Natural jurisprudence and the identity of the Scottish Enlightenment
Knud Haakonssen

Enlightenment natural jurisprudence in Scotland is commonly seen as a subject that quickly became old-fashioned and was rejected by the high Enlightenment, except as an introduction to university study. This perception derives in part from a teleological notion of Enlightenment as a tally of ‘contributions’ towards modernity. This chapter argues that, at the time, natural jurisprudence was a modern, practically relevant subject right through the Enlightenment, as shown in teaching practice, publications, and the demands of the legal profession. Through an overview of the publications of natural law, it is argued that, while certainly an academic discipline, it was also part of the wider civic culture. This was made possible by the character of natural jurisprudence as not itself a definite philosophy, but a genre, or practical language, that could be employed by a variety of very different religious and philosophical doctrines according to the shifting demands of successive generations.

The Dharmic Law
Tulsi Badrinath

This essay indicates that the principles of good governance are derived from the foundations of human order which, in order to be truly universal, must themselves be established in the sacredness of life. The
foundation, or dharma, of all relationships, personal and social, lies in the recognition that life is sacred; that all its expressions are interrelated and bound in a visible unity and that no violence shall be done to a person by another. Badrinath here informs the reader that the concern of Dharmic law with the dignity and worth of the individual and with social progress was given institutional forms of jurisprudence in the Mahabharata and a few centuries later in the ancient Indian treatise Arthasastra authored by Kautilya.

Introduction
Rik Peels

in Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology

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This Introduction explains the purpose of the book: giving an analysis of responsible belief. It provides several examples of cases in which people fail to believe responsibly, such as that of the terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists in Paris. An account of responsible belief is needed for three reasons. First, we are responsible for our beliefs but it seems we cannot control them. Second, the notion of blameworthy belief plays a crucial role in the law, but little is said in jurisprudence about what blameworthy and responsible belief amount to. Third, an account of responsible belief can help us to maintain or change social practices of holding each other doxastically responsible. Finally, it is briefly explained what is new about the account of responsible belief in this book: it is expressed in terms of influence rather than control and it focuses on excuses for belief.