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The exact phrase, “state of nature,” was used thousands of times in the British colonies between 1630 and 1810, in juridical, theological, medical, political, economic, and other senses. From the plurality of meanings, a distinctive American state of nature discourse started to emerge by the 1760s. It combined existing European and American semantic ranges and sidelined others in moments of intense contestation, for instance during the 1765–66 Stamp Act crisis, and the 1774 First Continental Congress. In numerous laws and resolutions, forensic arguments, petitions, sermons, broadsides, books, pamphlets, letters, diaries, and college essays, the increasingly distinct and coherent American state of nature came to justify independence at least as much as colonial formulations of liberty, property, and individual rights did.

How do alliances curb potential or actual cases of nuclear proliferation, if at all? Many scholars assert that alliances are effective tools for bridling the nuclear ambitions of states and that the United States can especially take credit for suppressing nuclear proliferation among its allies around the world. This book challenges this widely-held view by arguing that alliances can be most useful for preventing potential nuclear proliferation but much less useful for curbing actual nuclear proliferation. Drawing on deep archival research it shows how allied decision-makers often evaluate American security guarantees with reference to in-theater conventional military deployments. It also demonstrates the significant difficulties in mounting alliance coercion in order to extract non-proliferation commitments. The book mainly explores the three cases of supposed alliance non-proliferation success--West Germany, Japan, and South Korea—while examining in lesser detail the case of Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan.

The post-Cold War world has witnessed the extensive development of regional international organizations world-wide. The realtionship between their membership and democratization remains a topic of intense scholarly debate. This book opens up a new aspect of the debate by examining regional organization as set up by autocracies (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia, and China)—referring to them as “non-democratic regional organizations.” How do these newly emerged organizations counteract and confront the democratization process in their own member states and beyond their borders? How and why do the political regimes, the economic development and the cultures of their member states impac the foundation and development of these organizations? What influence do these organizations have on migration, trade, conflicts, and democratization? The book addresses these questions by developing a new theory of authoritarian regionalism. Employing quantitative analysis of authoritarian regionalism world-wide and its historical development since the 1950s, as well as analysing case studies of post-Soviet Eurasia, the book argues that authoritarian regionalism is a new phenomenon in world politics and that modern non-democratic organizations differ from their historical predecessors and that their influence has radically increased in terms of geographic scope and intensity in the last few years. As such, authoritarian regionalism is an important addition to studies of comparative regionalism and the international dimension of authoritarianism. From the policy perspective, non-democratic regional organizations pose a challenge for Western actors in promoting democracy around the world.

This book examines how ideas of war and peace have functioned as organizing frames of reference within the history of political theory. It interprets ten widely read figures in that history within five thematically focused chapters that pair (in order) Schmitt and Derrida, Aquinas and Machiavelli, Hobbes and Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, and Thucydides and Plato. The book’s substantive argument is that attempts to establish either war or peace as dominant intellectual perspectives obscure too much of political life. The book argues for a style of political theory committed more to questioning than to closure. It challenges two powerful currents in contemporary political philosophy: the verdict that premodern or metaphysical texts cannot speak to modern and postmodern societies, and the insistence that all forms of political theory be some form of democratic theory. What is offered instead is a nontraditional defense of the tradition and a democratic justification for moving beyond democratic theory. Though the book avoids any attempt to show the immediate relevance of these interpretations to current politics, its impetus stems very much from the current political circumstances. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century , a series of wars has eroded confidence in the progressively peaceful character of international relations; citizens of the Western democracies are being warned repeatedly about the threats posed within a dangerous world. In this turbulent context, democratic citizens must think more critically about the actions their governments undertake. The texts interpreted here are valuable resources for such critical thinking.

What should states do with the bodies of suicide bombers and other jihadists who die while perpetrating terrorist attacks? This original and unsettling book explores the host of ethical and political questions raised by this dilemma, from (non-)legitimization of the "enemy" and their cause to the non-territorial identity of individuals who identified in life with a global community of believers. Because states do not recognize suicide bombers as enemy combatants, governments must decide individually what to do with their remains. Riva Kastoryano offers a window onto this challenging predicament through the responses of the American, Spanish, British and French governments after the Al-Qaeda suicide attacks in New York, Madrid and London, and Islamic State's attacks on Paris in 2015. Interviewing officials, religious and local leaders and jihadists' families, both in their countries of origin and in the target nations, she has traced the terrorists' travel history, discovering unexpected connections between their itineraries and the handling of their burials. This fascinating book reveals how states' approaches to a seemingly practical issue are closely shaped by territory, culture, globalization and identity.

