Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory
Andrews Reath

This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.

The Morphosyntax of Complement-Head Sequences
Enoch Oladé Aboh

This book examines the syntax of the Niger-Conger language family, which includes most of the languages of sub-Saharan Africa. The book's author, who is a native speaker of Gungbe — one of the languages
discussed — analyses different aspects of the syntax of the ‘Kwa’ language group. The book discusses how grammatical pictures for these languages can shed some light on Universal Grammar in general.

Care Theory and International Relations
Daniel Engster

in The Heart of Justice: Care ethics and Political Theory

Published in print: 2007 Published Online: May 2007
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214358.003.0005

This chapter explores the question: What does it mean to care for others in international relations? Sara Ruddick, Fiona Robinson, and others have outlined international relations theories based upon care ethics, but their accounts are fairly general and say little about the rights and policies necessary for establishing caring relations among people across the world. The first half of this chapter develops a human rights framework based upon human beings' universal duty to care for others. The chapter argues that this framework avoids the central shortcomings of other international rights frameworks, and more generally provides a standard of justice that should be reasonably acceptable to people from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. The second half of the chapter outlines some specific strategies and policies for enforcing human rights abroad and caring for distant others. In the last section, the chapter discusses the conditions under which care theory might justify the use of military force, especially for the sake of intervening into other countries for humanitarian purposes.

Conclusion
William J. Talbott

in Human Rights and Human Well-Being

Published in print: 2010 Published Online: January 2011
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.003.0015

This chapter retraces the history of moral development to show how it is possible for us to have discovered a meta-theoretical principle of moral improvement, the main principle. The main principle explains why guarantees of the fourteen human rights on the chapter’s list would be moral improvements in any human society. The fourteen rights on the chapter’s list include almost all of the rights in the U.N. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, but also include a number of rights not in the UNUDHR. So the main principle helps to unify the rights in that document and points to future improvements. The chapter concludes with a reminder that the possibility of future moral improvement depends on there being lots of reasonable disagreement in the ongoing social process of the free give-and-take of opinion.

Legislating the Moral Law
Andrews Reath

This chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular categorical imperatives or moral requirements. The Formula of Universal Law is a law that Kant derives from the nature of rational volition or rational choice. In this sense, it is a law that the rational will legislates or gives to itself. Roughly, the will is a law to itself since the nature of rational volition leads to a principle that governs its own exercise, namely the Categorical Imperative. To understand the sense in which rational agents legislate particular moral requirements, it is important to bear in mind that Kant is led to this idea by considering how such requirements get their normative authority. Kant appears to claim that the agents who are subject to moral law must be the ‘legislators’ from whom these requirements receive their authority, because only then can we explain their unconditional authority as categorical imperatives. The view ascribed to Kant is that the reasons to comply with moral requirements are given simply by the reasoning that establishes them as requirements, from which it follows that moral agents are bound to moral requirements in such a way that they model the source of their authority.

Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality
Andrews Reath

Page 3 of 11
This chapter distinguishes the various claims that make up the thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality, and offers a reconstruction of the arguments on which they depend. To do so it argues that autonomy should be interpreted as a kind of sovereignty. The model for the autonomous agent is the political sovereign not subject to any outside authority, who has the power to enact law. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section II distinguishes some of the claims that go into Kant's doctrine of autonomy. Since the Sovereignty Thesis follows analytically from the concept of an unconditional moral requirement, Section III takes up Kant's concept of a practical law, to provide supporting material for later arguments. Sections IV to VII are organized around showing that the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and the Formula of Autonomy (FA) are equivalent in content. The equivalence of the FUL and FA is established by the two ideas just cited (the Sovereignty Thesis and the claim that the FUL is the constitutive principle of a will with autonomy). It serves as a capsule statement of Kant's thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality. Finally, Section VIII shows how the normative conception of autonomy developed in this chapter bears on the analytical arguments of Groundwork, III, where Kant identifies freedom with autonomy on the way to arguing that a free will is subject to moral principles.

Agency and Universal Law

Andrews Reath

in Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory: Selected Essays

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: May 2006
Item type: chapter

This chapter offers some reflections about how the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) has been understood by those who think that it can provide substantive guidance about choice and action. If the FUL were a purely formal criterion of universalizability, it would not reliably lead to any substantive moral judgments. These theorists have not, in general, understood the FUL as purely formal. Rather, they have incorporated a conception of rational agency into this formula, either explicitly or implicitly. The chapter is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses some of John Rawls's remarks about what he has called Kant's ‘moral constructivism’ — specifically his claim that a conception of the person plays a central role in specifying the content of a constructivist moral conception. Section III asks how the FUL needs to be understood if it is to play its intended role in the extended argument of the Groundwork. Section IV shows why one is entitled to read a conception of rational
agency into the FUL, and then considers some of the elements of this conception. In particular, it tries to make precise different senses in which rational agents with autonomy are independent spheres of judgment and choice and the sources of their own actions. Finally, Section V looks at various ways in which this conception of autonomous agency figures in determining whether a maxim can be willed as universal law without inconsistency.

