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Government wrongdoing or negligence harms people worldwide, but not all victims are equally effective at obtaining redress. This book examines the interactive dynamics of the politics of redress to understand why not. Relatively powerless groups like redress claimants depend on support from political elites, active groups in society, the media, experts, lawyers, and the interested public to capture democratic policymakers’ attention and sway their decisions. Focusing on when and how such third-party support matters, the book finds that elite allies may raise awareness about the victims’ cause or sponsor special legislation, but their activities also tend to deter the mobilization of fellow claimants and public sympathy. By contrast, claimants who gain elite allies only after the difficult and potentially risky process of mobilizing societal support tend to achieve more redress, which can include official inquiries, apologies, compensation, and structural reforms. The book illustrates these dynamics through comparisons of the parallel Japanese and South Korean movements of victims of harsh leprosy control policies, blood products tainted by hepatitis C, and North Korean abductions. It highlights how citizens in Northeast Asia—a region grappling with how to address Japan’s past wrongs—are leveraging similar processes to hold their own governments accountable for more recent harms. The book also reveals the growing power of litigation to promote policy change and greater accountability from decision makers.

This book examines the relationship between social movements and democratization in Indonesia. Collectively, progressive social movements have played a critical role in ensuring that different groups of citizens can engage directly in—and benefit from—the political process in a way that was not possible under authoritarianism. However, their individual roles have been different, with some playing a decisive role in the destabilization of the regime and others serving as bell-weathers of the advancement, or otherwise, of Indonesia's democracy in the decades since. Equally important, democratization has affected social movements differently depending on the form taken by each movement during the New Order period. The book assesses the contribution that nine progressive social movements have made to the democratization of Indonesia since the late 1980s, and how, in turn, each of those movements has been influenced by democratization.

In this groundbreaking book, Raghavan uses previously untapped archival sources to weave together new stories about the experiences of post-partition state-making in South Asia. Through meticulous research, it challenges the existing wisdom about the preponderance of animosity and the rhetoric of war. The book shows how amity and a spirit of cordiality governed relations between the states of India and Pakistan in the first five years after partition. Arguing that a hitherto overlooked set of considerations have to be integrated more closely into the analysis of bilateral dialogue, this book analyses the developments leading to the No War correspondence between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, the signing of a ‘Minorities’ Pact between the two prime ministers, and the early stages of the Indus Waters negotiations, as well as exploring the calculations of Indian and Pakistani delegates at a series of interdominion conferences held in the years after partition. This book will be of interest to specialists in histories of diplomatic practice as well as a general audience in search of narratives of peace in the South Asia region

After World War II, several late-developing countries registered astonishingly high growth rates under strong state direction, making use of smart investment strategies, turnkey factories, and reverse-engineering, and taking advantage of the postwar global economic boom. Among these economic miracles were postwar Japan and, in the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called Asian Tigers—Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan—whose experiences epitomized the analytic category of the “developmental state.” This book examines the emerging biotechnology sector in each of these three industrial dynamos. They have invested billions of dollars in the biotech industry since the 1990s, but commercial blockbusters and commensurate profits have not followed. Industrial upgrading at the cutting edge of technological innovation is vastly different from the dynamics of earlier practices in established industries. The profound uncertainties of life-science-based industries such as biotech have forced these nations to confront a new logic of industry development, one in which past strategies of picking and making winners have given way to a new strategy of throwing resources at what remain very long shots. The book illuminates a new political economy of industrial technology innovation in places where one would reasonably expect tremendous potential—yet where billion-dollar bets in biotech continue to teeter on the brink of spectacular failure.

Within Asia, the period from 1840s to 1960s had witnessed the rise and decline of Pax Britannica, the growth of multiple and often competing anti-colonial movements, and the entrenchment of the nation-state system. Beyond Pan-Asianism seeks to demonstrate the complex interactions between China, India, and their neighbouring societies against this background of imperialism and nationalist resistance. The contributors to this volume, from India, the West, and the Chinese-speaking world, cover a tremendous breadth of figures, including novelists, soldiers, intelligence officers, archivists, among others, by deploying published and archival materials in multiple Asian and Western languages. This volume also attempts to answer the question of how China–India connectedness in the modern period should be narrated. Instead of providing one definite answer, it engages with prevailing and past frameworks—notably ‘Pan-Asianism’ and ‘China/India as Method’—with an aim to provoke further discussions on how histories of China–India and, by extension the non-Western world, can be conceptualized.