Why are Americans governed by the rich? Millionaires make up only three percent of the public but control all three branches of the federal government. How did this happen? What stops lower-income and working-class Americans from becoming politicians? This book is a compelling and comprehensive account of why so few working-class people hold office—and what reformers can do about it. It debunks popular misconceptions (like the idea that workers are unelectable or unqualified to govern), identifies the factors that keep lower-class Americans off the ballot and out of political institutions, and evaluates a variety of reform proposals. The book shows that in the United States elections have a built-in “cash ceiling,” a series of structural barriers that make it almost impossible for the working-class to run for public office. Elections take a serious toll on candidates, many working-class Americans simply cannot shoulder the practical burdens, and civic and political leaders often pass them over in favor of white-collar candidates. But these obstacles are not inevitable. Pilot programs to recruit, train, and support working-class candidates have the potential to increase the economic diversity of our governing institutions and ultimately amplify the voices of ordinary citizens. Who runs for office goes to the heart of whether the USA has a democracy that is representative or not. The book shows that the best hope for combating the oversized political influence of the rich might simply be to help more working-class Americans become politicians.

This book examines the complex situation of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in post-Suharto Indonesia, focusing on Chinese in two of the largest Indonesian cities, Medan and Surabaya. The fall of Suharto in May 1998 led to the opening up of a democratic and liberal space to include a diversity of political actors and ideals in the political process. However, due to the absence of an effective, genuinely reformist party or political coalition, predatory politico-business interests nurtured under the New Order managed to capture the new political and economic regimes. As a result, corruption and internal mismanagement continue to plague the bureaucracy in the country. The indigenous Indonesian population generally still perceives the Chinese minority as an alien minority who are wealthy, selfish, insular and opportunistic; this is partially due to the role some Chinese have played in perpetuating corrupt business practices. As targets of extortion and corruption by bureaucratic officials and youth/crime organisations, the Chinese are neither merely passive bystanders of the democratisation process in Indonesia nor powerless victims of corrupt practices. By focusing on the important interconnected aspects of the role Chinese play in post-Suharto Indonesia, via business, politics and civil society, this book argues, through a combination of Anthony Giddens’s structure-agency theory as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field, that although the Chinese are constrained by various conditions, they also have played an active role in shaping these conditions.

This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of constituency service in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in “patronage democracies” emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, this book demonstrates that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, nonpartisan assistance to individual constituents. Under what conditions do they provide constituency service, rather than engage in partisan bias? The book shows that the uneven character of access to services at the local level—often because of biased allocation on the part of local intermediaries—generates demand for help from higher-level officials, and also creates incentives for those politicians to bypass intermediaries by providing direct assistance. It draws on elite and citizen surveys, interviews, qualitative shadowing, and experiments to explore the dynamics of both the demand for constituency service and its supply. The book’s findings highlight the potential for an underappreciated form of democratic accountability, one that is however rooted in the character of patronage-based politics.

For four decades Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran have vied for influence in the Muslim world. At the heart of this ongoing Cold War between Riyadh and Tehran lie the Sunni-Shia divide, and the two countries’ diverse histories, socio-economic compositions, and claims to exceptionalism. Saudis present their rivalry with Iran stemming from conflict between Sunnis and Shias. But, according to Iran's ruling clerics, their republic is founded on Islamic precepts whereas Saudis’ dynastic rule lacks legitimacy in Islam. This foundational schism has played out in a geopolitical competition for dominance in the region and beyond: Iran has acquired influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, while Saudi Arabia's hyperactive crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman, has intervened in the Yemeni civil war against the Tehran-backed Houthis, and tried to destabilize Lebanon and isolate neighboring Qatar.. In his lucid narrative, peppered with penetrating analysis, Dilip Hiro examines the toxic rivalry between the two nations, tracing its roots to the eighteen-century Arabia, and examines whether the current Cold War in the Islamic world is likely to end in the near future.

This book offers a close study of the rapidly evolving politics of LGBT rights in postcommunist Europe, where social attitudes have historically marginalized the issue and where the legacy of weak civil society has handicapped activism in general. What happens in societies such as these when increased exposure to transnational institutions such as the European Union and the minority-rights norms that they promote brings new visibility to LGBT issues? Is activism boosted by the infusion of resources from transnational networks? Or does transnational pressure bring backlash, inflaming antigay attitudes and driving activism underground? This study uncovers and explains the surprising divergence in the organization of LGBT activism in postcommunist Europe, focusing on Poland and the Czech Republic from the late 1980s through 2012. Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania form additional case studies. It argues that domestic backlash against transnational rights norms has been a primary catalyst for organizational development in the region’s most robust LGBT movements. It offers a comparative framework of broader relevance describing the conditions under which transnational pressure and domestic politics may interact to build robust activism, or not. This theorization offers resolution for a striking puzzle of LGBT politics in the countries examined: Why is the most organized and influential activism often found in societies where attitudes toward homosexuality are least tolerant? The book uses a multimethod research design drawing on field interviews, original sources, and participant observation to process trace how the framing of homosexuality and the organization of LGBT activism change in historical time.

