
Davod R. Nash and Jacobus J. Boomsma

in Sociobiology of Communication: an interdisciplinary perspective

All parasites need to evade host defences to be successful. Social
parasites, however, face unique challenges and opportunities. Their
hosts are particularly well defended against intruders, but their social
communication systems provide an alternative means of exploitation,
if social parasites can evolve ways to subvert this system for their own
ends. This chapter briefly reviews the range of tactics used by social
parasites to exploit their hosts, and the communication channels and
strategies used. Detailed analysis is presented of a few key systems that
have been particularly well studied (Maculinea butterflies, Microdon flies,
and slave-making and inquiline ants). The chapter examines general
patterns of how social parasites use communication with their hosts
to enhance their success, and the consequences that this has for the
coevolutionary interaction between social parasites and their hosts.

Christian Awakening and the New China
Lamin Sanneh

in Disciples of All Nations: Pillars of World Christianity
Synopsis: The chapter describes Chinese nationalism's confrontation with missions, and how Marxist revolution continued that confrontation, culminating in Mao's New China. The chapter examines the Cultural Revolution, the Protestant Three-Self movement, the Catholic Patriotic Association, and the phenomenon of registered and unregistered churches to account for the religious ferment in post-Maoist China. China's Marxist revolution found resonance among progressive Western voices who called for appeasement and accommodation. The chapter describes the ordination of Florence Lei as lightening rod for debate about women's role in church and society, and the ensuing controversy at the 1948 Lambeth Conference. Catholic and Protestant fortunes revived after the thaw in 1986, and the chapter discusses the role of charismatic groups and the Catholic renewal in China's global role. The chapter concludes with a look at religion as a dimension of civil society, and the importance of the growing Chinese diaspora.

Arthur Bryant, Appeasement, and Anti-Semitism
Reba N. Soffer

in History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: From the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan

Bryant's attitudes towards fascism cannot be separated from the rapidly accelerating events that began around 1934; or from the conflicting and confusing perceptions of those events and their context to most British participants; or from the political and social circles in which Bryant lived, thought, and worked. His commitment to the avoidance of war was hardly unique but belonged rather to a common currency, whose credit was exhausted only when war began in late 1939. The relation between his deeply felt patriotism and his desire to avoid war with the Nazis was complicated by the ambivalent anti-Semitism he shared with so many Conservatives.

Profits of Peace
Scott Newton

Profits of Peace
This interpretation of Anglo-German appeasement challenges existing accounts, both orthodox and revisionist, by focusing on the economic motivations behind appeasement rather than on the workings of foreign policy. This book argues that appeasement stemmed from the determination of interwar administrations particularly that of Neville Chamberlain, to protect the liberal-capitalist status quo established in the collapse of Lloyd George's attempts at reconstruction after 1918. This book shows that the government, aided and abetted by the Bank of England, the City, and large-scale industry, maintained its search for detente well beyond the outbreak of war, up until Winston Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940. The book goes on to reveal that certain circles within the establishment loyal to the pre-war order continued their efforts to reach agreement with Germany even after 1940. It argues that the Hess affair represented the appeasers' last throw: the subsequent entry of the USSR and the USA into the conflict guaranteed the impossibility of a separate Anglo-German settlement, and combined with war socialism at home to open the door to a new era characterized by the welfare state and the Anglo-American special relationship.

Status Quo
Stephen G. Craft

in American Justice In Taiwan: The 1957 Riots and Cold War Foreign Policy

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Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813166353.003.0014
Item type: chapter

Chapter 14 describes the political climate of fear and resentment that lingered between the United States and the ROC, despite open displays of goodwill. Eisenhower often questioned the placement of American troops overseas, but insisted that the U.S. position was essential to containing the spread of communism abroad, especially in Taiwan. Now that mutual confidence was undermined, any interest in SOFA negotiations with Taiwan was lost. Both sides took measures to prevent another incident like the Taiwan riots. While the ROC vowed to promote citizenship (rather than nationalism), train its police force in riot control, and offer conciliatory speeches and pamphlets, the U.S. vowed to teach Chinese customs more comprehensively, reduce personnel, decrease the size of MAAG, and encourage liability insurance for American drivers. Still, accidents continued to occur, and the situation in Taiwan remained particularly tense when many began to observe a breakdown in the discipline of American troops and an actual increase in American personnel living overseas. Though efforts at appeasement persisted,
the riots of Black Friday afforded no lasting change and the highly contentious policy of diplomatic immunity remained in effect.

Introduction
Scott Newton

in Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement
Published in print: 1996 Published Online: October 2011
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202127.003.0001
Item type: chapter

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the British policy of appeasement and how it was continued beyond the outbreak of war with the support of the government until Chamberlain's resignation on 10 May 1940, and quite unofficially thereafter. It also traces the roots of the pre-war status quo back at least to the mid-Victorian order, when it became axiomatic for British politics and economics to centre on the defence of free trade, the convertibility of sterling into gold at a fixed rate of exchange, and the balanced budget.

