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Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
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Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein

Abstract

Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and this book examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and personal research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, the book presents compelling ... More

Keywords: moral hazard, Kenneth J. Arrow, health care, health insurance, policy solutions, medical spending, American health care, health care policy

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780231163804
Published to University Press Scholarship Online: November 2015 DOI:10.7312/columbia/9780231163804.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Amy Finkelstein, author

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Contents

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Front Matter

Introduction

Joseph P. Newhouse

Commentary

Jonathan Gruber

Commentary

Kenneth J. Arrow

Commentary

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Arrow (1963)

By Kenneth J. Arrow*