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We live in a golden age of comparative constitutional law. Liberal democratic ideas have diffused readily around the world, and certain features such as judicial review and constitutional rights are now nearly universal. At the same time, recent years have seen a pronounced trend toward the erosion of democracy. This book argues that the rhetorical triumph of liberal democratic constitutionalism, and the tendency toward democratic retrenchment, are fully consistent phenomena. Legal globalization has a dark side: norms intended to protect and promote liberal democratic constitutionalism can often readily be used to undermine it. Abusive constitutional borrowing involves the appropriation of liberal democratic constitutional designs, concepts, and doctrines to advance authoritarian projects. Some of the most important hallmarks of liberal democratic constitutionalism—including constitutional rights, judicial review, and constituent power—can be turned into powerful instruments to demolish rather than defend democracy. The book offers a wealth of examples, selected both to shed new light on well-known cases such as Hungary, Poland, and Venezuela, as well as to expand discussions by considering contexts such as Cambodia, Rwanda, and Fiji. It also discusses the implications of the phenomenon of abusive constitutional borrowing for those who study and promote liberal democracy and related fields like human rights. It suggests ways in which the construction of norms might be improved to protect against abuse (what we call ‘abuse-proofing’), as well as ways in which monitoring regimes might be more attuned to the threat. Finally, it suggests recasting debates about liberal democracy to emphasize contestation, rather than mimicry.

Many government bodies relate to each other through contracts: government departments and agencies; government departments and the Treasury; National Health Service (NHS) purchasers and NHS Trusts. These ‘internal contracts’ are not, in general, regulated or enforced by the law. This book explores the practical problems encountered by the parties to internal contracts, drawing on evidence from an empirical case study of NHS contracts. It uncovers difficulties in defining the parties' roles; in maintaining good working relationships; and in securing compliance with contractual terms. It then examines the possibility of solving these problems through law. Some commentators, particularly public lawyers, have condemned the law's failure to keep pace with the rise of ‘government by contract’, but few have made specific proposals for reform. The book develops an original public law analysis of internal contracts, interpreting them as mechanisms of accountability from service providers to purchasers. It proposes norms which would help the parties to use their contracts as fair and effective mechanisms of accountability. It also suggests reforms to the institutional framework for internal contracts.

Accountability is regarded as a central feature of modern constitutionalism. At a general level, this prominence is perhaps unsurprising, given the long history of the idea. However, in many constitutional democracies, including the UK and the USA, it has acquired a particular resonance in contemporary circumstances with the declining power of social deference, the expanding reach of populist accountability mechanisms, and the increasing willingness of citizens to find mechanisms for challenging official decision-making. These chapters seek to explore how ideas of and mechanisms associated with accountability play a part in the contemporary constitution. While the majority of chapters concentrate on the United Kingdom, others provide comparative discussion with particular reference to the United States and aspects of European Union law. The main focus of the volume is the contemporary UK constitution. Chapters are included which analyse the historical context (including the role of Dicey), common law constitutionalism, the constitutional role of Parliament, the constitutional role of the courts, judicial accountability, human rights protection under the constitution and the contribution of non-judicial accountability mechanisms. Further chapters explore the public service principle, the impact of new public management on public service delivery, and the relationship between accountability and regulation. Finally accountability is discussed in the light of constitutional reform including the challenges posed by the ‘multi-layered’ government at the supra national level of EU membership and sub-national national levels of devolution and local government.

This work approaches the issue of democratic deficit from the angle of accountability, seen in contemporary society as an essential element of democratic government. It looks at differing understandings of the concept in the Member States and at various techniques — political, legal, and managerial — by which accountability can be assured. These include the Parliament as well as national parliaments but extend to less familiar institutions, such as the European Court of Auditors.

In the last thirty years, as a result of a neoliberal ideology that extolled so-called free markets and demonized government, America has lost its grasp on its core principle – democracy. Democracy, the ability of all Americans to participate freely and equally in the political and economic affairs of the country, suffered demonstrable losses. Economically, over the period, the vast majority of Americans have been made worse off as a result of the largest redistribution of wealth from the bottom to the top in American history. Politically, partisan gridlock and sound-bite politics have hampered efforts to seek fairer taxes, responsive and effective regulation, reliable health care, and better education, among other needs. This book explores this last generation of neoliberal government and concludes that those democratic losses can be regained. We know from experience that philosophical pragmatism and political progressivism express the country's creedal democratic values. More simply, our country's political commitment to expanding liberty, equality, and distributive fairness – bedrock values of modern democracy – is historically embedded and has yielded measurable gains. Democracy, American-style, outlawed legally sanctioned racism and sexism, fashioned the American Dream, and created the middle class, among other gains, while at the same time the United States became a global leader in economic and military power. More particularly, those gains were realized through an active, robust, and participatory government. As in the past, a sound regulatory state, while not perfect and in need of reform, is the vehicle to achieve the Constitution's goal of “a more perfect union.”

This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before he can be convicted of crime; second, that that voluntary act have the properties marking it as one of the kinds of acts prohibited by statute, what lawyers call the ‘actus reus’ of crimes; and third, the double jeopardy requirement that no one should be prosecuted or punished more than once for doing but one act instantiating but one offence. These three requirements are seen as part of the ‘general part’ of the criminal law, the part that applies to all crimes and that gives the criminal law a unified structure. As such they aid both the efficient drafting of a criminal code by the legislature and the application/interpretation of criminal codes by courts. The theory of action defended in the book – and from which illumination of the criminal law is sought – in a version of the family of theories known as causal theories of action. The thesis is that actions are those bodily movements caused by volitions when those volitions have those movements as their object, and nothing else. The criminal law's voluntary act requirement is then seen as the requirement that there be such an act. Omissions, states a person is in, thoughts, and involuntary bodily movements such as reflex reactions, are not acts by such a causal theory. The criminal law's actus reus requirement is seen as the requirement that a voluntary act must possess those causal or other properties definitive of the types of action prohibited by a criminal code. And the criminal law's double jeopardy requirements is seen as a conjunctive requirement: first, that no one be punished for the same kind of action, where the identity of act-types is governed by the kinds of acts morality makes wrong; unless the actor did that act more than once, where the identity of act-tokens is governed by the theory of action defended throughout the book. The philosophy of action illuminates the criminal law in these three ways because of certain moral theses, which the book also defends; that criminal liability both does and should track moral responsibility; that moral responsibility exists principally for what we do rather than for who we are, what we think, or what we fail to prevent; that actions causing harms are more blameworthy than actions that only risk or attempt such harms; and that punishment should be in proposition to the number and degree of wrong(s) done.

This book argues that too often the evolution of administrative law in Europe has been considered in the light of legal doctrines fashioned at the national level, if not of few authors, whose works are quoted to stress the different paths undertaken by European countries after the French Revolution. The book deviates from these standard accounts in that it focuses on control of administrative power by the courts and considers, empirically, judicial decisions at the epoch of the Belle Époque, more precisely the years 1890-1910. The legal systems selected for comparison include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Some relied on ordinary or generalist courts, while others created administrative courts, The outcome of the analysis confirms that, in contrast with the over-emphasized differences among national legal doctrines, the challenges which those legal systems faced were largely the same. Moreover, and more importantly, the analysis of the standards of conduct defined and refined by the courts reveals that they exercised an increasingly vigorous control over discretion. They gradually opened the gates of judicial review to new interests, intervened on grounds of purpose and defined general principles of law that were very similar, if not the same. The courts, not legislators, thus created the central tenets of administrative law. Finally, various explanations for the role played by the courts are considered in legal, historic, and political perspectives. The book thus provides an unprecedented outlook on the relationship between public authorities and individuals at the zenith of the sovereign state.

This book provides an analysis of the administration of the European Union and the legal framework within which that administration operates. It examines the multifarious approaches, techniques, and structures of public administration in order to systematize and assess the solutions they offer to political, social, and economic problems. The legal framework of administration is examined from the standpoint of how it meets the demands of specific policy objectives established by democratically accountable decision-makers. Administrative law structures and many of its underlying principles have developed in an evolutionary and isolated manner in each policy area. While aware of the diversity of specific areas, this book takes an overarching approach, setting out the common rules and principles that constitute the general body of EU administrative law. By integrating the disciplines of political and administrative science, and administrative law, the book offers a rich explanation and critique of the complex executive framework of the EU.

The book presents a unique and controversial rethinking of the intersection between modern American democratic theory and free expression. Most free speech scholars view freedom of expression as a vehicle for fostering democracy. However, most do so by relying upon communitarian, cooperative or collectivist democratic theories. This book reshapes free speech as an outgrowth of adversary democracy, arguing that individuals should have the opportunity to affect the outcomes of collective decision-making according to their own personal values and interests. Adversary democracy recognizes the inevitability of conflict within a democratic society, as well as the need for regulation of the conflict to prevent the onset of tyranny. In doing so, it embraces pluralism, diversity and individual growth and development

Public law has been conceived in many different ways, sometimes overlapping, often conflicting. However, in recent years a common theme running through the discussions of public law is one of loss. What function and future can public law have in this rapidly transforming landscape, where globalized states and supranational institutions have ever-increasing importance? This book takes stock of the idea, concepts, and values of public law as it has developed alongside the growth of the modern state, and assesses its continued usefulness as a distinct area of legal inquiry and normativity in light of various historical trends and contemporary pressures affecting the global configuration of law in general. Divided into three parts, the first provides a conceptual, philosophical, and historical understanding of the nature of public law, the nature of private law, and the relationship between the public, the private, and the concept of law. The second part focuses on the domains, values, and functions of public law in contemporary (state) legal practice, as seen, in part, through its relationship with private domains, values, and functions. The final part engages with the new legal scholarship on global transformation, analysing the changes in public law at the national level, including the new forms of interpenetration of public and private in the market state, as well as exploring the ubiquitous use of public law values and concepts beyond the state.

From random security checks at airports to the use of risk assessment in sentencing, actuarial methods are being used more than ever to determine whom law enforcement officials target and punish. And with the exception of racial profiling on our highways and streets, most people favor these methods because they believe they are a more cost-effective way to fight crime. This book challenges this growing reliance on actuarial methods. These prediction tools, the author demonstrates, may in fact increase the overall amount of crime in society, depending on the relative responsiveness of the profiled populations to heightened security. They may also aggravate the difficulties that minorities already have obtaining work, education, and a better quality of life—thus perpetuating the pattern of criminal behavior. Ultimately, the author shows how the perceived success of actuarial methods has begun to distort our very conception of just punishment and to obscure alternate visions of social order. In place of the actuarial, he proposes instead a turn to randomization in punishment and policing, concluding that the presumption should be against prediction.

This book provides a way to understand church–state conflict and the relationship between religion and liberal democracy in a contemporary era. It is argued that the fundamental reason for the church–state conflict is our aversion to questions of religious truth. By trying to avoid the question of religious truth, law and religion have ultimately reached a state of incoherence. It asserts that the answer to this dilemma is to take “the agnostic turn”—that is, to take an empathetic and imaginative approach to questions of religious truth, one that actually confronts rather than avoids these questions, but without reaching a final judgment about what that truth is.

You find yourself in a court of law, accused of having hit someone. What can you say to avoid conviction? One thing you can do is simply to deny the accusation: ‘No’, you claim, ‘I didn’t do it.’ But suppose you did do it. You may then give a different answer. ‘Yes, I hit him’, you grant, ‘but it was self-defence’; or ‘Yes, but I was acting under duress.’ To answer in this way—to offer a ‘Yes, but… ’ reply—is to hold that your particular wrong was committed in exceptional circumstances. Perhaps it is true that, as a rule, wrongdoers ought to be convicted. But in your case the court should set the rule aside. You should be acquitted. Within limits, the law allows for exceptions. But how do we draw the line between a rule and its exceptions? This is a long-debated question with important practical consequences, but legal theorists have found it surprisingly difficult to answer. This book tackles this persistent puzzle by offering a new, proof-based account of exceptions and their role in legal reasoning. It clarifies the relationship between legal defences and the allocation of burdens of proof, discusses the structure of legal rules and the interplay of claims and answers in the legal process, and sheds new light on the offence/defence distinction in criminal law.

Constitutionalism represents America's greatest gift to human freedom, yet its story remains largely untold. For over 200 years, its ideals, ideas, and institutions influenced different peoples in different lands at different times. American constitutionalism and the revolutionary republican documents on which it is based affected countless countries by helping them develop their own constitutional democracies. Western constitutionalism—of which America was a part along with Britain and France—reached a major turning point in global history in 1989, when the forces of democracy exceeded the forces of autocracy for the first time. This book traces the spread of American constitutionalism—from Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean region, to Asia and Africa—beginning chronologically with the American Revolution and the fateful “shot heard round the world” and ending with the conclusion of the Cold War in 1989. The American model contributed significantly by spearheading the drive to greater democracy throughout the Western world, and this book tells a story that will change the way readers view the important role American constitutionalism played during this era.

Antonin Scalia and American Constitutionalism is a critical study of Justice Antonin Scalia’s jurisprudence, his work on the U.S. Supreme Court, and his significance for an understanding of American constitutionalism. After tracing Scalia’s emergence as a hero of the political right and his opposition to many of the decisions of the Warren Court, this book examines his general jurisprudential theory of originalism and textualism, arguing that he failed to produce either the objective method he claimed or the “correct” constitutional results he promised. Focusing on his judicial performance over his thirty years on the Court, the book examines his opinions on virtually all of the constitutional issues he addressed, from fundamentals of structure to most major constitutional provisions. The book argues that Scalia applied his jurisprudential theories in inconsistent ways and often ignored, twisted, or abandoned the interpretive methods he proclaimed, in most cases reaching results that were consistent with “conservative” politics and the ideology of the post-Reagan Republican Party. Most broadly, it argues that Scalia’s jurisprudence and career are particularly significant because they exemplify—contrary to his own persistent claims—three paramount characteristics of American constitutionalism: the inherent inadequacy of “originalism” and other formal interpretive methodologies to produce “correct” answers to controverted constitutional questions; the relationship—particularly close in Scalia’s case—between constitutional interpretations on one hand and substantive personal and political goals on the other; and the truly and unavoidably “living” nature of American constitutionalism itself. As a historical matter, the book concludes, Scalia stands as a towering figure of irony because his judicial career disproved the central claims of his own jurisprudence.

This book is a small contribution towards understanding the place of religion in modern India and the nature of Indian secularism. While there are several possible ways to approach this complex task, this book has chosen to do so by looking at the Indian Supreme Court judgments. This is not intended to be a comprehensive account of the Supreme Court's understanding of religion and secularism, but a discussion of judicial interventions in areas which are important to the life of the Indian nation and Indian secularism. Several public events have shaped the argument of this book, even though it might not be apparent from the text itself: the riots following the assassination of Indira Gandhi; the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001; and the Mumbai terror attacks. One reaction to these acts of terrible violence, where religion or religious extremism could be seen to be central, might have been to argue for banishing religion from the public sphere. This book traverses an opposite path because it believes that religion and religiosity were not at the heart of these violent events. It argues that religious pluralism and religious tolerance are critical for the survival of the Indian nation, and it seeks to bring this view back to centre stage in the context of the courts in particular and public policy in general.

<Online Only>This book recounts the transformation of Europe from the interwar era until the euro crisis, using the tools of constitutional analysis and critical theory. The central claim is twofold: post-war Europe is reconstituted in a manner combining political authoritarianism and economic liberalism, producing an order which is now in a critical condition. The book begins in the interwar era, when liberalism, unable to deal with mass democracy and the social question, turns to authoritarianism in an attempt to suppress democracy, with disastrous consequences in Weimar and elsewhere. After the Second World War, partly on the basis of a very different diagnosis of interwar collapse, and initially through a passive authoritarianism, inter-state sovereignty is reconfigured, state-society relations are depoliticized, and social relations transformed. Integration is substituted for internationalism, technocracy for democracy, and economic liberty for political freedom and class struggle. This transformation takes time to unfold, and it presents continuities as well as discontinuities. It is deepened by the neo-liberalism of the Maastricht era and the creation of Economic and Monetary Union, and yet countermovements then also emerge: geopolitically, in the return of the German question; and domestically, in the challenges presented by constitutional courts and anti-systemic movements. Struggles over sovereignty, democracy, and political freedom resurface, but are then more actively repressed through the authoritarian liberalism of the euro crisis phase. This leads now to an impasse. Anti-systemic politics return but remain uneasily within the EU, suggesting that the post-war order of authoritarian liberalism is reaching its limits. As yet, however, there has been no definitive rupture.</Online Only>

The Human Rights Act (HRA) of the UK, enacted in 1998, provoked particular interest amongst scholars. Unlike systems of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy, it promised a new, ‘balanced’ model for the protection of rights, which conferred courts with a limited power of review over legislation. Under this new model, rights-based decision-making was expected to be balanced amongst courts and legislatures, rather than lopsided in favour of either. Indian courts, on the other hand, have always been constitutionally entrusted with the power to strike down primary legislation enacted by the Union and state legislatures. This book examines the promise of the new model against its performance in practice by comparing judicial review under the HRA to an exemplar of the old model of judicial review, the Indian Constitution. It argues that although the HRA fosters a more balanced allocation of powers between legislatures and courts than the Indian Constitution, it does so for a novel reason. Balanced constitutionalism is not achieved through the legislative rejection of judicial decision-making about rights. Instead, the nature of the remedy under the HRA enables British courts to assert their genuine interpretations of rights in situations in which Indian courts find it difficult to do so.

This work explores the relationship between Bentham's utilitarian practical philosophy and his positivist jurisprudence. These theories appear to be in tension because his utilitarian commitment to the sovereignty of utility as a practical decision principle seems inconsistent with his positivist insistence on the sovereignty of the will of the lawmaker. Two themes emerge from the attempt in this work to reconcile these two core elements of Bentham's practical thought. First, Bentham's conception of law does not fit the conventional model of legal positivism. Bentham was not just a utilitarian and a positivist; he was a positivist by virtue of his commitment to a utilitarian understanding of the fundamental task of law. Moreover, his emphasis on the necessary publicity and the systemic character of law, led him to insist on an essential role for utilitarian reasons in the regular public functioning of law. Second, Bentham's radical critique of common law theory and practice convinced him of the necessity to reconcile the need for certainty of law with an equally great need for its flexibility. He eventually developed a constitutional framework for adjudication in the shadow of codified law that accorded judges discretion to decide particular cases according to their best judgment of the balance of utilities, guaranteeing the accountability and appropriate motivation of judicial decision-making through institutional incentives. The original text of this work, first published in 1986, remains largely unchanged, but an afterword reconsiders and revises some themes in response to criticism.

This book traces a fundamental transformation in law—the turn towards ‘postnational law’—which reflects the increasing enmeshment of national, regional, and international law and calls into question central legitimating principles of the different layers. Two fundamental approaches to the structure of this new legal order stand out and form the focus of this book: constitutionalism and pluralism. Postnational constitutionalism embodies the hope of integrating the order through an overarching legal framework that would tame politics by defining relations and institutionalizing key values. Yet such a constitutionalist order would require too massive a transformation of postnational institutions and society, and thinner approaches, widespread in the literature and more realistic, would sell the constitutionalist promise short. This book proposes instead to conceptualize and develop the postnational order in a pluralist vein, characterized by a multiplicity of legal sub-orders, not connected through an overarching frame but interacting in often political modes. Many areas of regional and global governance can be understood in such terms, as demonstrated here for the European human rights regime, the UN sanctions regime in its tension with human rights, and the regime complex of international trade, environment, and food safety. The pluralism on display in these examples also holds normative appeal. By reflecting diverging views on the right scope of the polity, it respects individuals’ autonomy and their right to shape their political order, thus furthering democratic values. By leaving relations between different layers of law unsettled, it allows for contestation and adaptation which helps to stabilize postnational governance and remedy power imbalances in its initial design. In the highly diverse and contested space of the postnational, breaking with domestic political traditions and going ‘beyond constitutionalism’ towards a pluralist order may be the better option.