When the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in 1975, they inherited a war-ravaged and internationally isolated country. Pol Pot's government espoused the rhetoric of self-reliance, but Democratic Kampuchea was utterly dependent on Chinese foreign aid and technical assistance to survive. Yet in a markedly asymmetrical relationship between a modernizing, nuclear power and a virtually premodern state, China was largely unable to use its power to influence Cambodian politics or policy. This book traces this surprising lack of influence to variations between the Chinese and Cambodian institutions that administered military aid, technology transfer, and international trade. Today, China's extensive engagement with the developing world suggests an inexorably rising China in the process of securing a degree of economic and political dominance that was unthinkable even a decade ago. Yet, China's experience with its first-ever client state suggests that the effectiveness of Chinese foreign aid, and influence that comes with it, is only as good as the institutions that manage the relationship. By focusing on the links between China and Democratic Kampuchea, the book peers into the “black box” of Chinese foreign aid to illustrate how domestic institutional fragmentation limits Beijing's ability to influence the countries that accept its assistance.

Joseph Schumpeter's conceptions of entrepreneurship, innovation, and creative destruction have been hugely influential. He pioneered the study of economic development and of technological paradigm shifts and was a forerunner of the emerging field of evolutionary economics. He is not thought of as a theorist of credit-supercharged high-speed growth, but this is what he became in postwar Japan. As this book shows, economists and planners in postwar Japan seized upon Schumpeter's ideas and put them directly to work. The inflationary creation of credit, as theorized by Schumpeter, was a vital but mostly unrecognized aspect of the successful stabilization of Japanese capitalism after World War II and was integral to Japan's postwar success. It also helps to explain Japan's bubble, and the global bubbles that have followed it. The heterodox analysis presented in the book goes beyond the economic history of postwar Japan; it opens up a new view of the core circuits of modern capital in general.

Institutions are norms that undergird organizations and are reflected in laws and practices. Scholars point towards the ‘stickiness’ of institutions as stubbornly persisting on the historical landscape. As institutions tend to persist, the related political, administrative, and social processes persist as well. Therefore, it is puzzling when perpetuating institutions change paths. This book unravels one such puzzle by examining the process of institutional change through the lenses of transformation in the ‘information regime’ in India by tracing the passage of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005. Historically, in India, the norm of secrecy was entrenched within the state, perpetuating since colonial times. Yet, in 2005, the RTI Act was enacted heralding an institutional shift from the norm of ‘secrecy’ to the new norm of ‘openness’. What explains this institutional change? Based on new historical evidence overlooked in the mainstream literature, this book shows that the RTI Act was path-dependent on ideas of openness that emerged within the state since Independence. It argues that an endogenous policy discourse on enacting legislation on access to information had begun since Independence; it incrementally evolved and reached a ‘tipping point’ and, after surviving many political challenges, resulted in institutional change. Initially these ideas emerged gradually and incrementally as part of opposition politics, but eventually became part of mainstream politics. The book presents an alternate perspective to the mainstream narrative explaining the evolution of the RTI Act and makes theoretical contribution to the literature on institutional change.

This book examines the political landscape that followed the 2010 elections in Myanmar and the subsequent transition from direct military rule to a semi-civilian, ‘hybrid’ regime. Striking political, social, and economic transformations have indeed taken place in the long-isolated country since the military junta disbanded in March 2011. To better construe – and question – what has routinely been labelled a ‘Burmese Spring’, the book examines the reasons behind the ongoing political transition, as well as the role of the Burmese armed forces in the process. The book draws on in-depth interviews with Burmese political actors, party leaders, parliamentarians, active and retired army officers. It also takes its cue from comparative scholarship on civil-military relations and post-authoritarian politics, looking at the ‘praetorian’ logic to explain the transitional moment. Myanmar’s road to democratic change is, however, paved with obstacles. As the book suggests, the continuing military intervention in domestic politics, the resilience of bureaucratic, economic and political clientelism at all levels of society, the towering presence of Aung San Suu Kyi, the shadowy influence of regional and global powers, and the enduring concerns about interethnic and interreligious relations, all are strong reminders of the series of elemental conundrums which Myanmar will have to deal with in order to achieve democratization, sustainable development and peace.

