The Quest for Reality
Barry Stroud

Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.

Global Environmental History
Ian Simmons

In the last 12,000 years, human societies have moved through phases of forager, agricultural, industrial and 'post-industrial' economies. Each of these has been affected by the natural world and in turn has changed
the workings of the non-human or ‘natural’ components of this planet. For each of these phases the author discusses questions of population growth and distribution together with the technologies available to the human groups of the time. Overall there is no doubt about the central role of access to energy flows and storage in making possible the life ways of many diverse groups. In addition to these basic chronicles the author is at pains to include the question of how these economies and ecologies are represented in today’s cultural frameworks. The theme of scale pervades the book. A distinction is made between processes which affect many parts of the world but are not coalescent (‘worldwide’) and those which penetrate the entire biophysical entity and to which the term ‘global’ can truly be applied. Despite the current levels of anxiety about human-environmental relationships this book concentrates on environmental history and not prophecy. There is though a parting shot to the effect that history is probably not a good guide to human futures.

Shankara and Kumarila
Ariel Glucklich

in The Footsteps of Vishnu: A Historical Introduction to Hinduism

This chapter examines two schools of Hindu philosophy and two philosophers from the eighth–ninth centuries: Shankara and Kumarila. The subject matter and methodology of philosophical work is explained, including the reliance on scriptural interpretation and modes of argumentation. The two schools, Advaita Vedanta and Purva Mimamsa, deal respectively with Brahman and dharma, and the chapter explores how a debate between the two would have proceeded. Other branches of Vedanta philosophy are also briefly discussed.

Perceptual Knowledge (I): (Space)
Quassim Cassam

in The Possibility of Knowledge

According to Kant, the perception of space is not just an enabling condition for basic primary epistemic seeing but also an enabling
condition for epistemic perceiving generally and for the resulting perceptual knowledge. What he is committed to, in other words, is the Spatial Perception Requirement (SPR): in order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. This chapter argues for a qualified version of SPR, that is, a version of SPR that acknowledges the differences between the role of spatial perception in epistemic seeing and its role in other forms of epistemic perceiving. It contends that SPR is defensible. It is also plausible that SPR is at least weakly a priori. Not only can it be established non-empirically, it is doubtful that it can be established by empirical methods.

Michael Podro 1931–2008
ALEXANDER POTTS

in Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 172, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows, X

Michael Podro was a scholar who exerted a considerable influence on the study of art history. His first book was The Manifold in Perception: Theories of Art from Kant to Hildebrand (1972). After taking his English degree at Cambridge, Podro studied for a year at the Slade, where he was influenced by the teaching of Ernst Gombrich. His book Depiction was a response to Gombrich. Podro taught art history at Camberwell School of Art and Crafts, then was lecturer in the philosophy of art at the Warburg Institute. Finally, he moved to the University of Essex, where he remained for the rest of his career. Podro was elected as a Fellow of the British Academy in 1992. Obituary by Alexander Potts.

Phenomenology or Deconstruction?
Christopher Watkin

Phenomenology or Deconstruction? challenges traditional understandings of the relationship between two important movements in European thought through new readings of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy. A constant dialogue with Jacques Derrida's discussion of phenomenological themes provides the impetus
to establishing a new understanding of ‘being’ and ‘presence’ that exposes significant blind spots inherent in traditional readings of both phenomenology and deconstruction, wedded as such readings often are to an ideology of antagonism or succession. In reproducing neither a stock phenomenological reaction to deconstruction nor the routine deconstructive reading of phenomenology, this book provides a fresh assessment of the possibilities for the future of phenomenology, along with a new reading of the deconstructive legacy. It shows how a phenomenological tradition much wider and richer than Husserlian or Heideggerean thought alone can take account of Derrida’s critique of ontology and yet still hold a commitment to the ontological. Its new reading of being and presence fundamentally re-draws our understanding of the relation of deconstruction and phenomenology, and provides the first sustained discussion of the possibilities and problems for any future ‘deconstructive phenomenology’.