Why do some military and rebel groups commit many types of violence, creating an impression of senseless chaos, whereas others carefully control violence against civilians? A classic catch-22 faces the leaders of armed groups. Leaders need large groups of people willing to kill and maim—but to do so only under strict control. How can commanders control violence when fighters who are not under direct supervision experience extraordinary stress, fear, and anger? This book argues that discipline is not enough in wartime. Restraint occurs when fighters know why they are fighting and believe in the cause—that is, when commanders invest in political education. Drawing on evidence about state and non-state groups in El Salvador, and extending the argument to the Mano River wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the book shows that investments in political education can improve human rights outcomes even where rational incentives for restraint are weak—and that groups whose fighters lack a sense of purpose may engage in massive violence even where incentives for restraint are strong. It concludes that high levels of violence against civilians should be considered a “default setting,” not an aberration.

The study of grand strategy has historically been confined to a few great powers—preponderantly, the United States, China, and Russia. In contrast, this volume introduces readers to the novel field of “comparative grand strategy.” Its co-editors offer a framework that expands the analysis beyond a traditional rationalist approach to incorporate significant cultural factors that influence strategists as they prioritize threats and opportunities in the global system. This framework then combines these factors with domestic political influences often understated or overlooked in the international relations literature. It considers both how grand strategy is actually formulated and the varied instruments used to implement it. Applying this framework, the volume’s remaining contributors then examine how grand strategy is conceived, formulated, and implemented by ten states. These consist of the United Nations G5 members and five other states “pivotal” to global or regional economic development and security. This group is composed of Brazil and India—two regional powers operating in very different security environments—and Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, who confront each other in a truly existential conflict. Departing from a state-based analysis, an eleventh case study examines the European Union—an organization that lacks many of the trappings of a conventional state but which is able to call upon more resources than most. The volume’s concluding chapter points to both the theoretical and empirical areas of convergence and divergence highlighted by these chapters, and the prospective questions for future analysis in the emergent field of comparative grand strategy.

In bicameral legislatures like Congress, the two chambers must reach agreement before a bill is enacted into law, a process that is often chaotic and contentious. In The Congressional End Game: Interchamber Bargaining and Compromise in Congress, Josh Ryan offers a coherent theory of how this process works and the types of policy outcomes produced. He shows that both conference committees and an alternative resolution venue, amendment trading, create policy that approximates the preferences of the more moderate chamber, though neither chamber receives exactly what it wants. Using comprehensive data on recent congressional legislation and an array of empirical tests, The Congressional Endgame explains how the chambers seek agreement, why failure at the resolution stage is so rare, and what types of legislation are likely to emerge from negotiations. The book finds that the characteristics of the winning coalition are critically important to which chamber "wins" after bargaining, with more moderate chambers receiving more of what they want. The results are especially relevant in the current age of party polarization and strong leadership, where divided party control of the House and Senate is common. These factors contribute to the public perception that the House and Senate are unable to compromise, and call into question the relevance and effectiveness of the bicameral system as designed by the Framers. Instead, The Congressional Endgame demonstrates interchamber negotiations serve their intended purpose well: they increase the odds of compromise while at the same time offering a powerful constraint on dramatic policy changes.

The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts significantly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside antisatellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital American military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and cross-domain deterrence poses serious problems in practice. This book steps back to assess the theoretical relevance of cross-domain deterrence for the field of international relations. As a general concept, cross-domain deterrence posits that the ways in which actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve. Contributors to this book include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of cross-domain deterrence by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and nonmilitary instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases.

Who is an authority on the American wars in Vietnam and Iraq? The Pentagon? Leading politicians? Allies? Academic specialists? The media? American soldiers? Vietnamese and Iraqis? Protesters? Families of war dead? Curators of war exhibitions? War novelists? This book considers locations of war knowledge that are often overlooked by scholars in the social sciences and also by civilians who have an interest in understanding these wars. It takes readers to a permanent exhibition of war at the Smithsonian National Museum of American History, to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and its traveling facsimile, to Section 60 of the Arlington National Cemetery where military killed in Iraq are buried, and to well-regarded novels and memoirs about these wars. Across vastly different sites of war knowledge, the book considers whose war appears where, how it is curated, and whether some sites re-curate commonplace understandings of these wars by highlighting experiences war experts can neglect.

