Richard Holton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199214570
- eISBN:
- 9780191706547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214570.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of ...
More
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.Less
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.
Ingrid Wassenaar
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198160045
- eISBN:
- 9780191673757
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198160045.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to ...
More
A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to celebrate the wonders of the moi sensible uncritically. This effaces all that is morally dubious or frankly experimental about Proust’s account of selfhood. It denies the rigour with which Proust tries to understand exactly why it is so difficult to explain one’s own actions to another. The great party scenes, for example, or the countless digressions, read like manuals on how acts of self-justification take place. Proust, however, is not merely interested in some kind of taxonomy of excuses, hypocrisy, disingenuousness, and Schadenfreude. He wants to know why self-justification tends to be interpreted as indicative of moral or psychological weakness. He asks himself whether self-justification informs isolated moments of everyday existence or whether it endures in an overall conception of self that lasts an individual’s lifetime. He investigates whether it dictates the functioning of an entire social group. Can we decide, he asks, whether justifying one’s self should be written off as morally repugnant, or taken seriously as evidence of moral probity?Less
A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to celebrate the wonders of the moi sensible uncritically. This effaces all that is morally dubious or frankly experimental about Proust’s account of selfhood. It denies the rigour with which Proust tries to understand exactly why it is so difficult to explain one’s own actions to another. The great party scenes, for example, or the countless digressions, read like manuals on how acts of self-justification take place. Proust, however, is not merely interested in some kind of taxonomy of excuses, hypocrisy, disingenuousness, and Schadenfreude. He wants to know why self-justification tends to be interpreted as indicative of moral or psychological weakness. He asks himself whether self-justification informs isolated moments of everyday existence or whether it endures in an overall conception of self that lasts an individual’s lifetime. He investigates whether it dictates the functioning of an entire social group. Can we decide, he asks, whether justifying one’s self should be written off as morally repugnant, or taken seriously as evidence of moral probity?
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
More
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are ...
More
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.Less
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246274
- eISBN:
- 9780191715198
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246270.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render ...
More
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.Less
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of ...
More
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.Less
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.
Alison Sinclair
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198151906
- eISBN:
- 9780191672880
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198151906.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
In Western literature, love and death appear regularly in conjunction with one another: death posited as the extreme, or perhaps the only possible expression, of true love; love, the only human ...
More
In Western literature, love and death appear regularly in conjunction with one another: death posited as the extreme, or perhaps the only possible expression, of true love; love, the only human experience one has that appears sufficient to stand in counterpoise to our inevitable and ever approaching mortality. This book argues that the representation of cuckoldry in literature provides an artistic containment for anxieties about physical waning, which will lead inexorably towards death. Here, comedy sweetens the pill, as does distance, relieving the reader of the pain of identification with a male character whose fate he would presumably rather not share. Honour literature moves to a different point on the scale, dealing with human emotional vulnerability by defence, by the splitting-off and projecting-out of unwanted weakness, including the susceptibility to love and passion.Less
In Western literature, love and death appear regularly in conjunction with one another: death posited as the extreme, or perhaps the only possible expression, of true love; love, the only human experience one has that appears sufficient to stand in counterpoise to our inevitable and ever approaching mortality. This book argues that the representation of cuckoldry in literature provides an artistic containment for anxieties about physical waning, which will lead inexorably towards death. Here, comedy sweetens the pill, as does distance, relieving the reader of the pain of identification with a male character whose fate he would presumably rather not share. Honour literature moves to a different point on the scale, dealing with human emotional vulnerability by defence, by the splitting-off and projecting-out of unwanted weakness, including the susceptibility to love and passion.
Ira Katznelson
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198279242
- eISBN:
- 9780191601910
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198279248.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Defeated in the East and discredited in the West, Marxism has broken down as an ideology and as a guide to governance. However, for all its flaws, it remains an important tool for understanding and ...
More
Defeated in the East and discredited in the West, Marxism has broken down as an ideology and as a guide to governance. However, for all its flaws, it remains an important tool for understanding and raising questions about key aspects of modern life. In Marxism and the City, Ira Katznelson critically assesses the scholarship on cities that has developed within Marxism in the past quarter century to show how some of the most important weaknesses in Marxism as a social theory can be remedied by forcing it to engage seriously with cities and spatial concerns. He argues that such a Marxism still has a significant contribution to make to the discussion of historical questions such as the transition from feudalism to a world composed of capitalist economies and nation‐states and the acquiescence of the western working classes to capitalism. Katznelson demonstrates how a Marxism that embraces complexity and is open to engagement with other social–theoretical traditions can illuminate understanding of cities and of the patterns of class and group formation that have characterized urban life in the West.Less
Defeated in the East and discredited in the West, Marxism has broken down as an ideology and as a guide to governance. However, for all its flaws, it remains an important tool for understanding and raising questions about key aspects of modern life. In Marxism and the City, Ira Katznelson critically assesses the scholarship on cities that has developed within Marxism in the past quarter century to show how some of the most important weaknesses in Marxism as a social theory can be remedied by forcing it to engage seriously with cities and spatial concerns. He argues that such a Marxism still has a significant contribution to make to the discussion of historical questions such as the transition from feudalism to a world composed of capitalist economies and nation‐states and the acquiescence of the western working classes to capitalism. Katznelson demonstrates how a Marxism that embraces complexity and is open to engagement with other social–theoretical traditions can illuminate understanding of cities and of the patterns of class and group formation that have characterized urban life in the West.