**Doing Aesthetics with Arendt**

Cecilia Sjöholm

Published in print: 2015 Published Online: May 2016


Publisher: Columbia University Press

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231173087.001.0001

Cecilia Sjöholm reads Hannah Arendt as a philosopher of the senses, grappling with questions of vision, hearing, and touch even in her political work. Constructing an Arendtian theory of aesthetics from the philosopher’s fragmentary writings on art and perception, Sjöholm begins a vibrant new chapter in Arendt scholarship that expands her relevance for contemporary philosophers. Arendt wrote thoughtfully about the role of sensibility and aesthetic judgment in political life and on the power of art to enrich human experience. Sjöholm draws a clear line from Arendt’s consideration of these subjects to her reflections on aesthetic encounters and works of art mentioned in her published writings and stored among her memorabilia. This delicate effort allows Sjöholm to revisit Arendt’s political concepts of freedom, plurality, and judgment from an aesthetic point of view and incorporate Arendt’s insight into current discussions of literature, music, theater, and visual art. Though Arendt did not explicitly outline an aesthetics, Sjöholm’s work substantively incorporates her perspective into contemporary reckonings with radical politics and their relationship to art.
This chapter reviews some of the earliest research relating social perception to social reality. This includes some of the earliest (and classic) studies of stereotypes, the “New Look” in perception movement of the 1940s and 1950s, and some of the early classics of social perception research. Much of this work was interpreted by the original authors as demonstrating widespread flaws and biases in social judgment and is routinely interpreted in much the same manner by modern scholars. Nonetheless, this chapter shows that, in general, this early work either failed to demonstrate inaccuracy or provided far more evidence of accuracy than of error or bias.

In his The Realm of Reason, the author proposes a theory that states the conditions under which a thinker can be said to be entitled to form a given belief. The author's ‘Generalised Rationalism’ is based on three principles of rationalism, each framed as a claim about the relation of entitlement. The theory is rationalist in that it holds, against empiricism, that some entitlements are a priori, i.e. justified independently of experience; it is generalised in that it holds that all kinds of content have a component that is a priori. The status of these entitlements as a priori is founded in a particular way in the network of relations between entitlement, understanding, and truth. The author applies his theory in detail to several classical philosophical problems, including the nature of perceptual entitlement, induction, and the status of moral judgements. In the course of these discussions, the author develops a theory of the structure of entitlement and a general theory of the a priori, elaborates on the nature of Generalised Rationalism by juxtaposing it to classical and recent rationalist thought, and elucidates the general implications...
the truth of his theory has for theories of meaning, reference, and explanation.

The First Sense
Matthew Fulkerson

Published in print: 2014 Published Online: May 2014
Publisher: The MIT Press
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019965.001.0001
Item type: book

This book offers a philosophical account of human touch, one informed and constrained by empirical work on touch. It begins by arguing that human touch, despite its functional diversity, is a single, unified sensory modality. From there, it describes and argues for a novel, unifying role for exploratory action in touch. Later chapters fill in the details of this unified, exploratory form of perception, offering philosophical accounts of tool use and distal touch, the representational structure of tangible properties, the spatial content of touch, and the role of pleasure in tactual experience. The resulting account has significant implications for our general understanding of perception and perceptual experience.

Sensing and Doing
Mohan Matthen

in Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception

Published in print: 2005 Published Online: April 2005
Publisher: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/0199268509.003.0010
Item type: chapter

Sensory systems do not passively pick up features available in the ambient energy patterns. According to the Coevolution Thesis propounded here, they provide an organism with discriminatory abilities that subserve action-modes that evolve in parallel. The kind of action served is not merely bodily motion. A proper general understanding takes account of the epistemic uses of sense perception. The Aeffectors@ that are important for the coevolution of sense perception are thus internal units that analyse and store information. The primary content or meaning of a sensory state is specified in terms of epistemic action, its secondary content or extension may be specified in physical terms.
Introduction
Cyriel M. A. Pennartz

This book explores the neural basis of consciousness and, more specifically, with the foundations of neural representations underlying consciousness. It adopts a neuroscientific angle on how neural systems generate representations and consciousness, but at the same time considers the “hard” problem of consciousness. In contrast to aspects that have proven accessible to experimental study, such as attention and memory, this hard aspect is considered to be the qualitative nature of conscious experience, and precisely because of this nature it has been vexingly difficult to come up with plausible neural explanations. In this chapter, we will first dig into definitional issues in studies of consciousness and representation, such as: what is consciousness, and how may the concept of “representation” be informative about it? How do we recognize a conscious state in ourselves or in other beings? Important distinctions between 'detection' and 'perception' are introduced as well as different uses of 'meaning'. Finally, a brief overview of this book's contents is given.

Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness
David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill (eds)

In this volume, cognitive scientists and philosophers examine two closely related aspects of mind and mental functioning: the relationships among the various senses and the links that connect different conscious experiences to form unified wholes. Contributors address a range of questions concerning how information from one sense influences the processing of information from the other senses and how unified states of consciousness emerge from the bonds that tie conscious experiences together. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness is the first book to address both of these topics, integrating scientific and philosophical concerns. Much recent work in both philosophy and perception science has challenged traditional conceptions of the sensory
systems as operating in isolation. Contributors consider the ways in which perceptual contact with the world is or may be “multisensory,” discussing such subjects as the modeling of multisensory integration and philosophical aspects of sensory modalities. Recent years have seen a similar surge of interest in unity of consciousness. Contributors explore a range of questions on this topic, including the nature of that unity, the degree to which conscious experiences are unified, and the relationship between unified consciousness and the self. Contributors: Tim Bayne, David J. Bennett, Berit Brogaard, Barry Dainton, Ophelia Deroy, Frederique de Vignemont, Marc Ernst, Richard Held, Christopher S. Hill, Geoffrey Lee, Kristan Marlow, Farid Masrour, Jennifer Matey, Casey O'Callaghan, Cesare V. Parise, Kevin Rice, Elizabeth Schechter, Pawan Sinha, Julia Trommershaeuser, Loes C. J. van Dam, Jonathan Vogel, James Van Cleve, Robert Van Gulick, Jonas Wulff

Categories and Principles of the Understanding
Georges Dicker

in Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction

Published in print: 2004 Published Online: January 2005
Item type: chapter

This chapter introduces Kant’s theory of categories and corresponding principles. It explains and evaluates Kant’s attempt to derive his categories from forms of judgment. It also discusses in detail the principles that do not depend on the Transcendental Deduction—namely, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Postulates of Empirical Thought—and introduces those that do depend on the Transcendental Deduction—namely, the Analogies of Experience.

The cinema of Lucrecia Martel
Deborah Martin

Published in print: 2016 Published Online: September 2016
Item type: book

Since the release of her debut feature, La ciénaga, in 2001, Argentine director Lucrecia Martel has gained worldwide recognition for her richly allusive, elliptical and sensorial film-making. The first monograph on her work, The Cinema of Lucrecia Martel analyses her three feature films, which also include La niña santa (2004) and La mujer sin cabeza (2008), alongside the unstudied short films Nueva Argirópolis (2010),
Pescados (2010) and Muta (2011). It examines the place of Martel’s work within the experimental turn taken by Argentine cinema in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a trend of which Martel is often described as a major player, yet also explores correspondences between her work and other national and global filmmaking trends, including the horror genre, and classic Hollywood. It brings together the rich and diverse critical approaches which have been taken in the analysis of Martel’s work – including feminist and queer approaches, political readings and phenomenology – and proposes new ways of understanding her films, in particular through their figuring of desire as revolutionary, their use of the child’s perspective, and their address to the senses and perception, which it argues serve to renew cinematic language and thought.

