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Vagueness and Degrees of Truth

Nicholas J. J. Smith

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199233007
eISBN:
9780191716430
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This book argues that an adequate account of vagueness must involve degrees of truth. The basic idea of degrees of truth is that while some sentences are true and some are false, others possess ... More


The Space of Possible Theories of Vagueness

Nicholas J. J. Smith

in Vagueness and Degrees of Truth

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199233007
eISBN:
9780191716430
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter presents the main existing theories of vagueness, as well as some possible theories which have not yet found advocates. Each theory is presented not necessarily as it was first presented ... More


Frege on Truth (1986)

TYLER BURGE

in Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199278534
eISBN:
9780191706943
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278534.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter shows that Frege's argument that sentences have truth values as their Bedeutungen (denotations) depends on his composition principle for denotation and on his view of the theoretically ... More


A Theory of Presentism

Craig Bourne

in A Future for Presentism

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199212804
eISBN:
9780191707094
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I begin by laying down three conditions which any theory of time should meet: it should accord with our view that certain statements about the past are true; that the truthmakers for those statements ... More


Kripke's Theory of Truth (Strong Kleene Version)

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter is an exposition of the strong Kleene version of Kripke's fixed point semantics, and the theories of truth that can be obtained from it. Emphasis is put on the distinction between ... More


Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps

Mark Richard

in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, & its Logic

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199570386
eISBN:
9780191722134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0027
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being ... More


Semantic Paradoxes

Graham Priest

in In Contradiction

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199263301
eISBN:
9780191718823
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter defends the view that the semantic paradoxes are bona fide sound arguments. It states a set of conditions sufficient for contradiction and then defends the view that natural language ... More


Truth and Falsity

Graham Priest

in In Contradiction

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199263301
eISBN:
9780191718823
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter discusses truth and related notions: the T-schema, meaning, assertion, falsity. It defends the T-schema, and argues for a teleological account of truth. It concludes with a discussion ... More


The Legacy of <i>Principia</i>

Judith Jarvis Thomson

in Metaethics after Moore

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199269914
eISBN:
9780191710032
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter argues that the legacy in question is that the force of the open question argument, together with the rejection of the Moorean idea that there are non-natural properties, motivate two ... More


Truth

Jonathan Barnes

in Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199568178
eISBN:
9780191702037
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568178.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

According to Cicero, ‘Chrysippus strains every sinew in order to persuade us that every assertible is either true or false’. How did Chrysippus strain his sinews? Why did he strain them? And what ... More


The Value of Truth

Paul Horwich

in Truth -- Meaning -- Reality

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199268900
eISBN:
9780191708459
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

This chapter attempts to clarify and defend the idea, VT, that true belief is desirable and false belief undesirable, to see if one can explain why it is correct, and to examine its epistemological ... More


Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value

Nicholas J. J. Smith

in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, & its Logic

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199570386
eISBN:
9780191722134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0029
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds ... More


Truth, Falsity, and Unity

Richard Gaskin

in The Unity of the Proposition

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199239450
eISBN:
9780191716997
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239450.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter addresses the question: What distinguishes a declarative sentence from a mere list of words? The tradition has always assumed that declarative sentences are semantically complex, and it ... More


Supernumeration: Vagueness and Numbers

Peter Simons

in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, & its Logic

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199570386
eISBN:
9780191722134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0028
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

There is a notable discrepancy between philosophers and practitioners on approaches to vagueness. Philosophers almost all reject fuzzy logic and a majority accept some form of supervaluational ... More


Values of Truth and Truth of Values

Michael P. Lynch

in Epistemic Value

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199231188
eISBN:
9780191710827
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, General

In this chapter the following two questions are addressed: ‘What does it mean to say that truth is a value?’ and ’How seriously, from what we might call the meta-normative point of view, should we ... More


Truth Conditions and Semantics

Jody Azzouni

in Talking About Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations and Fictions

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199738946
eISBN:
9780199866175
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The aim of this chapter is to show that allowing languages to have ontologically neutral idioms, both quantificational and singular, poses no problems for semantic theories of such languages. The ... More


Epistemic Value

Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds)

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199231188
eISBN:
9780191710827
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether ... More


Propositions, Time, and Eternity

Wolfgang Künne

in Conceptions of Truth

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241316
eISBN:
9780191597831
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241317.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

I argue that neither sentences nor sentential utterances nor token‐sentences, but propositions, conceived of as (possible) contents of certain speech acts and of certain mental acts and states, are ... More


Presupposition

Richard Swinburne

in Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199212460
eISBN:
9780191707193
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212460.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Someone may express a claim within a system of presuppositions held by his hearers. The presuppositions are however not part of the claim, and the truth-value of the claim does not depend on the ... More


Why Beliefs Are Never True: A Reconstruction of Stoic Epistemology

Katja Maria Vogt

in Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199916818
eISBN:
9780199980291
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy

According to the Stoics, beliefs are not evaluated as “true” or “false.” This aspect of Stoic epistemology, though rather stark, has not been noted by interpreters. The chapter is devoted to ... More


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