Many thought China’s rise would fundamentally remake the global order. Yet, much like other developing nations, the Chinese state now finds itself in a status quo characterized by free trade and American domination. Through a cutting-edge historical, sociological, and political analysis, Ho-fung Hung details the competing interests and economic realities that temper the dream of Chinese supremacy—forces that are stymieing growth throughout the global South. Hung focuses on four common misconceptions: that China could undermine orthodoxy by offering an alternative model of growth; that China is radically altering power relations between the East and the West; that China is capable of diminishing the global power of the United States; and that the Chinese economy would restore the world’s wealth after the 2008 financial crisis. His work reveals how much China depends on the existing order and how the interests of the Chinese elites maintain these ties. Through its perpetuation of the dollar standard and its addiction to U.S. Treasury bonds, China remains bound to the terms of its own prosperity, and its economic practices of exploiting debt bubbles are destined to fail. Hung ultimately warns of a postmiracle China that will grow increasingly assertive in attitude while remaining constrained in capability.

Westerners tend to divide the political world into “good” democracies and “bad” authoritarian regimes, but the Chinese political model does not fit neatly in either category. Over the past three decades, China has evolved a political system that can best be described as “political meritocracy.” This book seeks to understand the ideals and the reality of this unique political system. How do the ideals of political meritocracy set the standard for evaluating political progress (and regress) in China? How can China avoid the disadvantages of political meritocracy? And how can political meritocracy best be combined with democracy? This book answers these questions and more. Opening with a critique of “one person, one vote” as a way of choosing top leaders, it argues that Chinese-style political meritocracy can help to remedy the key flaws of electoral democracy. It discusses the advantages and pitfalls of political meritocracy, distinguishes between different ways of combining meritocracy and democracy, and argues that China has evolved a model of democratic meritocracy that is morally desirable and politically stable. It also summarizes and evaluates the “China model”—meritocracy at the top, experimentation in the middle, and democracy at the bottom—and its implications for the rest of the world. The book looks at a political system that not only has had a long history in China, but could prove to be the most important political development of the twenty-first century.

This book is framed around two very simple and interrelated questions; what is global power and in what ways does China have it? By focussing on political economy and ideational dimensions of global power, it shows how Xi Jinping, whilst building on what came before, has developed a set of strategic strands designed to bring about (global) change. This does not mean that all Chinese international interactions are a direct result of a clearly coordinated and controlled state project; grand strategy and state interest and intent can be (and indeed, often is) assumed when in reality Chinese overseas actors are utilising their ‘bounded autonomy’ to attain other objectives. The changing nature of China’s global economic role – not least the growth of outward investment – might have been enough it itself to shine a new light on the nature of China’s rise. So too might the way that China’s leaders have articulated their global governance reform agenda and used an ‘occidentalism’ to establish China’s leadership credentials. Or the nature of attempts to influence (or even control) the way that China’s rise is discussed and debated across the world. It’s perhaps not surprising, then, that while a risen China might have gained followership from some, concern about the consequences of China’s rise has increased quite significantly in places where it was previously viewed with less apprehension.

Today's China is governed by a new economic model that marks a radical break from the Mao and Deng eras; it departs fundamentally from both the East Asian developmental state and its own Communist past. It has not, however, adopted a liberal economic model. China has retained elements of statist control even though it has liberalized foreign direct investment more than any other developing country in recent years. This mode of global economic integration reveals much about China's state capacity and development strategy, which is based on retaining government control over critical sectors while meeting commitments made to the World Trade Organization. This book demonstrates that China only appears to be a more liberal state; even as it introduces competition and devolves economic decision-making, the state has selectively imposed new regulations at the sectoral level, asserting and even tightening control over industry and market development, to achieve state goals. By investigating how China implemented its economic policies between 1978 and 2010, the book gives the most complete picture yet of China's regulatory state, particularly as it has shaped the telecommunications and textiles industries. It contends that a logic of strategic value explains how the state, with its different levels of authority and maze of bureaucracies, interacts with new economic stakeholders to enhance its control in certain economic sectors while relinquishing control in others. Sectoral characteristics determine policy specifics although the organization of institutions and boom-bust cycles influence how the state reformulates old rules and creates new ones to maximize benefits and minimize costs after an initial phase of liberalization.

This book introduces an innovative theory that pinpoints how states employ economic tools of national power to pursue their strategic objectives. The book shows what Chinese economic statecraft is, how it works, and why it is more or less effective. It provides an accessible tool kit to help us better understand important economic developments in the People's Republic of China. The book links domestic Chinese political economy with the international ramifications of China's economic power as a tool for realizing China's strategic foreign policy interests. It presents a novel approach to studying economic statecraft that calls attention to the central challenge of how the state is (or is not) able to control and direct the behavior of economic actors. The book identifies key causes of Chinese state control through tightly structured, substate and crossnational comparisons of business–government relations. These cases range across three important arenas of China's grand strategy that prominently feature a strategic role for economics: China's efforts to secure access to vital raw materials located abroad, Mainland relations toward Taiwan, and China's sovereign wealth funds. The ideas in this book are applicable beyond China and help us to understand how states exercise international economic power in the twenty-first century.