The Genesis of Appeasement, 1933–1938
Scott Newton

in Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement
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Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202127.003.0004
Item type: chapter

The capture of Europe's most powerful economy by National Socialism was a profoundly disturbing event for Germany's neighbours and for all those who were committed to the complex of Enlightenment values which had sustained the growth and development of western society since the Industrial Revolution. It also posed a specific challenge, initially economic but in time also strategic, to British interests. Preservation of the status quo lay behind Chamberlain's search for a settlement with Germany. The prime minister hoped to avoid an open-ended commitment to higher levels of defence expenditure through the pursuit of a rearmament programme which would deter the Nazis from an adventurist foreign policy and bring them to the conference table. From the moment Chamberlain became prime minister, therefore, the National Government single-mindedly pursued a twin-track policy of deterrence and détente.
The Climax of Appeasement, 1938–1939
Scott Newton

in Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement
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Publisher: Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202127.003.0005

The high tide of British attempts to reach a lasting settlement with Germany ran from the summer of 1938 until March 1939. It was a period which started with the Sudeten crisis, peaked at Munich, and came to an end with the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. During this time the British government stepped up its efforts to reach détente with Nazi Germany on the basis of political and economic agreements intended to redress the perceived injustices of Versailles and simultaneously to draw the Third Reich away from autarky.

The Approach of War, March-September 1939
Scott Newton

in Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement
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The German invasion of Czechoslovakia was a surprise to the British government and provoked widespread anxiety amongst a public whose willingness to believe in the permanence of the Munich agreement was evaporating fast. In Westminster the government came under pressure from the Labour Party; but for Chamberlain the most alarming development was the open disenchantment with appeasement revealed on his own side of the House. A looming financial crisis coincided with and may well have inspired a series of attempts at concluding a lasting Anglo-German détente. The point of all the activity was to persuade Hitler that co-operation with Britain on a broad political and economic front was possible — but only on condition that Germany renounced the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. The search for such a diplomatic coup led the Chamberlain government to make a number of generous offers to Germany during the course of July and August 1939.
Conclusion

Scott Newton

in Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement

The Hess affair marked the last serious attempt to reach a specifically Anglo-German, détente. In July 1945 the British electorate, radicalized by total war, elected a majority Labour government for the first time. There was to be no repeat of the post-1918 experience. This time the reconstruction agenda was carried through against weak opposition from a demoralized Conservative Party. By 1950 Britain had a National Health Service. Town and country planning was established. Economic expansion had reduced unemployment to below 3% of the work-force. A shift in manufacturing production and export composition away from the old staples in favour of the new industries which had received a stimulus from the war — electrical goods, electronics, aerospace, and vehicle manufacturing — was under way. Victory in war and success in reconstruction were, however, accompanied by dependence on the United States.

Churchill and Appeasement

Paul Addison

in Churchill

What might loosely be called the Churchillian critique of appeasement involves a series of assumptions about patterns of behaviour in international crises to which appeal has frequently been made both in Britain and in the United States. What is characteristic of this critique is that while purporting to be an argument about political realism, it is in fact one which is about morality. The term ‘appeasement’ itself has lost its original meaning of the defusing of conflict and taken on the meaning of purchasing peace for one's own interests by sacrificing the interests of others. It is worth recalling that in the 1930s, Winston Churchill did not oppose the appeasement of either Italy or Japan. And that in so far as both Italy and Japan remained neutral in 1939, leaving Britain to face Germany led by Adolf Hitler as its only enemy in Europe instead of
three worldwide, the appeasement of Italy and Japan did, for a time, pay handsome dividends.

Introduction
Sarah D. Shields

in Fezzes in the River: Identity Politics and European Diplomacy in the Middle East on the Eve of World War II

The government of Turkey claimed that the population of the Sanjak of Alexandretta was Turkish and insisted that the territory could therefore not become part of the predominantly Arabic-speaking Syria. This connection between language, identity, and state reflected new European ways of thinking about communities that were inconsistent with the historical experiences of the people of the multi-linguistic, multi-religious, even multi-“national” Ottoman empire of which the Sanjak had been part for the preceding four centuries. Saydo’s argument illustrates the irony of European statesmen’s insistence that Sanjak residents were composed of mutually exclusive identity groups: as onlookers watched, Saydo and his neighbor argued, gestured, and brandished their weapons as each shouted about whether the other should register as a Turks or an Arab, all the while speaking in Kurdish.

