Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.
This book is a critical examination of the astonishing progress made in the philosophical study of the properties of the natural numbers from the 1880s to the 1930s. It reassesses the brilliant innovations of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and others, which transformed philosophy as well as the understanding of mathematics. The book argues that through the problem of arithmetic participates in the larger puzzle of the relationship between thought, language, experience, and the world, we can distinguish accounts that look to each of these to supply the content we require: those that involve the structure of our experience of the world; those that explicitly involve our grasp of a 'third realm' of abstract objects distinct from the concrete objects of the empirical world and the ideas of the author's private Gedankenwelt; those that appeal to something non-physical that is nevertheless an aspect of reality in harmony with which the physical aspect of the world is configured; and finally those that involve only our grasp of language.

Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic
Michael Potter

Wittgenstein's philosophical career began in 1911 when he went to Cambridge to work with Russell. He compiled the Notes on Logic two years later as a kind of summary of the work he had done so far. Russell thought that they were 'as good as anything that has ever been done in logic', but he had Wittgenstein himself to explain them to him. Without the benefit of Wittgenstein's explanations, most later scholars have preferred to treat the Notes solely as an interpretative aid in understanding the Tractatus (which draws on them for material), rather than as a philosophical work in their own right. This book demonstrates the philosophical and historical importance of the Notes. By teasing out the meaning of key passages, it shows how many of the most important insights in the Tractatus they contain. It discusses in detail how Wittgenstein arrived at these insights by thinking through ideas he obtained from Russell and Frege. And it uses a blend of biography and philosophy to illuminate the methods Wittgenstein used in his work. The book features the complete text of the Notes in a critical edition, with a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which they were compiled.
This introductory chapter discusses the theoretical approach used in this book, which focuses on Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus during the First World War, but it had its birth in the two years he spent working in Cambridge with Russell between 1911 and 1913. He compiled the Notes on Logic at the very end of that period, as a summary for Russell of the work he had accomplished. The destruction of his notebooks makes the Notes almost the only guide to the work he had been doing in Cambridge. Studying them provides insight on which of his ideas Wittgenstein owed to this period, and which to the very different circumstances in which he worked later, first in Norway and then on active service during the war. It also lays bare some of the influences which helped to form Wittgenstein's views.

Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy
José L. Zalabardo (ed.)

This book collects nine previously unpublished works on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work. They cover a wide range of aspects of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but they can be broadly clustered as focusing on three areas: the relationship between Wittgenstein's account of representation and Russell's theories of judgment, the role of objects in the tractarian system and Wittgenstein's philosophical method.

Propositions, Functions, and Analysis
Peter Hylton

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The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The essays collected in this volume, by one of the authorities on Russell's philosophy, all aim at recapturing and articulating aspects of Russell's philosophical vision during his most influential and important period, the two decades following his break with Idealism in 1899. One theme of the collection concerns Russell's views about propositions and their analysis, and the relation of those ideas to his rejection of Idealism. Another theme is the development of Russell's logicism, culminating in Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica, and the author offers a revealing view of the conception of logic that underlies it. Here again there is an emphasis on Russell's argument against Idealism, on the idea that his logicism was a crucial part of that argument. A further focus of the volume is Russell's views about functions and propositional functions. This theme is part of a contrast that the author draws between Russell's general philosophical position and that of Frege; in particular, there is a close parallel with the quite different views that the two philosophers held about the nature of philosophical analysis. The author also sheds light on the much-disputed idea of an operation, which Wittgenstein advances in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

Ramsey's Problem and its Solution
E. J. Lowe

in The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science
Published in print: 2005 Published Online: May 2006
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Item type: chapter

F. P. Ramsey's objections to the universal/particular distinction, especially as advocated by Bertrand Russell, are examined in depth and rebutted. At the same time, certain important lessons are drawn from his arguments concerning how best to articulate the distinction. In response to related arguments recently directed against the four-category ontology by Fraser MacBride, it is shown how each of the four categories can be uniquely identified in terms of the characteristic pattern of ontological dependence relations that its members bear to members of other ontological categories.

Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics
D. M. Armstrong

Published in print: 2010 Published Online: September 2010
Publisher: Oxford University Press
This book tries to present in brief compass a metaphysical system, matured (as is hoped) over many years. By metaphysics is understood an account of the fundamental categories of being, such notions as property, relation, causality. These notions are more abstract than the results of scientific inquiry, and are controversial among scientists as well as among philosophers. The book sprang from lectures given to graduate students, and has deliberately been kept at an informal level. It includes some explanations not required in a book for professional philosophers. The argument is developed in sixteen short chapters. It is argued that the world is a world of states of affairs, involving universals and particulars. The notion of finding suitable truthmakers for truths grows in importance as the book proceeds.

Relations
David M. Armstrong

in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

Following Bertrand Russell, properties are seen as the monadic case with the dyadic, triadic, etc. cases constituting the relations. A Principle of Instantial Invariance, that a relation that is a universal has always the same number of terms in each instantiation, is argued for, against Fraser MacBride A distinction is drawn between internal and external relations and it is argued that the internal relations do no more than supervene.

Particulars
David M. Armstrong

in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

It is argued that particulars have only a ‘loose and popular’ identity over time (Bishop Butler), ‘perdurantist’ rather than ‘endurantist’. For an unchanging particular we need to go to a four-dimensional object, a ‘space-time worm’. Such an object is primarily held together by a causal relation (immanent causation in W.E. Johnson's terminology).
Following Russell, an ordinary particular can be described as a ‘causal line’. Particulars are contingent entities.

Absences
David M. Armstrong
in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics
Published in print: 2010 Published Online: September 2010
Item type: chapter

It is desirable to expel absences from the ontology. Phil Dowe's account of preventions and omissions (which involve absences) indicates that they supervene on actual causal states of affairs. Totality states of affairs can then be used to give truthmakers for truths of absence. It is noted that this result was anticipated by Russell. The solution is applied to give truthmakers for the possibility (but not the existence) of what David Lewis calls ‘aliens’.

Reference without Referents
R. M. Sainsbury
Published in print: 2005 Published Online: July 2005
Item type: book

This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions (rather than truth values) can throw light on the meaning of sentences so can reference conditions (rather than referents) throw light on the meaning of referring expressions. A reference condition need not be a descriptive condition, and it need not be satisfied. The first of these points marks the divergence from descriptivist theories, and the second, from direct reference theories. This idea is applied to proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions (singular, plural and mass); problems of existential and fictional sentences are addressed; and, in the final chapter, an analogue of the main idea is applied to mental content.

Thought and Reference
Kent Bach
Published in print: 1994 Published Online: October 2011
Publisher: Oxford University Press
This book presents a view of the problems of reference and singular terms, including an account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms.

A Muslim in Victorian America
Umar F. Abd-Allah

Conflicts and controversies at home and abroad have led Americans to focus on Islam more than ever before. Little is known about Islam in Victorian America. This book is a biography of Alexander Russell Webb, one of the earliest American Muslims to achieve public renown. Webb was a central figure of American Islam during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A native of the Hudson Valley, he was a journalist, editor, and civil servant. Raised a Presbyterian, Webb early on began to cultivate an interest in other religions and became particularly fascinated by Islam. While serving as US consul to the Philippines in 1887, he took a greater interest in the faith and embraced it in 1888, one of the first Americans known to have done so. Within a few years, he began corresponding with important Muslims in India. Webb became an enthusiastic propagator of the faith, founding the first Islamic institution in the United States: the American Mission. He wrote numerous books intended to introduce Islam to Americans, started the first Islamic press in the United States, published a journal entitled The Moslem World, and served as the representative of Islam at the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago. In 1901, he was appointed Honorary Turkish Consul General in New York and was invited to Turkey, where he received two Ottoman medals of merits.

