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This book charts a journey that ranges from poems of chivalry to philosophy, from Yvain to Hegel, from Beatrice to Heidegger. An ancient legend identifies Demon, Chance, Love, and Necessity as the four gods who preside over the birth of every human being. We must all pay tribute to these deities and should not try to elude or dupe them. To accept them, the book suggests, is to live one's life as an adventure—not in the trivial sense of the term, with lightness and disenchantment, but with the understanding that adventure, as a specific way of being, is the most profound experience in our human existence. The four gods of legend are joined at the end by a goddess, the most elusive and mysterious of all: Elpis, Hope. In Greek mythology, Hope remains in Pandora's box, not because it postpones its fulfillment to an invisible beyond but because somehow it has always been already satisfied. Here, the book presents Hope as the ultimate gift of the human adventure on Earth.

Relativity is the phenomenon that things relate to things: parents to their offspring; doubles to halves; larger things to smaller things. This book is about how ancient philosophers, particularly Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Sextus Empiricus, understood this phenomenon and how their theories of relativity affected, and were affected by, their broader philosophical outlooks. Many scholars have thought that ancient thinkers were either fundamentally confused about the phenomenon of relativity, or held a view that is a trivial variation on a modern view. This book argues that neither is the case. In fact, ancient philosophers shared a close-knit family of views, referred to as ‘constitutive relativity’: a relative is not simply linked by a relation, but is constituted by it. The book shows that this view is present in Plato, and is exploited by him in some key arguments concerning the Forms and the partition of the soul. Aristotle adopts the constitutive view in his discussions of relativity in Categories 7 and the Topics, and retains the constitutive view in his later discussion in Metaphysics 5.15. The Relatives Argument of Aristotle’s lost work On Ideas also involves constitutive relativity. The book moves on to examine a complex report of Stoic relativity and the role relativity played in Stoic philosophy. Finally, the book discusses Sextus Empiricus’ way of thinking about relativity, which does not appeal to the nature of relatives, but rather to how we conceive of things as correlative.

Engages in a wide-ranging exploration of what we can learn from the study of ancient civilizations, which is relevant to fundamental problems, both intellectual and moral, that we continue to face today.

How far is it possible to arrive at an understanding of alien systems of belief? Is it possible to talk meaningfully of 'science' and of its various constituent disciplines, 'astronomy', 'geography', 'anatomy', and so on, in the ancient world? Are logic and its laws universal? Is there one ontology—a single world—to which all attempts at understanding must be considered to be directed? When we encounter apparently very different views of reality, how far can that be put down to a difference in conceptions of what needs explaining, or of what counts as an explanation, or to different preferred modes of reasoning or styles of enquiry? Do the notions of truth and belief represent reliable cross-cultural universals? Are the discourses of human nature and of human rights universally applicable? What political institutions do we need to help secure equity and justice within nation states and between them?

Lloyd provides compelling evidence that the science and culture of ancient Greece and China have much to offer contemporary debates in many fields of study.

This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book argues that Aquinas fundamentally revised some of the main features of Aristotle's paradigmatic account of friendship so as to accommodate the case of friendship between radically unequal beings: man and God. As a result, Aquinas presented a broader view of friendship than Aristotle's, allowing for a higher extent of disagreement, lack of mutual understanding, and inequality between friends.

Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics is hot. Yet Aristotle’s accounts of the individual virtues remain opaque, for most contemporary commentators of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics have focused upon other matters. By contrast, this book takes Aristotle’s detailed description of the individual virtues to be central to his ethical theory. Working through the Nicomachean Ethics virtue by virtue, explaining and generally defending Aristotle’s claims, the book brings each of Aristotle’s virtues alive. A new Aristotle emerges, an Aristotle fascinated by the details of the individual virtues. Justice and friendship hold special places in Aristotle’s virtue theory. Many contemporary discussions place justice and friendship at opposite, perhaps even conflicting poles of a spectrum. Justice seems to be very much a public, impartial, and dispassionate thing, while friendship is paradigmatically private, partial, and passionate. Yet in Aristotle’s view they are actually symbiotic. Justice is defined in terms of friendship, and good friendship is defined in terms of justice. Virtue ethics is not only about being good; it is also about becoming good. The book reconstructs Aristotle’s account of moral development. Certain character types serve as stages of moral development. Certain catalysts and mechanisms lead from one stage to the next. Explaining why some people cannot make moral progress specifies the preconditions of moral development. Finally, the book describes Aristotle’s quest to determine the ultimate goal of moral development: happiness.

Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy. This book sheds new light on this challenging text by arguing that it is coherently structured around two themes of enduring philosophical interest: knowledge and learning. The Posterior Analytics, this book argues, is a sustained examination of scientific knowledge: what it is and how it is acquired. Aristotle first discusses two principal forms of scientific knowledge (epistēmē and nous). He then provides a compelling account, in reverse order, of the types of learning one needs to undertake in order to acquire them. The Posterior Analytics thus emerges as an elegantly organized work in which Aristotle describes the mind’s ascent from perception of sensible particulars to scientific knowledge of first principles. This book also highlights Plato’s influence on Aristotle’s text. For each type of learning Aristotle discusses, this book uncovers an instance of Meno’s Paradox (a puzzle from Plato’s Meno according to which inquiry and learning are impossible) and a solution to it. In addition, this book argues, against current orthodoxy, that Aristotle is committed to the Socratic Picture of inquiry, according to which one should seek what a thing’s essence is before seeking its demonstrable attributes and their causes.

Focuses on two themes in Aristotle's philosophy and their interconnection. The first is his account of the meaning (or signification) of terms such as ‘man’, ‘fish’, and ‘eclipse’, which refer to kinds of objects or processes. The second is his theory of the essences of these kinds, what we refer to in defining them, and what makes them what they are. For Aristotle, the meaning of such terms is determined by a distinctive type of efficient causal connection between the kind and thoughts with which the terms are associated. However, although these terms signify existing kinds with essences, one who has the relevant thoughts need not know either that the kind exists or that, if it exists, it has an essence of a given type. In consequence, Aristotle's account of the essence of kinds has to be grounded in his metaphysics and not in his theory of the mastery of natural kind terms. Aristotle's essences are specified in our definitions of kinds because they determine the kind's distinctive nature and necessary properties. They simultaneously ground the identity of the kind and explain its necessary, but non‐essential, features. In these respects, Aristotelian essentialism, which plays a central role in his scientific and metaphysical writings, is distinct both from twentieth‐century attempts to revive essentialism (such as are to be found in the writings of Kripke and Putnam) and from the views criticized by anti‐essentialists (such as Locke and Quine). This book aims to set out and critically evaluate Aristotle's distinctive form of essentialism.

This book presents an examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. It makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility — albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, the book explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account — such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle' account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its ‘origin’ in the agent and that our actions are ‘up to us to do and not to do’ — often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency — turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point the book makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility.

How can one explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? Are the five senses sufficient for the perception of objects? Aristotle was the first to investigate these questions to a depth that makes his account fruitful even for contemporary philosophy, but also challenging. He addressed them by means of the metaphysical modeling of the unity of the perceptual faculty and the unity of perceptual content. This book offers a reconstruction of the six metaphysical models offered by Aristotle to address these and related questions, focusing on their metaphysical underpinning in his theory of causal powers. By doing so, the book brings out what is especially valuable and even surprising about the topic: Aristotle’s metaphysics of perception is fundamentally different from his metaphysics of substance. Yet, for precisely this reason, his models of perceptual content are unexplored territory. This book is groundbreaking in charting this new territory: it offers an understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics of the content of perceptual experience and of the composition of the perceptual faculty, and aims at bringing out the breakthroughs Aristotle achieved.

Aristotle’s theories of truth, practical reasoning, and action are some of the most influential theories in the history of philosophy. It is surprising, then, that so little attention has been given to his notion of practical truth. In Aristotle on Practical Truth, C. M. M. Olfert gives the first book-length treatment of this notion and the role of truth in our practical lives overall. She offers a novel account of practical truth: it is the truth, in the technical Aristotelian sense of “truth,” about what is good simpliciter (haplôs) for a particular person in her particular situation. Olfert argues that, understood in this way, Aristotle’s notion of practical truth is an attractive idea that illuminates the core of his practical philosophy. But it is also an idea that challenges a common view that in practical reasoning, we aim at action or acting well as our primary goals, not at truth and knowledge. Contrary to this common view, Olfert shows that in dialogues such as Charmides, Protagoras, and Republic, Plato describes practical reasoning as being concerned equally with grasping the truth and with acting well. She argues that Aristotle develops this Platonic picture with the notion of practical truth and with a technical notion of rational action as fitting ourselves to the world. Using key texts from the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, as well as De Anima, Metaphysics, De Interpretatione, and Categories, Olfert demonstrates that practical truth deserves to be treated as a central and plausible Aristotelian idea.

This book presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s account of how shame instils virtue, and defends its philosophical import. Despite shame’s bad reputation as a potential obstacle to the development of moral autonomy, shame is for Aristotle the proto-virtue of those learning to be good, since it is the emotion that equips them with the seeds of virtue. Other emotions such as friendliness, righteous indignation, emulation, hope, and even spiritedness may play important roles on the road to virtue. However, shame is the only one that Aristotle repeatedly associates with moral progress. The reason is that shame can move young agents to perform good actions and avoid bad ones in ways that appropriately resemble not only the external behavior but also the orientation and receptivity to moral value characteristic of virtuous people. By turning their attention to considerations about the perceived nobility and praiseworthiness of their own actions and character, shame places young people in the path to becoming good. Although they are not yet virtuous, learners with a sense of shame can appreciate the value of the noble and guide their actions by a true interest in doing the right thing. Shame, thus, enables learners to perform virtuous actions in the right way before they have practical wisdom or stable dispositions of character. This proposal solves a long-debated problem concerning Aristotle’s notion of habituation by showing that shame provides motivational continuity between the actions of the learners and the virtuous dispositions that they will eventually acquire.

Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the precise term originated in the eighteenth century. But if teleology means the use of ends or goals in natural science, then Aristotle was rather a critical innovator of teleological explanation. Teleological notions were widespread among Aristotle’s predecessors, but he rejected their conception of extrinsic causes such as intelligence or god as the primary cause for natural things. Instead, he considers nature itself as an internal principle of change and as an end, and his teleological explanations focus on what is intrinsically good for natural substances themselves. Aristotle’s philosophy was later conflated with the teleological proof for the existence of god, the anthropic cosmological principle, creationism, intelligent design, vitalism, animism, anthropocentrism, and opposition to materialism, evolution, and mechanism. But and examination of both his explicit methodology and the explanations actually offered in his scientific works (on physics, cosmology, theology, psychology, biology, and anthropology) shows that Aristotle’s aporetic approach to teleology drives a middle course through traditional oppositions between: causation and explanation, mechanism and materialism, naturalism and anthropocentrism, realism and instrumentalism.

Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us – a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This book argues that Aristotle understands appearances of goodness as literal quasi-perceptual appearances, operations of a psychological capacity responsible for phenomena like dreams and visualization: phantasia (‘imagination’). It then uses Aristotle’s detailed accounts of phantasia and its relation to perception and thought to gain new insight into some of the most debated areas of his philosophy: his accounts of emotions, akrasia, ethical habituation, character, deliberation, and desire. The result is a new – and controversial – interpretation of Aristotle’s moral psychology: one which greatly restricts the role of reason in ethical matters, and gives an absolutely central role to pleasure.

Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's own senses are active. Observing that other animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the ‘common sense’ (koine aisthesis, sensus communis). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. This book offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. This book begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, this book provides an examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.

The De Interpretatione is one of Aristotle's core works, containing highly influential analyses of the basic elements of language and the nature of truth and falsehood, as well as the famous Sea‐battle paradox. As a whole, however, the treatise has been neglected; attention has concentrated on a few oases of interest, and scholars have been satisfied with the medieval view that the treatise is a discussion of the proposition, and forms the second part of the Organon, building on the categories and anticipating the formal logic of the Analytics. This book argues that the subject of the De Interpretatione is not the proposition, as has conventionally been supposed, but the contradictory pair of assertions, and that it is oriented not towards the formal logic of the Analytics, but to the Topics and Sophistic Refutations, the works in which Aristotle describes dialectic, the method of argument consisting in the asking and answering of dialectical questions. In posing a dialectical question, the questioner presents a contradictory pair of assertions and invites the answerer to select one or the other as true, hoping in the end to lead to a refutation, i.e. a proof that the contradictory of the answerer's thesis is true, and therefore the thesis itself is false. The ability to assign assertions to their pairs correctly, and to know in which cases the truth of one member of a pair does not imply the falsehood of the other, are vital tasks for the dialectician. The De Interpretatione's discussion of contradiction thus provides the theoretical background essential for dialectic.

The book contains the proceedings of the 19th Symposium Aristotelicum (Munich 2011), dedicated to Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, which expounds a common causal explanation of animal self-motion. Besides a philosophical introduction by Christof Rapp and essays on the individual chapters of De Motu Animalium, there is a new critical edition of the Greek text and a philological introduction by Oliver Primavesi, and an English translation of the new text by Benjamin Morison. The philosophical introduction and the essays on the individual chapters aim to give a balanced representation of scholarly debate on the treatise and related issues since the publication of Martha Nussbaum’s edition and commentary in 1978. The new edition and translation of the Greek text were made necessary by the discovery, in 2011, of a second, independent branch of the manuscript tradition. The new text, which is the first to be based on a full collation of all forty-seven extant Greek manuscripts, differs in 120 significant cases from the text published by Nussbaum in 1978.