Sorting Out Ethics
R. M. Hare

This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non-descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.

Language Acquisition
Michael Devitt

This chapter takes the familiar arguments for nativism to establish the interesting nativist thesis that “the initial state” of linguistic competence is sufficiently rich that humans can naturally learn only languages that
conform to the rules specified by “Universal Grammar” (the UG-rules). It rejects Fodor’s “only-theory-in-town” abduction for the very exciting “I-Representational Thesis”, the thesis that the UG-rules are represented in the initial state. It argues that this thesis lacks significant evidence and is implausible. The chapter also argues for some tentative proposals: that the UG-rules are, largely if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought, a proposal resting on the Language-of-Thought Hypothesis (LOTH); that if LOTH is false, then the UG-rules are not, in a robust way, innate in a speaker; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. The chapter concludes the book-long argument that there is no significant evidence for the Representational Thesis (RT) and that it is implausible.

four The Conversion to Newton
Martin Schöneld
in The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project
Published in print: 2000 Published Online: May 2006
Item type: chapter

This chapter explores Kant’s studies from 1754 to 1757, the application of his dynamic perspectives to fire, tides, the Earth’s rotation, climate, winds, and earthquakes. Section 1 surveys the background of Kant’s efforts in the 1750s, such as how his earthquake papers relate to the Lisbon tsunami (1755), and describes his co-discovery of sea wind patterns and his discovery of the monsoon dynamics. Section 2 examines Kant’s study of the fate of Earth’s rotation (1754) and its correct determination of the dynamic interplay among lunar period, tidal forces, oceanic friction, and the long-term slowdown of Earth’s rotation. Section 3 discusses Kant’s Master’s Thesis (1755), his chemical conjectures on fire, and his attempt to clarify the spatial energy field, the ether. Section 4 examines Kant’s qualitative approach to cosmological questions and his heuristic reliance on analogical reasoning.

five The Universal Natural History The Purposiveness of Nature
Martin Schöneld
in The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project
Published in print: 2000 Published Online: May 2006
Item type: chapter
This chapter explores Kant’s second book, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). Section 1 describes the context of the book and Kant’s critique of static and anthropocentric conceptions of nature by the Pietists, Physico-Theologians, Newton, and Wolff. Section 2 describes the goal of Kant’s teleology, its naturalized thrust toward well-ordered complexity or “relative perfection.” Section 3 examines the means of Kant’s teleology, the dynamic interplay of attractive and repulsive forces. Section 4 analyzes the application of teleology to cosmic phenomena such as the solar system, Wright’s earlier stipulation, Laplace’s later conjecture, and the eventual confirmation of Kant’s nebular hypothesis. Section 5 explores Kant’s arguments for life, humanity, and reason as products of cosmic evolution. Section 6 discusses Kant’s “static law” — that the mean planetary density determines the biospherical potential of reason — and its incongruity with the racism in Physical Geography (1756-60) and Beautiful and Sublime (1764). Section 7 describes Kant’s dynamic cosmology, explicates his “phoenix”-symbol, and discusses his various scientific aperçus.

Possible and Probable Languages
Frederick J. Newmeyer

This book takes on the question of language variety, addressing the question of why some language types are impossible and why some grammatical features are more common than others. The task of trying to explain typological variation among languages has been mainly undertaken by functionally-oriented linguists. Generative grammarians entering the field of typology in the 1980s put forward the idea that cross-linguistic differences could be explained by linguistic parameters within Universal Grammar, whose operation might vary from language to language. Unfortunately, this way of looking at variation turned out to be much less successful than was hoped for. The alternative to parameters is presented, which combines leading ideas from functionalist and formalist approaches that in the past have been considered incompatible. It throws fresh light on language typology and variation, and provides new insights into the principles of Universal Grammar.
Introduction
Tom Simpson, Stephen Stich, Peter Carruthers, and Stephen Laurence
in The Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition
Published in print: 2007 Published Online: May 2007
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acompress:oso/9780195310139.003.001
Item type: chapter

This chapter provides a brief history of some of the theoretical strands that form the backdrop to contemporary debates among nativists about the evolutionary and cognitive underpinnings of culture, and the ways that culture shapes the mind. Summaries of the contents of each of the chapters in the volume are also provided.

