This monograph is a comprehensive study of the thought of al-Kindī, the first self-described philosopher in Islam, and the first to write original treatises in Arabic. Al-Kindī’s writings are closely engaged with Greek philosophical and scientific texts, whose translation into Arabic he oversaw. Some of the philosophical views for which al-Kindī is known are reactions to Greek thinkers. For instance, he used ideas from Philoponus in arguing against the eternity of the world, and his discussion of divine attributes is based on Neoplatonic texts. However, the book also places al-Kindī’s thought within the context of 9th century Islamic culture, especially contemporary theological developments. The book covers every aspect of al-Kindī’s extant philosophical corpus, including not only his philosophical theology but also his theory of soul, his epistemology, and his ethics. Two chapters are devoted to al-Kindī’s works on the natural sciences (in particular pharmacology, optics, music, and cosmology). The book concludes by discussing how al-Kindī used Greek cosmological ideas in his account of divine providence.

The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are indeed true. Many philosophers have taken the Law to be central to many of our most important philosophical concepts. This book mounts the case against this view. Starting with an analysis
of Aristotle on the Law, it discusses the nature of truth, rationality, negation, and logic itself, and argues that the Law is inessential to all of these things. The book develops Priest’s earlier ideas in In Contradiction.

**Space, Time, Matter, and Form**

David Bostock

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: May 2006

The book features a collection of ten essays on themes from Aristotle’s Physics. Six of these have been previously published, and four are newly written for this volume. The first five essays are based on single theme, namely Aristotle’s conception of substance as it appears in his physical works. The basic texts here are Physics I-II, but the essays also range quite widely over Aristotle’s other physical works, where these are relevant to his understanding of the notions of substance, matter, and form. The general view of these five essays is that Aristotle’s idea of matter was a winner, but his idea of form certainly was not. The remaining five essays are on various topics from Physics III-VI, with each confined to the text of the Physics itself. The topics covered fall broadly under the headings: space, time, and infinity.

**Just a Job?**

George Cheney, Dan Lair, Dean Ritz, and Brenden Kendall

Published in print: 2009 Published Online: February 2010

This book offers a fresh perspective on ethics at work, questioning the notions that doing ethics at work has to be work, and that work is somehow a sphere where a different set of rules applies. When we separate ethics from life, we put it beyond our daily reach, treating it as something that is meaningful only at certain moments. This problem permeates our everyday talk about ethics at work, in popular culture, in our textbooks, and even in our ethics codes. This book uses insights from the fields of communications and rhetoric to show how in the very framing of ethics—even before we get to specific decisions—we limit the potential roles of ethics in our work lives and in the pursuit of happiness. Sayings such as “It's just a job” and “Let the market decide” are two examples of demonstrating that our perspective on professional ethics is shaped and reinforced by everyday language. The standard “bad apples” approach to dealing with corporate and governmental wrongdoing is
not surprising; few people are willing to consider how to cultivate “the
good orchard.” The book argues that ethics is about more than behaviour
regulation, spectacular scandals, and comprehensive codes. The authors
offer a new take on virtue ethics, referencing Aristotle's practical ideal
of eudaimonia, or flourishing, allowing us to tell new stories about the
ordinary and to see the extraordinary aspects of professional integrity
and success.

Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy
John Marenbon (ed.)
Published in print: 2013 Published Online: January 2014
Item type: book

The usual division of philosophy into ‘medieval’ and ‘modern’ obscures
the continuities in philosophy up until 1700. This book examines three
areas where these continuities are particularly clear: knowledge, the
mind, and language. It does so through three chapters, by different
authors, each followed by a detailed response. The first chapter shows
how Descartes attacked faculty psychology and thus separated himself
from one strand of the medieval tradition, represented by Suárez. At
the same time, Descartes was closely following another strand, found in
Ockham. Thus, the discontinuity between medieval and modern may not
be as sharp as first appears. The second chapter considers discussions
of whether knowledge should be kept for the elite. In the Christian world
medieval and seventeenth-century thinkers alike rarely advocated
esotericism, but Jewish and Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazâlî, Averroes,
and Maimonides strongly defended it. The main chapter of Part III argues
that a version of such esotericism may be a defensible philosophical
position today. The main chapter of Part II shows how Locke's philosophy
of language fits into a long medieval tradition of thought based on
Aristotle's On Interpretation. Locke introduced the requirement that a
word be linked to an idea in the speaker's mind, but the chapter argues
that this does not mean that Locke was proposing that we each have a
private language.

Plotinus on Intellect
Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson
Published in print: 2007 Published Online: May 2007
Item type: book
This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is also the sphere of being, the Platonic Ideas, which exist as its thoughts. Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect raises a host of questions that the book seeks to answer: Intellect's thought is described as an attempt to grasp the One and at the same time as self-thought. How are these two claims related? How are they compatible? What lies in Plotinus' insistence that Intellect's thought is a thought of itself? The minimal requirements thought must satisfy according to Plotinus is that it must involve a distinction between thinker and object of thought, and the object itself must be varied. How are these two claims which amount to holding that Intellect is plural in two different ways related? What is the relation between Intellect as a thinker and Intellect as an object of thought? Plotinus' position here seems to amount to a form of idealism, a claim that is explored in the book. As opposed to ordinary human discursive thinking, Intellect's thought is all-at-once, timeless, truthful, and a direct intuition into 'the things themselves'; it is presumably not even propositional. This strong notion of non-discursive thought is discussed and explained as well as Plotinus' claim that this must be the primary form of thought. The main conclusion of the book is that though clearly dependent on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, Plotinus' theory of Intellect contains very significant innovations.

Conclusions on the Terminology
Pavel Gregoric

in Aristotle on the Common Sense

Published in print: 2007 Published Online: September 2007
Published Online: September 2007
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DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0011
Item type: chapter

This chapter indicates that the phrase ‘common sense’ probably has not yet crystallized into a technical term with Aristotle. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, owing to Aristotle, it became a technical term at some point between Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias. There is consistency in Aristotle's use of the phrase ‘common sense’ which, on its own, would imply that the phrase is a technical term for Aristotle, functioning as a proper name for the sensory capacity of the soul. However, a survey of the other uses manifest variation which suggests that the phrase really did not have the status of a technical term for Aristotle. Depending on the context, the terms which make up the phrase can take different nuances in meaning within their respective semantic horizons and assume different word order to express different
ideas. Aristotle takes advantage of this variability in different contexts, and it is possible that he would not be inclined to do so had the phrase been fixed in his mind as a technical term.

Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue
J. Warren Smith
Published in print: 2010 Published Online: January 2011
Item type: book

Though understandably overshadowed by Augustine’s preeminence in the West, Ambrose is a doctor of the Catholic Church and an important patristic authority for the Middle Ages and Reformation, especially in moral theology. Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue argues that Ambrose of Milan’s theological commitments, particularly his understanding of the Christian’s participation in God’s saving economy through baptism, are foundational for his virtue theory laid out in his catechetical and other pastoral writings. While he holds a high regard for classical and Hellenistic views of virtue, Ambrose insists that the Christian is able to attain the highest ideal of virtue taught by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. This is possible because the Christian has received the transformative grace of baptism that allows the Christian to participate in the new creation inaugurated by Christ’s incarnation, death, and resurrection. This book explores Ambrose’s understanding of this grace and how it frees the Christian to live the virtuous life. The argument is laid out in two parts. In Part I, the book examines Ambrose’s understanding of human nature and the effects of sin upon that nature. Central to this Part is the question of Ambrose’s understanding of the right relationship of soul and body as presented in Ambrose’s repeated appeal to Paul’s words, “Who will deliver me from this body of death?” (Rom. 7:24). Part II lays out Ambrose’s account of baptism as the sacrament of justification and regeneration (sacramental and proleptic participation in the renewal of human nature in the resurrection). Ultimately, Ambrose’s account of the efficacy of baptism rests upon his Christology and pneumatology. The final chapters explain how Ambrose’s accounts of Christ and the Holy Spirit are foundational to his view of the grace that liberates the soul from the corruption of concupiscence.

