Through Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier was able to send his message to Kissinger regarding his government's willingness to have a direct meeting or discussions with the United States. Thus, a breakthrough had arrived. All that remained was to decide on who would go and when. In this chapter, the author examines what prompted Kissinger's secret trip, codenamed Polo I, rather than an open one despite Zhou's April 27 message. It explores ideas about whether the secrecy of Kissinger's trip to China grew from a mixture of domestic political motives, international calculations, or personal ambition. Other breakthroughs discussed in this chapter are ping-pong diplomacy and the Soviets' decision to accelerate the détente process.

From Geneva to Bandung

Gregg A. Brazinsky

During the aftermath of the Korean War, the PRC continued seeking to strengthen its status in Asia, especially among other post-colonial states, but it hoped to do so in a more peaceful atmosphere that would allow economic recovery and domestic reconstruction. This chapter demonstrates how Beijing used two particularly important conferences—the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference—to demonstrate that it was a peaceful, responsible power. Guided by the
skilled statesmanship of Zhou Enlai, the PRC aimed to play a significant role in both conferences while working to assure that the conferences themselves would be important and produce significant results.

Beijing, 1972
Yafeng Xia and Chris Tudda


The Mao-Nixon summit was the first time that an American president had set foot in communist China. It followed twenty-two years of hostilities and confrontation between the two states and was a result of a radically changed international situation, following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. Mao adjusted his foreign policy in an attempt to join forces with the United States against the Soviet Union, while Nixon pursued a new strategy by achieving a rapprochement with China that none of his predecessors even attempted. With Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai as essential intermediaries, he engaged Mao in a discussion that ended the PRC’s isolation from the West and America’s estrangement from China, while also opening up new avenues for what the Americans called ‘triangular diplomacy’.

Countering Soviet Encirclement and Trying to Preserve Mao’s Legacy
John W. Garver

in China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China

Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic skill in handling rapprochement with the United States won him praise in the Western media. Mao became suspicious. If Zhou outlived Mao with prestige intact, he might reverse the Cultural Revolution and rehabilitate purged revisionists. Mao sought to diminish Zhou’s prestige by criticizing his capitulationist diplomacy with the United States. A botched deal with the United States in Cambodia offered evidence of abandoning revolution. Rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping was
part of Mao’s effort to put a solidly antirevisionist leadership in place. Deng’s stature was enhanced by having him give a keynote speech at the UN and oversee seizure of disputed islands in the South China Sea. China’s leaders increasingly sought a global united front against “Soviet social imperialist expansionism.” Pakistan was rearmed after its 1971 defeat and Iran embraced as bulwarks against Soviet expansion.

Finale to the Hong Kong-style Cultural Revolution
Gary Ka-wai Cheung

in Hong Kong's Watershed: The 1967 Riots

The burning of the British diplomatic compound in Beijing strengthened the hand of the moderate faction led by Zhou Enlai. It also allowed secret talks between the left wing and the Hong Kong government to ease the tensions in the colony. George Walden, assistant political adviser to the governor during the 1967 riots revealed that secret negotiations were held between the Hong Kong government and the mainland officials stationed in Hong Kong in the wake of the arson attack on the office of the British chargé d'affaires. The left wing and the Hong Kong government made completely different analyses of the impact of the disturbances. The leftists played up the economic crisis facing the Hong Kong government while the colonial administration insisted that the mayhem had not seriously disrupted the economy. The left wing admitted their failure in the 1967 disturbances in 1978.

Heroic Models and Exemplary Leaders
Kirk A. Denton

in Exhibiting the Past: Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in Postsocialist China

This chapter looks at two kinds of memorial halls: those devoted to upstanding average people (Lei Feng) and those devoted to leaders (Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping). In the post-Mao era, the memorial halls for Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping have taken on particular political meaning. To be sure, these halls project state power, but more
importantly they mark a concerted effort to present to the public the benign human and moral face of that power. But exemplary as they may have been, great leaders such as Zhou or Deng do not serve as good role models for the average person. This is where Lei Feng fits in. He was an average guy, a rank-and-file soldier with little education, from an impoverished background. The example of Lei Feng suggests that anyone could follow in his footsteps to become a man of socialist virtue. The discussions cover the Lei Feng Memorial Hall in Fushun, the Zhou Enlai Memorial Hall in Huai’an, and the Deng Xiaoping Memorial Hall in Guang’an (Sichuan).

Economic Crunch
Roderick MacFarquhar


Published in print: 1997 Published Online: October 2011
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192149978.003.0009

This chapter examines Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's exposition of the economic burdens of his country at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference. Zhou exposed three major problems, including China's parlous grain-supply situation, the relationship of that problem to the urban population, and the country's external liabilities. His gloomy outline of China's economic condition ensured that the most important immediate result of the conference was to unleash a flurry of activity among senior economic officials.