The DEUCE—a user's view
Robin A. Vowels
in Alan Turing's Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker's Struggle to build the Modern Computer
Published in print: 2005 Published Online: January 2008
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acompress:oso/9780198565932.003.0015
Item type: chapter

This chapter describes the origins and development of the English Electric DEUCE (Digital Electronic Universal Computing Engine), the production machine derived from the ACE Pilot Model. The DEUCE was an outstanding commercial success due to its high speed, huge programme and subroutine library, fast magnetic drum, enhanced peripheral equipment, and extraordinary reliability. The first DEUCE was installed in early 1955. Most DEUCEs saw a decade of service, and approximately twenty were still operating in 1965, some continuing to the end of the decade.

ABSTRACT STRUCTURES
Steve Awodey
in Category Theory
Published in print: 2006 Published Online: September 2007
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/acompress:oso/9780198568612.003.0002
Item type: chapter
This chapter focuses on abstract characterizations. It is shown that one of the basic ways of giving abstract characterization is via a Universal Mapping Property (UMP). Epis and monos, initial and terminal objects, generalized elements, sections and retractions, products, categories with products, and hom-sets are discussed. Exercises are provided in the last part of the chapter.

Conclusion
Webb Keane

in Ethical Life: Its Natural and Social Histories
Published in print: 2015 Published Online: October 2017
Item type: chapter

This concluding chapter discusses the universal aspirations of contemporary human rights and humanitarian movements and the problems that they face. The human rights movement aims to realize the assertion in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Meanwhile, humanitarianism tends to focus on suffering and the prevention or amelioration of physical harm. Both movements, however, are predicated on ethical universality in principle and its global reach in practice. That is, since ethical values, the sentiments they should induce, and the obligations they impose pertain to all humans, so too should ethical agency be indifferent to any distinctions of culture, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, or political divisions.

On the Possible and the Probable in Language
Frederick J. Newmeyer

in Possible and Probable Languages: A Generative Perspective on Linguistic Typology
Published in print: 2005 Published Online: September 2007
Item type: chapter

This chapter sets the stage for the succeeding chapters by addressing a foundational cluster of questions inherent to the practice of linguistic typology: What does it mean to say that some grammatical feature is possible or impossible, or probable or improbable? Section 1.2 tries to pinpoint how one might identify a ‘possible human language’ and Section 1.3 raises some background issues relevant to the determination
of why some language types appear to be more probable than others. Section 1.4 focuses on the major differences between formalists and functionalists with respect to the explanation of typological generalizations, using an extended published debate between Peter Coopmans and Bernard Comrie as a point of reference.

Parameterized Principles
Frederick J. Newmeyer

in Possible and Probable Languages: A Generative Perspective on Linguistic Typology

This chapter presents the principal means within generative theory by which typological generalizations have been captured, namely, by the parameterization of principles of Universal Grammar. It begins (Section 2.2) with a look at early work in generative-based typological analysis, before parameters were introduced. Section 2.3 presents the Government-Binding approach to parameters and Section 2.4 their treatment within the Minimalist Program. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 discuss parameter- and typology-related issues with respect to language acquisition and language change respectively.

Parameters, Performance, and the Explanation of Typological Generalizations
Frederick J. Newmeyer

This chapter launches a frontal assault not just on the parametric approach to grammar, but also on the very idea that it is the job of Universal Grammar (UG) per se to account for typological generalizations. It contrasts two approaches to typological variation in grammar within the general envelope of formal theory. In one approach, variation is captured largely by means of parameters, either directly tied to principles of UG or to functional projections provided by UG. In the other approach, variation is captured by means of extragrammatical
principles. The chapter concludes that the second approach is better supported than the first.

Constraining the Learning Path without Constraints, or The Ocp and NoBanana 1

Charles Reiss

in Rules, Constraints, and Phonological Phenomena

Published in print: 2008 Published Online: May 2008

This chapter argue that wellformedness constraints are inappropriate computational devices for modeling grammar. It develops a purely derivational theory with minimal theoretical apparatus and no filters or wellformedness constraints. The conceptual arguments will be bolstered by reference to recent work developing alternative approaches to phonological computation from constraint-based ones. The author also makes concrete proposals concerning the nature of phonological acquisition. The idea is to constrain the acquisition task without recourse to innate constraints.