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InteranimationsReceiving Modern German Philosophy$
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Robert B. Pippin

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780226259659

Published to University Press Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226259796.001.0001

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date: 14 December 2017

Robert Brandom’s Hegel

Robert Brandom’s Hegel

Chapter:
(p.29) 2 Robert Brandom’s Hegel
Source:
Interanimations
Author(s):

Robert B. Pippin

Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226259796.003.0002

Brandom is drawn to Hegel as an early, implicit, illuminating manifestation of his own account of the essential elements of a successful explanation of intentionality: that it be functionalist, inferentialist, holist, normative, social pragmatist, and historically inflected. Brandom wants to claim that intentionality depends on normativity, the achievement of socially recognized normative statuses constituted by normative attitudes, and in such a context, Brandom’s Hegel has to qualify as the most promising Brandomian, avant la lettre. My questions in this chapter are whether the full dimensions of Hegel’s understanding of the relation between practical and theoretical philosophy are available to Brandom, whether Brandom’s account of the role of history in Hegel is sufficiently robust, and whether his approach has accounted for Hegel’s conception of idealism.

Keywords:   Robert Brandom, Wildrid Sellars, John Haugeland, de dicto, de re, Donald Davidson, reliable differential, responsive disposition, score keeping, Queen’s schilling

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