What is the role of currency statecraft in world politics? When a national money gains international appeal, the power resources of the issuing country are augmented. Currency statecraft is about what the country chooses to do – or not do – with its currency power. This book begins with the premise that every international money goes through a life cycle, from youth to maturity to (eventually) decline. At each stage, the supplier has three choices: to be pro-active in favor of international use, to resist internationalization, or to remain neutral. The central argument of the book is that beyond purely material factors, currency statecraft is motivated by cognitive considerations having to do with a society’s underlying sense of identity. In particular, policy is shaped by the extent of a state’s geopolitical ambition: how driven it is to build or sustain a prominent place in the community of nations. Extensive study of experience in the modern era demonstrates the key role played by the presence or absence of geopolitical ambition in the rise of international currencies like the West German Deutsche mark or Japanese yen, the long-standing dominance of the US dollar, and the decline of the British pound. The book concludes with a look at the growing rivalry between America’s greenback and the emergent renminbi of China – the central drama on the world currency stage today. Analysis suggests that a new era of open and costly monetary hostilities may be approaching.

Over the past two decades, many states have been called on to recognize and apologize for historic wrongs. In response, some states have apologized for past crimes, while others continue to silence, deny, and relativize dark pasts. What explains this tremendous variation? When and why do states change the stories they tell about dark pasts? Based on a comparative analysis of the trajectories of Turkey’s narrative of the 1915-17 Armenian Genocide and Japan’s narrative of the 1937-8 Nanjing Massacre, Dark Pasts argues that international pressures increase the likelihood of change in official narratives of dark pasts, but domestic considerations determine the content of such change. Rather than simply changing with the passage of time, persistence, or rightness, official narratives of dark pasts are shaped by interactions between domestic and international politics. Combining historical richness and analytical rigor, Dark Pasts unravels the complex processes through which such narratives are constructed and contested, and offers an innovative way to analyze the content of and changes in historical memories. The book sheds light on the persistent presence of the past and reveals how domestic politics functions as a filter that shapes the ways in which states’ narratives change – or don’t – over time.

The “ASEAN Way” is based on the principle of consensus; any individual member state effectively has a veto over any proposal it does not support. This book analyzes how China uses its financial power and influence to divide the member countries of ASEAN in order to prevent them from acting collectively to resolve their territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. Comparative case studies of China’s relations with Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar illustrate that the regime type in the country with which China is interacting plays an important role in enhancing or constraining China’s ability to influence the governments of developing states within ASEAN and globally. Authoritarian institutions facilitate Chinese influence while democratic institutions inhibit that influence. The book argues that as long as ASEAN includes developing, authoritarian regimes, and given that the United States and other global powers are unlikely to risk any serious conflict over each push of China’s maritime boundaries, little by little, China will assert its sovereignty over the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the book contends that if China chooses to engage in more sophisticated bilateral politics with democratic states, such as providing incentives to a broader range of interest groups, then China will have more success in projecting its power globally.

Earned Citizenship is an intervention in the U.S. immigration reform debate that advances the proposition that long-term, unauthorized immigrant U.S. residents should be able to earn legalization and a pathway to citizenship through service to citizens in their adopted U.S. communities as restitution for immigration law violations. Earned Citizenship first applies the principle of civic membership as reciprocity to support the argument that military service by unauthorized immigrants in particular merits naturalization in the United States, given its strong citizen-soldier tradition. The book contends that noncitizens who serve in the military during a period of declared hostilities should be immune from deportation for the rest of their lives. After drawing from the military aspect of the civic republican tradition, the second part of the book considers the civic value of caregiving as a service to citizens and the nation, which merits a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants. Family immigration policies should be expanded to recognize the importance of caregiving duties performed by family members and fictive kin for dependents. This argument is part of a broader project aimed at reconciling the civic republicanism of the first part of the book with a feminist ethic of care and its emphasis on dependency work. As a whole, this book provides a nonhumanitarian justification for legalizing unauthorized immigrants based on their contributions to citizens and institutions in their adopted nation.

All known societies exclude and stigmatize one or more minority groups. Frequently these exclusions are underwritten with a rhetoric of disgust: people of a certain group, it is alleged, are filthy, hyper-animal, or not fit to share such facilities as drinking water, food, and public swimming pools with the ‘clean’ and ‘fully human’ majority. But exclusions vary in their scope and also in the specific disgust-ideologies underlying them. In this volume, interdisciplinary scholars from the United States and India present a detailed comparative study of the varieties of prejudice and stigma that pervade contemporary social and political life: prejudice along the axes of caste, race, gender, age, sexual orientation, transgender, disability, religion, and economic class. In examining these forms of stigma and their intersections, the authors present theoretically pluralistic and empirically sensitive accounts that both explain group-based stigma and suggest ways forward. These forward-looking remedies, including group resistance to subordination as well as institutional and legal change, point the way towards a public culture that is informed by our diverse histories of discrimination and therefore equipped to eliminate stigma in all of its multifaceted forms.