States, Contents, and the Source of Entitlement

Christopher Peacocke

in The Realm of Reason

Published in print: 2003 Published Online: April 2004
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Item type: chapter

States and defends the second principle of rationalism, The Rationalist Dependence Thesis, which holds that the rational truth-conduciveness of any given transition to which a thinker is entitled is to be philosophically explained in terms of the nature of the intentional contents and states involved in the transition. The second principle, therefore, explains what it means for a transition to lead to true judgements in ‘a distinctive way characteristic of rational transitions’: if the reliability of that transition can be seen to follow from the nature of those contents and states, then the transition is one to which the thinker is entitled. The remainder of Ch. 2 elucidates and paves the way for the author's argument for the Rationalist Dependence Thesis: the author identifies two tasks for a rationalist to support the thesis for content-endorsing transitions, namely to show why the content of perceptual entitling states will tend to be true and to show why the transition to the judgement of the content made rational by the entitling perceptual state is truth-conducive when the entitling state has a correct content. The first task is judged to be the greater challenge and three levels of the entitlement relation are distinguished from one another, each level differing from the others in terms of generality and explanatory power.
Explaining Perceptual Entitlement
Christopher Peacocke

in The Realm of Reason

Published in print: 2003 Published Online: April 2004
Item type: chapter

Concerns itself with explaining the conclusion of the preceding chapter, namely that there is an entitlement to take experiences with instance-individuated contents at face value. The author explains this by, first, formulating and defending a general principle about the explanation of complexity; second, establishing that this general principle applies to the explanation of the occurrence of experiences with instance-individuated contents, and does so in such a way as to support the presumption that the contents of such experiences are correct; third, arguing that this application to perceptual states provides the philosophical explanation of why one is entitled to take experiences with instance-individuated contents at face value.

Extensions and Consequences
Christopher Peacocke

in The Realm of Reason

Published in print: 2003 Published Online: April 2004
Item type: chapter

Traces out some of the ramifications the explanation of the character and source of perceptual entitlement has and indicates some applications beyond the case of perceptual entitlement. These extensions concern the relations between rationality and truth; the possibility of Gettier examples in the domain of perceptual knowledge; Moore's Proof; the relationship between entitlement and factive states; the individuation of concepts; moral thought; and the philosophy of action.

Possibilities of Perception
Jennifer Church

Published in print: 2013 Published Online: September 2013
Item type: book
The epistemology and the phenomenology of perception are closely related insofar as both depend on experiences of self-evident objectivity —experiences in which the objectivity of a state of affairs is evident from within our experience of that state of affairs. This book offers a distinctive account of perception, showing how imagining alternate perspectives and alternate possibilities plays a key role in creating and validating experiences of self-evident objectivity. Offered first as an account of what it takes to perceive ordinary objects such as birds and trees, the account is then extended to show how it is also possible to perceive such things as causes, reasons, mental states, distant galaxies, molecular arrangements, mathematical relations, and interpersonal obligations. A chapter is devoted to the phenomenology and epistemology of moral perception, including the perception of persons as such; and a chapter is devoted to the peculiarities of aesthetic perception, including the perception of artworks as such. In all of these cases, it is argued, perception can be literal (not merely figurative or metaphorical) and substantive (not merely formal or deflationary). The account helps to explain the advantages of perceptual versus non-perceptual knowledge. It is also helps to make sense of some historical discussions of the role of the imagination in acquiring and validating knowledge (Plato’s cave, Descartes’ explanation of rational intuition, and Kant’s arguments concerning objectivity, causality, and the Categorical Imperative).

Between Perception and Action

Bence Nanay

What mediates between sensory input and motor output? This is probably the most basic question one can ask about the mind. There is stimulation on your retina, something happens in your skull, and then your hand reaches out to grab the apple in front of you. What is it that happens in between? What representations make it possible for you to grab this apple? The representations that make this possible could be labelled “pragmatic representations”. The aim of the book is to argue that pragmatic representations whose function is to mediate between sensory input and motor output play an immensely important role in our mental life. And they help us to explain why the vast majority of what goes on in our mind is very similar to the simple mental processes of animals. The human mind, like the minds of non-human animals, has been selected for allowing us to perform actions successfully. The vast majority of our actions, like the actions of non-human animals,
could not be performed without perceptual guidance, and what provides the perceptual guidance for performing actions are pragmatic representations. If we accept this framework, many classic questions in philosophy of perception and of action will look very different. The aim of this book is to trace the various consequences of this way of thinking about the mind in a number of branches of philosophy as well as in psychology and cognitive science.