Plotinus on Number
Svetla Slaveva-Griffin
Published in print: 2009 Published Online: May 2009
This book examines Plotinus’ concept of number, one of the most difficult and obscure topics in Neoplatonism. The book argues that Plotinus is the first philosopher who explains the Platonic “true number” and the quantitative mathematical numbers in a conceptually informed relationship as between an intelligible paradigm and its sense-perceptible image. Throughout the Enneads and especially in Ennead VI.6, the treatise On Numbers, Plotinus systematically peels off the layers of mathematical and quantitative perception from the concept of number to reveal that real number is the primary activity of substance (ousia), which orders the unfolding of the universe from its absolute source into a finite multiplicity. The book traces the development of Plotinus’ concepts of number and multiplicity in Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s view of number, and Neopythagoreanism. This analysis establishes number to be the building block of the intelligible realm and the architecture of the universe in Plotinus. For him, as for his Platonic and Neopythagorean predecessors, the universe has a meaning, enciphered by number. In this light, Plotinus’ concept of number is the fundamental link between the number theories of the Neopythagoreans and the later Neoplatonists.

Aquinas on Friendship
Daniel Schwartz

Published in print: 2007 Published Online: May 2008
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205394.001.0001

This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book argues that Aquinas fundamentally revised some of the main features of Aristotle's paradigmatic account of friendship so as to accommodate the case of friendship between radically unequal beings: man and God. As a result, Aquinas presented a broader view of friendship than Aristotle's, allowing for a higher extent of disagreement, lack of mutual understanding, and inequality between friends.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 43
Brad Inwood (ed.)

Published in print: 2012 Published Online: January 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199666164.001.0001
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy provides, twice each year, a collection of the best current work in the field of ancient philosophy. Each volume features original essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, from the beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. From its first volume in 1983, OSAP has been a highly influential venue for work in the field, and has often featured essays of substantial length as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Volume 43 includes two articles on Plato, five on Aristotle, two on important aspects of Stoicism and one on Plutarch and scepticism.

Conclusion: In Defense of Plato
Svetla Slaveva-Griffin
in Plotinus on Number

The concept of number is the troublemaker in the history of Platonism. It separated the followers of Plato and Aristotle into two camps for generations. For Plotinus, however, the concept becomes the peacemaker, which reconciles the camps. The importance of this reconciliation is central to Plotinus’ philosophical system because it not only uses Aristotle to defend Plato from Aristotle himself, but establishes Plotinus’ concept of number as the fundamental link between the number theories of the Neopythagoreans and the later Neoplatonists. This book demonstrates that the subject of number should be considered among the most important concepts for understanding Plotinus’ philosophy and therefore deserves greater scholarly attention than it has received. Plotinus adopts and adapts Platonic and Neopythagorean cosmology to place number in the foundation of the intelligible realm and the construction of the universe. Throughout the Enneads and especially in Ennead VI.6, he systematically peels off the layers of mathematical and quantitative perception from the concept of number to reveal that real intelligible number is the primary activity of substance, which orders the unfolding of the universe from its absolute source into a finite multiplicity.
This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. It attributes Aquinas' broadening of friendship to the unsuitability of Aristotelian friendship to accommodate successfully the Christian ideal of friendship with God. While Aquinas accepted the principle that friends will and reject the same things, he promoted (or demoted) this principle to an ideal. Perfect concord can be fulfilled only by individuals equipped with similar idiosyncrasies and information, placed in identical circumstances, and therefore capable of appreciating the same reasons and having similar attitudes.

Seneca and the Idea of Tragedy
Gregory A. Staley

As both a literary genre and a view of life, tragedy has from the very beginning spurred a dialogue between poetry and philosophy. Plato wanted to ban tragedians from his ideal community because he believed that they dabbled in the philosopher’s business but had no “idea” what they were doing. Aristotle set out to answer Plato’s objections by arguing that fiction offers a faithful image of the truth and promotes emotional health through the mechanism of catharsis. This book argues that Aristotle’s definition of tragedy actually had its greatest impact not on Greek tragedy itself but on the later history of the idea of tragedy, beginning with the tragedies of the Roman poet and Stoic philosopher Seneca (4 bc–ad 65), whose Latin plays were known and read in the Renaissance for centuries before the now more famous Greek tragedies were rediscovered. When Sir Philip Sidney (1554–1586) composed An Apology for Poetry, he borrowed from Seneca the word idea to designate what we would now label as a “theory” of tragedy. Through Sidney, Seneca’s plays came to exemplify an idea of tragedy that was at its core Aristotelian. Senecan tragedy enacts Aristotle’s conception of the genre as a vivid image of the truth and treats tragedy as a natural venue in which to explore the human soul.
Introduction
Sergio Tenenbaum
in Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good

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Publisher: Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0001
Item type: chapter

In the introduction, Tenenbaum provides a general overview about the main debates that arise from investigation of the relation between desire (and practical reason) and the good, and briefly explains the contribution that the individual chapters make to these debates, as well as how these chapters hang together.

