The Body
Tim Bayne

in The Unity of Consciousness

This chapter examines whether the unity of consciousness is grounded in bodily self-consciousness. The focal point of discussion is the embodiment constraint, which claims that the unity of consciousness cannot co-exist with a break down in the unity of bodily self-consciousness. Three challenges to the embodiment constraint are examined. The first challenge turns on the question of whether bodily sensations and perceptual experiences can be located within a single frame of reference. The second challenge focuses on a pair of pathologies of bodily experience—depersonalization and Cotard's delusion—in which patients appear to lose the normal integrity of bodily self-consciousness but retain a unified consciousness. A third challenge to the embodiment constraint derives from the possibility of multiple embodiment. It is argued that although the embodiment constraint can meet the first two challenges it succumbs to the third.

Creativity and the Insight That Literature Brings
Gregory Currie

in The Philosophy of Creativity: New Essays

One outcome of the exercise of creative literary talent is said to be insight into the workings of the mind. Many advocates of this view write as if its truth were self-evident. I suggest that it is not, that indeed there is little evidence in its favor, and I consider how the claim might be tested. Recent experimental studies by Oatley and colleagues look
promising in this regard; I suggest that their results so far provide very weak evidence at best. In the absence of better evidence, I turn to the question of whether there are aspects of literary creativity that we should expect, on general grounds, would lead reliably to insight about the mind. I consider two such aspects: the institutions of literary production and the psychology of literary creativity. I suggest that in both cases, there are some grounds for thinking that literary creativity is not reliably connected with the production of insight.