Mission Runs Aground and Webb's Final Years
Umar F. Abd-Allah

in A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb
This chapter focuses on the financial difficulties of Webb's mission and his final years. Webb's participation in the Parliament of Religions was the high point of his American Islamic Propaganda. He returned to Manhattan for the October 6 grand opening of the mission's new headquarters on Twentieth Street. However, only months later the mission was in financial trouble due to a lack of support from abroad. During his later years, Webb returned to mainstream journalism. He was also elected to the Rutherford Board of Education in 1902 and served a three-year term until 1905. During the same period, from 1903 until 1904, he served simultaneously as Rutherford district clerk. Webb suffered from diabetes for many years and died of the disease at his home on Sunday, October 1, 1916, at the age of seventy.

Conclusion: Webb's Legacy

Umar F. Abd-Allah

in A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: September 2006
Item type: chapter

This chapter focuses on Webb's legacy. It argues that Webb's legacy is valuable for the future of American pluralism and the emerging self-definition of its large and growing Muslim community. Sulayman Nyang defines Webb as the prototype of a “Webbian tradition” within American Islam, one that is “color-blind,” addresses itself “to the plight of all people in the world,” and is disposed to balance religious identity with American culture, creating a sense of self that is at once genuinely American and truly Islamic. As a historical generalization, Nyang's Webbian tradition may be somewhat problematic, although it is useful as a sociological concept and future ideal. Webb was not completely color-blind. He did, however, express concern for the plight of the poor and oppressed, and he certainly saw Islam as eminently compatible with an American identity.

The Yankee Mohammedan

Umar F. Abd-Allah

in A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: September 2006
Item type: chapter
This chapter presents an introduction to the life of Alexander Russell Webb (1846-1916), who adopted Islam as a private faith and personal fulfillment of his identity as an American. He is considered one of the outstanding figures in the early history of Islam in the United States, and his legacy constitutes a valuable point of reference for all Americans today, and especially for those in the growing Muslim community of the United States. Webb was born and raised in Hudson, New York. In 1887, President Cleveland, the first Democrat to be served elected president since the end of Reconstruction, appointed Webb as American consul to the Philippines; he served in Manila until 1892. The Philippines afforded Webb access to information about Islam that he had not had in the United States. Shortly after his arrival in Manila, he decided to embrace Islam. Webb returned to New York in February 1893 and set about establishing his mission in Manhattan, immediately attracting front-page headlines in the New York Times and other American newspapers.

**Hudson Valley Roots**

Umar F. Abd-Allah

in A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187288.003.0002


Item type: chapter

This chapter focuses on Alexander Russell Webb's childhood. It describes how he grew up only a few minutes' walk from the Hudson River's banks, and how his identity was deeply rooted in the river and its history. It then covers religion innovation in the Mid-Atlantic and Webb's formative period, race and ethnicity during his time, his family, and his education.

**Webb's Journey to Islam**

Umar F. Abd-Allah

in A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: 2006

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Item type: chapter

This chapter chronicles Webb's conversion to Islam. It is shown that Webb's conversion was actually a series of conversions. First, he adopted materialism, which he rejected for Buddhism in search for new spirituality. Then, he adopted Theosophy and made changes in his eating habits and lifestyle. Finally, he embraced Islam. The parallels of Webb's
conversion with other Victorian converts to Islam and Buddhism are discussed.

Diplomatic Post in the Orient
Umar F. Abd-Allah

in A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: September 2006
Item type: chapter

This chapter focuses on Webb's experiences as a US consul to the Philippines. On September 29, 1887, Webb was appointed US consul to Manila — then under Spanish colonial control — by President Grover Cleveland (1885-1889), the first Democratic president since Reconstruction. Webb retained the position under the succeeding Republican administration of President Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893).