Doing and Being
Jonathan Beere

Published in print: 2009 Published Online: February 2010
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Item type: book

Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: energeia and dunamis. While these terms seem ambiguous between actuality/potentiality and activity/capacity, Aristotle did not intend them to be so. Through a careful and detailed reading of Metaphysics Theta, the author argues that we can solve the problem by rejecting both ‘actuality’ and ‘activity’ as translations of energeia, and by working out an analogical conception of energeia. This approach enables the author to discern a hitherto unnoticed connection between Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, and to give satisfying interpretations of the major claims that Aristotle makes in Metaphysics Theta, the claim that energeia is prior in being to capacity (Theta 8), and the claim that any eternal principle must be perfectly good (Theta 9).

Numbers
David M. Armstrong
in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

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Publisher: Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0013
Item type: chapter
An account is given of the Forrest-Armstrong theory of number (Peter Forrest). Natural numbers are argued to be relations holding between a certain property and a certain mereological whole (black swan on the lake now, and the whole that these swans make). With the rational numbers and the real numbers the relation becomes one of proportion, they are the units that measure the proportion. It is pointed out, however, that this view is largely to be found in Isaac Newton, and is even anticipated in Aristotle. What it is for a mathematical entity such as a number to be ‘instantiated’ is considered.

**A Method of Modal Proof In Aristotle**

Jacob Rosen and Marko Malink

in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 42

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In Prior Analytics 1. 15, Aristotle states the following rule of modal logic, which we may call the possibility rule: given the premiss that A is possible, and given a derivation of B from A, it can be inferred that B is possible. Aristotle is the first philosopher known to state this rule, and it stands among his most significant contributions to philosophical thought about modality. He applies the possibility rule in arguments that are central to his physical and metaphysical views, in works such as the Physics, De caelo, De generatione et corruptione, and the Metaphysics. These arguments have proved difficult to understand, largely because the exact nature of the possibility rule and its role in each argument is often unclear. The chapter offers a comprehensive treatment of the arguments throughout Aristotle's works, resulting in a better understanding both of the possibility rule and of the individual arguments in which it appears.

**Aristotle on Law and Moral Education**

Zena Hitz

in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 42

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It is widely agreed that Aristotle holds that the best moral education involves habituation in the proper pleasures of virtuous action. But it is
rarely acknowledged that Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes the social and political sources of good habits, and strongly suggests that the correct law-ordained education in proper pleasures is very rare or non-existent. A careful look at the Nicomachean Ethics along with parallel discussions in the Eudeman Ethics and Politics suggests that Aristotle divided public moral education or law-ordained habituation into two types. One type is a defective form practiced by the Spartans, producing civic courage and similar defective virtue-like states motivated by external incentives. By contrast Aristotle endorses the law-ordained musical education described in Politics 8. The chapter argues that Aristotle considers the well-habituated state of proper pleasures in virtue to be best cultivated by this kind of musical education; and that this explains both his emphasis on good laws and on their scarcity.

Cicero and Dicaearchus
Sean Mcconnell

in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 42

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Cicero's general interest in Dicaearchus' ethical and political thought can be detected in his letters to Atticus and De legibus. At present, however, we do not possess a clear and detailed picture of Dicaearchus' influence on Cicero's own ethical and political thought. This chapter argues that, despite these obstacles, we can construct a positive account of the nature and extent of Dicaearchus' influence that offers new insights into key aspects of Cicero's philosophical thought and practice. First it offers a novel reconstruction of Dicaearchus' argument for the supremacy of the praktikos bios and his relationship with Aristotle and Theophrastus in the Peripatetic tradition. The chapter then considers how Dicaearchus figures in Cicero's political and ethical deliberations by analysing a letter to Atticus in which Dicaearchus is referred to by name. At this point we are in a position to identify the precise nature of Dicaearchus' influence on Cicero's De republica, which is the subject of the final and concluding section. Here the chapter argues that Cicero's vision of philosophy and its role in Roman political culture, as showcased in the preface to De republica, is appropriated in all fundamental respects from Dicaearchus.