The history of double-effect reasoning
T. A. Cavanaugh

in Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: September 2006
Item type: chapter

This chapter presents the history of DER, considering Aquinas’s originating account and closely tracing the development of double effect through subsequent moralists up to the 19th century Jesuit J.P. Gury, who proposed the standard modern version. Over the six centuries separating Aquinas and Gury, ethicists expanded the number of cases considered by DER and further articulated its grounds in action theory, arriving at double-effect criteria as generally applicable to relevant cases. These criteria, their import, order, relation to one another, necessity, and sufficiency are analyzed, and revisions are proposed.

The i/f distinction: distinguishing intent from foresight
T. A. Cavanaugh

in Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil

Published in print: 2006 Published Online: September 2006
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This chapter analyzes the intended/foreseen (i/f) distinction: how to name it, how to make it, and how to apply it to the classic cases of euthanasia/terminal sedation, craniotomy/hysterectomy, and terror bombing/tactical bombing. Addressing the problem of closeness Foot moots, inadequate responses to this problem are considered such as paring one’s intentions, the counter-factual test, and conceptual necessity. The chapter presents an account of the i/f distinction based on the resources found in Aquinas, Anscombe, and Bratman who indicate how intention characteristically differs from foresight insofar as the
former is while the latter is not a plan of action formed in deliberation embodying practical knowledge.

5. Is Non-Combatant Immunity Absolute?
David Fisher

in Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-first Century?

The principle of non-combatant immunity forbids deliberate attacks on civilians. Yet civilians are regularly killed in war. So are all wars unjust? Just-war commentators have resisted this conclusion, distinguishing between intended and foreseen consequences. The role of double effect is examined both in just-war thinking and in supporting moral absolutism. Double effect marks an important distinction, but this is not sufficient to support moral absolutism. Other gradations of mental state are also relevant to the attribution of moral responsibility. Absolutism oversimplifies the nature of moral reasoning and leads to implausible conclusions. The principle of non-combatant immunity cannot be held absolute. But to minimize the suffering caused by war there are strong reasons for holding it as near absolute a principle as we can. The application of the principle is examined against two case studies: the 2008–9 conflict in Gaza and NATO air operations in Kosovo in 1999.

Mineness and Faith
Kevin W. Hector

in The Theological Project of Modernism: Faith and the Conditions of Mineness

This chapter sketches an account of “mineness” that draws together much of the recent literature on this and related subjects. The key claims are these: first, that “mineness” is a matter of one’s life hanging together in such a way that one can identify with it; second, that the need for such hanging together renders one vulnerable insofar as important phenomena may not actually conform with one’s life-intentions, since such phenomena may instead be governed by forces that are hostile or indifferent to these intentions; and third, that modern theology can be read as a series of responses to the question of how one can identify
with one’s life even in the face of such vulnerability, and, in particular, as claiming that faith plays a key role in enabling one to do so.