The Bandung Era
John W. Garver

in China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China

Published in print: 2016 Published Online: March 2016
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190261054.003.0004

Following Stalin's death, differences developed between Moscow and Beijing over the appropriate level of de-Stalinization. Mao welcomed a period of peace to concentrate on socialist industrialization, offering China the chance to expand ties with the newly independent countries and thereby countering US efforts to contain the PRC. At the Bandung
conference of developing countries, Zhou Enlai demonstrated considerable diplomatic skill in reaching out to various countries—India, Pakistan, Egypt, and Cambodia—expanding PRC foreign ties beyond the socialist camp for the first time. A dialogue with the United States was launched to pry the United States away from Taiwan, but without success. A dialogue mechanism between Beijing and Washington was, however, established that served as the primary channel for communications until 1971.

The Smashing of the Gang of Four
Immanuel C. Y. Hsü
in China without mao: The Search for a New Order
Published in print: 1990 Published Online: October 2011
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195060560.003.0001

1976 was a year of agony for China. Deep bereavement was felt in every corner of the land over the loss of three of its great leaders: Premier Zhou Enlai in January, Marshal Zhu De in July, and Chairman Mao Zedong in September. Added to human grief was a series of natural disasters. In July, a major earthquake demolished the industrial city of Tangshan, and during the next two months the Yellow River flooded seven times. Compounding the human misery and political instability was the succession crisis precipitated by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing and her associates, later dubbed the Gang of Four. It was a time of sorrow, yet like darkness before dawn, also a time of hope. Out of disorder a new order was struggling to be born, and with it was the promise of greater stability, progress, and a better life for the people.

Emergency Measures
Roderick MacFarquhar
Published in print: 1997 Published Online: October 2011
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192149978.003.0003

This chapter examines the remedial measures taken by the Chinese government to address the catastrophic decline in grain output and its impact on people's food consumption during the 1960s. Based on the recommendations of Politburo Standing Committee economists
Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun, the government agreed to purchase grain from abroad. Chen Yun also proposed the implementation of the Sixty Articles on Agriculture, stepping up industrial support for agricultural development, and the mobilization of urban residents to the countryside in order to reduce the amount of grain taken from the peasantry for sale in the cities.

From Isolation to Engagement
Jeremi Suri

in Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy

After more than two decades of estrangement, the opening of relations between the United States and China was one of the great diplomatic achievements of the late Cold War. American leaders pursued this opening with determination and foresight. They sent repeated signals of their seriousness, they worked through numerous partners, and they exhibited remarkable patience when their initial overtures received little response. Chinese leaders were cautious, but willing to assess evidence of changing American attitudes. Both sides emphasized points of possible agreement, and put off long-standing areas of disagreement. Secrecy facilitated early communications. President Nixon and National Security Assistant Henry Kissinger took serious political risks, especially when they traveled to Beijing, showing deference to Chinese traditions. Chairman Mao and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai showed adaptability, abandoning their ideological criticisms of the United States for diplomatic and strategic purposes. Energetic and focused diplomacy on both sides made the U.S. opening to China possible.

Conclusion
Anne Witchard

in Lao She in London

After the international success of Rickshaw Boy, Lao She returned from the US to Mao's China in 1949 with high hopes. Welcomed back by his comrade from Chongqing days, Zhou Enlai, he was accorded the title,
‘People's Artist’ along with a slew of committee posts. Lao She had never shied from identifying himself as a ‘petty bourgeois’ writer who had a sense of righteousness but no enthusiasm for political factionalism. That he did so at a time when Mao's 1966 rectification campaign declared its objective to repudiate reactionary bourgeois academics, was to seal his own doom. 40 years after his fiction first started to explore China's emergence onto the global stage, Mao's Cultural Revolution got underway and Lao She was driven to drown himself. Lao She's play of the period, Teahouse, ranks in cultural magnitude with J. M. Synge's The Playboy of the Western World (1907), each a monument to the twentieth-century struggle of decolonizing nationhood. The consensus is that non-Western modernisms have a place not as derivative products of a Euro-American original but as full partners in a literary movement, best understood by regarding modernism as an aesthetic response to conditions of modernity that are globally structured but nationally or locally particular.