This book examines the complex situation of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in post-Suharto Indonesia, focusing on Chinese in two of the largest Indonesian cities, Medan and Surabaya. The fall of Suharto in May 1998 led to the opening up of a democratic and liberal space to include a diversity of political actors and ideals in the political process. However, due to the absence of an effective, genuinely reformist party or political coalition, predatory politico-business interests nurtured under the New Order managed to capture the new political and economic regimes. As a result, corruption and internal mismanagement continue to plague the bureaucracy in the country. The indigenous Indonesian population generally still perceives the Chinese minority as an alien minority who are wealthy, selfish, insular and opportunistic; this is partially due to the role some Chinese have played in perpetuating corrupt business practices. As targets of extortion and corruption by bureaucratic officials and youth/crime organisations, the Chinese are neither merely passive bystanders of the democratisation process in Indonesia nor powerless victims of corrupt practices. By focusing on the important interconnected aspects of the role Chinese play in post-Suharto Indonesia, via business, politics and civil society, this book argues, through a combination of Anthony Giddens’s structure-agency theory as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field, that although the Chinese are constrained by various conditions, they also have played an active role in shaping these conditions.

Since the mid-2000s, public opinion and debate in China have become increasingly common and consequential, despite the ongoing censorship of speech and regulation of civil society. How did this happen? This book shows how the Chinese state drew on law, the media, and the Internet to further an authoritarian project of modernization, but in so doing, inadvertently created a nationwide public sphere in China—one the state must now endeavor to control. The book examines the influence this unruly sphere has had on Chinese politics and the ways that the state has responded. It shows that the development of the public sphere in China has provided an unprecedented forum for citizens to influence the public agenda, demand accountability from the government, and organize around the concepts of law and rights. It demonstrates how citizens came to understand themselves as legal subjects, how legal and media professionals began to collaborate in unexpected ways, and how existing conditions of political and economic fragmentation created unintended opportunities for political critique, particularly with the rise of the Internet. The emergence of this public sphere—and its uncertain future—is a pressing issue with important implications for the political prospects of the Chinese people. The book offers new possibilities for thinking about the transformation of state–society relations.

Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? This book contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. This book shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials. A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. The book finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption. Focusing on ordinary people offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officials' role in illicit exchanges. From the book's novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy.

This book chronicles the surprising and dramatic political conflicts of a rural Chinese county over the course of the Cultural Revolution. The book uncovers a previously unimagined level of strife in the countryside that began with the Red Guard Movement in 1966 and continued unabated until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Showing how the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution were not limited to urban areas, but reached far into isolated rural regions, the book reveals that the intervention of military forces in 1967 encouraged factional divisions in Feng County because different branches of China's armed forces took various sides in local disputes. The book also lays bare how the fortunes of local political groups were closely tethered to unpredictable shifts in the decisions of government authorities in Beijing. Eventually, a backlash against suppression and victimization grew in the early 1970s and resulted in active protests, which presaged the settling of scores against radical Maoism. A meticulous look at how one overlooked region experienced the Cultural Revolution, the book illuminates the all-encompassing nature of one of the most unstable periods in modern Chinese history.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 was supposed to be the death knell for the developmental state. The International Monetary Fund supplied emergency funds for shattered economies but demanded that states liberalize financial markets and withdraw from direct involvement in the economy. Financial liberalization was meant to spell the end of strategic industry policy and the state-directed “policy lending” it involved. Yet, South Korea has since seen a striking revival of financial activism. Policy lending by state-owned development banks has returned the state to the core of the financial system. Korean development banks now account for one quarter of all loans and take the lead in providing low-cost finance to local manufacturing firms in strategic industries. This book argues that an ideational analysis can help explain this renewed financial activism. It demonstrates the presence of a “developmental mindset” on the part of political leaders and policy elites in Korea. The developmental mindset has a long history in Korea but is subject to the vicissitudes of political and economic circumstances. The book traces the structural, institutional, political, and ideational factors that have strengthened and at times weakened the developmental consensus, culminating in the revival of financial activism in Korea. In doing so, it offers a novel defense of the developmental state idea and a new framework for investigating the emergence and evolution of developmental states. It also canvasses the implications of the Korean experience for wider debates concerning the future of financial activism in an era of financialization, energy insecurity, and climate change.