Gadis Gadzhiev
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244089
- eISBN:
- 9780191600364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244081.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately ...
More
Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately leading to the institutionalization of a super‐presidential regime created through brute force. The chapter emphasizes that Russia was the only post‐communist country that experienced a military intervention after democratic elections had taken place. The first part of the chapter focuses on how the process of amending the 1978 Russian Constitution deteriorated into a power struggle between the parliament and the president and describes the institutional structure that resulted from this contentious process. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the Russian Constitution, which set clear rules for the institutional game but without respect for the division of power principle, has contributed to state weakness. It is emphasized that by concentrating power in the presidency, the executive has become overburdened and the state ineffective.Less
Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately leading to the institutionalization of a super‐presidential regime created through brute force. The chapter emphasizes that Russia was the only post‐communist country that experienced a military intervention after democratic elections had taken place. The first part of the chapter focuses on how the process of amending the 1978 Russian Constitution deteriorated into a power struggle between the parliament and the president and describes the institutional structure that resulted from this contentious process. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the Russian Constitution, which set clear rules for the institutional game but without respect for the division of power principle, has contributed to state weakness. It is emphasized that by concentrating power in the presidency, the executive has become overburdened and the state ineffective.
Andrew Moravcsik
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245000
- eISBN:
- 9780191599996
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245002.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Moravcsik attacks the view, shared by Euro‐enthusiasts and Euro‐sceptics alike, that current developments in the EU herald the advent of a European federal state; according to Moravcsik, the EU lacks ...
More
Moravcsik attacks the view, shared by Euro‐enthusiasts and Euro‐sceptics alike, that current developments in the EU herald the advent of a European federal state; according to Moravcsik, the EU lacks and is likely to continue to lack the fundamental competences that would make it federal. To make this point, Moravcsik emphasizes what the EU does not do and is unlikely to take on in the foreseeable future, spelling out how the ‘EU plays almost no role—at most a weak sort of international coordination—in most of the issue‐areas about which European voters care most, such as taxation, social welfare provision, defence, high foreign policy, policing, education, cultural policy, human rights, and small business policy’. Moravcsik finds this not surprising, since the EU's built‐in ‘constitutional constraints’, from fiscal to legislative and regulatory powers, create a strong bias towards the status quo. His normative conclusion that the ‘existing hybrid status quo is sufficiently efficient and adequately legitimate to resist any fundamental institutional reform’ seems to echo Weiler's conclusion in Ch. 2 that the EU ‘ain’t broke, so don’t fix it’, although the two authors get to this position from opposite premises: Weiler thinks that today's EU founded on constitutional tolerance—bowing to the majority without being one people—is an amazingly ambitious project, while Moravcsik celebrates the EU's character as ‘a second‐best constitutional compromise designed to cope pragmatically with concrete problems’. The three sections of the chapter: (1) describe the existing confederal structure of EU institutions, focussing on the substantive narrowness and institutional weakness of its mandate; (2) examine the causes of this narrow and weak institutional mandate in the European constitutional settlement; and (3) assess the normative consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the EU state structure.Less
Moravcsik attacks the view, shared by Euro‐enthusiasts and Euro‐sceptics alike, that current developments in the EU herald the advent of a European federal state; according to Moravcsik, the EU lacks and is likely to continue to lack the fundamental competences that would make it federal. To make this point, Moravcsik emphasizes what the EU does not do and is unlikely to take on in the foreseeable future, spelling out how the ‘EU plays almost no role—at most a weak sort of international coordination—in most of the issue‐areas about which European voters care most, such as taxation, social welfare provision, defence, high foreign policy, policing, education, cultural policy, human rights, and small business policy’. Moravcsik finds this not surprising, since the EU's built‐in ‘constitutional constraints’, from fiscal to legislative and regulatory powers, create a strong bias towards the status quo. His normative conclusion that the ‘existing hybrid status quo is sufficiently efficient and adequately legitimate to resist any fundamental institutional reform’ seems to echo Weiler's conclusion in Ch. 2 that the EU ‘ain’t broke, so don’t fix it’, although the two authors get to this position from opposite premises: Weiler thinks that today's EU founded on constitutional tolerance—bowing to the majority without being one people—is an amazingly ambitious project, while Moravcsik celebrates the EU's character as ‘a second‐best constitutional compromise designed to cope pragmatically with concrete problems’. The three sections of the chapter: (1) describe the existing confederal structure of EU institutions, focussing on the substantive narrowness and institutional weakness of its mandate; (2) examine the causes of this narrow and weak institutional mandate in the European constitutional settlement; and (3) assess the normative consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the EU state structure.