Roiling in Troubled Waters
Pang Yang Huei

in Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954-1958

Published in print: 2019 Published Online: September 2019
Publisher: Hong Kong University Press
Item type: chapter

After the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks ceased in December 1957, further talks were suspended indefinitely. On 23 August 1958, the PRC again targeted artillery barrages on Quemoy and Matsu, igniting another confrontation. However, on 6 September, both Zhou and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly announced possible peaceful measures and this led to the convening of the Sino-US negotiations in Warsaw from 15 September onwards. In particular, this chapter reviews the positions of the ROC, US and PRC just prior to the outbreak of the crisis and critical developments. Next, it scrutinizes the reactions of China, the US and Taiwan to this crisis and the speed of its resolution. Finally, the rationalizations given by China and the US seeking to justify their actions to their domestic public and in the international arena are considered.
“Playing a Game,” Finding a “Lever”
Richard A. Moss

in Nixon's Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Détente

Published in print: 2017 Published Online: September 2017
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813167879.003.0004
Item type: chapter

The Sino-Soviet conflict, which first surfaced in the late 1950s and degenerated into armed border clashes in 1969, proved to be the main catalyst for Sino-American rapprochement. The China question almost immediately entered into the dialogue of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel. Publicly, the Nixon administration said it would pursue relationships with both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Privately, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to play the Soviets and the Chinese off each other—the concept of triangular diplomacy. Triangular diplomacy had less to do with the concrete and crude move of playing the powers off each other than it did with trying to influence the perceptions and emotions of Communist leaders. The documentary record suggests that it was only after Sino-American rapprochement had been set in motion in April-May 1971, with the Chinese Ping Pong diplomacy and the secret traffic through the Pakistani channel, that U.S. policymakers began to talk of playing the Communist powers off one another for American advantage.

China: In Times of Civil and Cold War
Takashi Yoshida

in The Making of "The Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: January 2010
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195180961.003.0006
Item type: chapter

This chapter traces the history and memory of the Nanjing Massacre in China from 1945 to 1971. During the civil war, the main focus of both Nationalist and Communist governments was on defeating their current enemies rather than remembering the war against Japan. Locals in Nanjing, however, preserved their personal memories and the history of the atrocities by initiating studies of Nanjing within the framework of the Chinese official narrative.
If there was such a thing as a national consensus in China, it focused on the commitment to the Four Modernizations — of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. The avowed goal was to turn China into a relatively modern state by the year 2000. The Four Modernizations had been written into the party constitution and the state constitution. Zhou Enlai was generally credited with initiating the idea of the Four Modernizations in a report to the Fourth National People’s Congress in January 1975. Not until the smashing of the Gang in October were the Four Modernizations revived. Chairman Hua seized the opportunity to promote them in a spirit of revolutionary vigor but without much economic expertise.

This chapter examines Third World international affairs from the perspective of independent Algeria’s new foreign policy apparatus. In the early and mid-1960s, many of the organizing themes of Third World solidarity were in conflict with one another. The Algerian government was forced to choose between the themes of Arab unity, Maghribi unity, and African unity, which exacerbated contestations of Algeria’s national identity. Algeria worked toward the unification of the Third World’s various groupings and regions, even as the Soviet-Chinese rivalry for influence in the developing world turned Afro-Asianism and nonalignment into competing agendas. Algerian foreign policy was ambitious but pragmatic: the country’s leaders took advantage of their position at the intersection of multiple regions and geopolitical currents to magnify their influence in each context. However, a border conflict with Morocco in October 1963 showed that the Algerian leadership could not fully escape geographical realities.
This chapter focuses on Richard Nixon's shocking revelations that had profound international implications. Nixon had a flair for the dramatic. Although he made most of his decisions in solitude on the basis of memoranda or with a few intimate aides, he liked to unveil his biggest decisions in major, primetime television speeches that moved audiences without being subjected to questions and demonstrated decisiveness and courage of action. On July 15, he disclosed that after months of secret negotiations he would travel to the People's Republic of China for unprecedented meetings with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, breaking more than twenty years of diplomatic isolation with the mainland. On August 15, Nixon “rocked” the internal economy and political structure by gutting the Bretton Woods dollar-for-gold system that had existed for decades without consulting members of the international monetary system.

The year 1976 was monumental for China with the loss of important state leaders, and a tragic earthquake. Amidst all of the government’s active response to a panda starvation scare demonstrates the importance of this animal to China. A repeat starvation scare in the mid-1980s creates an opportunity to trace the transformation of China from Mao Zedong era to the Deng Xiaoping era by juxtaposing the two panda-starvation scares. The responses to these two scares demonstrate a shift in the perception of nature from one of state ownership to one of popular ownership and illustrate the dramatic increase in international participation in the study of the panda and the efforts to preserve this national treasure.
One of the most salient examples of the giant panda as a national symbol, the phenomenon of offering state-gift pandas to other countries, grew out of the end of the Cultural Revolution era. State-gift pandas were among the most successful efforts by China to paint for itself a new international face as it strove for greater international recognition and integration. These high-profile gifts had a profound effect on the wild panda population. The impact of “panda diplomacy” on China’s wild pandas inspired new protection policies during the 1970s.