Independence
Sarah D. Shields

The Sanjak became independent on November 29, 1937, amid celebrations by local Turks. France and Turkey became embroiled in renewed controversy as Ankara claimed that mandatory officials were trying to thwart the Sanjak’s independence. Paris rushed to comply with Turkey’s demands, arresting Arab activists and sending high-ranking French officers to Ankara to discuss joint military actions. Turkish diplomats in Ankara objected to the new electoral regulations for the Sanjak, insisting that each voter had the right to declare his affiliation.
to any of the specified groups he chose; registration by community had not been intended to serve as a census of the relative population sizes, the Turks insisted. France agreed with Turkey’s demands, increasingly certain that Turkish neutrality would be essential if the growing tension in Europe spilled into war. Allowing anyone to register in any community encouraged both Turkish and Arab activists to recruit every potential voter.

Hopes of Anglo-French Intervention Fade
Burnett Bolloten

in The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution

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Item type: chapter

This chapter takes a more detailed look into the Anglo-French policies toward Spain, especially in light of its complex relations with Russia and Germany. Both Britain and France had feared that any interventions on their part in Spain's affairs would only come about to Russia's benefit, and potentially bolster Communism in the larger context of Europe. Nor did they care for the advancement of the German cause—both nations, as a matter of fact, preferred neither Germany nor Russia to gain the upper hand. Meanwhile, the chapter also considers how Stalin's democratic camouflage in Spain was doomed to failure, as despite distorting the true nature of the Revolution Stalin had failed to involve Britain and France in the Spanish conflict.

Leaders
Stuart Ball

in Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918-1945

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DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199667987.003.0008
Item type: chapter

This chapter arrives at the apex of power in the Conservative Party—the Leader of the Party. It analyses the office of Party Leader: their rise to the top, the machinery by which they ‘emerge’ or are chosen, their roles and duties in that post, and the mechanisms and difficulties involved in their removal. The styles of leadership exhibited by the five Leaders of the period are also considered and compared. The second part of the chapter focuses upon a fact that, whilst apparently politically dominant and
electronically successful, the Conservative Party between 1920 and 1940 was almost constantly affected by internal disunity which manifested as visible dissent and public opposition to the Leader or his policy. The final part of this chapter focuses on the four main crises of the Coalition in 1921–22, protectionism in 1929–31, India in 1929–35 and ‘appeasement’ in 1936–39 are considered first in terms of various common themes and patterns, and then the causes and outcome are examined in each case.

**Behavior and Ecology of Rock Iguanas, I**

Emília P. Martins and Kathryn E. Lacy

in Iguanas: Biology and Conservation

Published in print: 2004 Published Online: March 2012

This chapter examines the communicative displays of the Turks and Caicos Island iguana, Cyclura carinata. Animals living in social groups often exhibit communicative displays, for example, appeasement displays, to reduce aggression among individuals. This chapter considers the naturally occurring headbob displays of Cyclura carinata, testing the hypothesis that this form of display serves an appeasement or submissive function. It also explores the details of the display to identify structural differences between displays used in different contexts.

**A Symbol of Appeasement**

Laurence R. Jurdem

in Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy

Published in print: 2018 Published Online: January 2019

One of the major concerns of writers for the publications of conservative opinion was the growth of leftist ideology that permeated much of the newly independent Third World. Many of the activist leaders who led their nations’ independence movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the decades following World War II viewed the Soviet Union as an ally that was philosophically opposed to European imperialism. It was within the General Assembly of the United Nations that these new states began to exert their influence. Since the founding of the institution in 1945, the United States had been able to exert a large amount of
influence in the major decisions taken up by the UN. The independent nations that now occupied the diplomatic chamber were determined to redress the economic injustices they believed had been committed against them by the West. Commentators who contributed to these publications were frustrated by the inability of American policy makers to stand up to the rampant criticism of the United States and its democratic values and believed that this represented another example of the decline of US foreign policy.

The Obama Doctrine’s Reset with Russia and Europe
Robert G. Kaufman

in Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama's Grand Strategy Weakened America

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Item type: chapter

The Obama Doctrine’s combination of engagement of adversaries and reliance on soft power has reached its negative apotheosis with his zealous pursuit of the reset with an increasingly authoritarian and expansionist Russian regime. Calibrated sanctions and diplomacy will not suffice to persuade Putin to abandon his grand design to restore some type of Russian empire across central Europe, starting with the dismemberment of an independent Ukraine. The administration’s reset has demoralized traditional democratic allies in Eastern Europe and emboldened Putin’s worst instincts. The Western European democracies lack the political will or military capability to balance successfully against Putin without a strong, credible American military presence that President Obama’s diplomacy and improvident defense cuts have undermined. The Obama Doctrine will leave Europe less free and less secure than the more robust policies of his Republican internationalist predecessors.