Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
A Behavioral Theory of Elections$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780691135076

Published to University Press Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691135076.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of
date: 13 December 2017

An Integrated Model of Two-Party Elections

An Integrated Model of Two-Party Elections

Chapter:
(p.132) Chapter Six An Integrated Model of Two-Party Elections
Source:
A Behavioral Theory of Elections
Author(s):

Jonathan Bendor

Daniel Diermeier

David A. Siegel

Michael M. Ting

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691135076.003.0006

This chapter introduces a model of two-party elections that integrates the focused models of party competition, turnout, and voter choice. To address the complexity of this synthetic model, computation is used as the main way to generate results (predictions). The model yields a “general equilibrium” of the election game. It also allows for greater heterogeneity within each coalition while taking into account the link between payoffs and aspirations. The chapter first describes the proposed computational model for two parties before discussing some results of the basic integrated model. It also considers several new questions that the model can address, such as: who votes and who votes correctly. Finally, it examines the dynamics that lead to equilibrium behavior.

Keywords:   two-party elections, party competition, turnout, voter choice, payoffs, aspirations, computational model, political parties, equilibrium behavior

University Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .