Jeff McMahan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548668
- eISBN:
- 9780191721045
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548668.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more ...
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Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more permissive in a state of war? This book argues that conditions in war make no difference to what morality permits and that the justifications for killing people are the same in war as they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defence. This view is radically at odds with the traditional theory of the just war and has implications that challenge common sense views. It implies, for example, that it is wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause, that those who fight in a just war are not legitimate targets of attack, and that some civilians may, in principle if not in practice, be morally liable to suffer certain harms in war.Less
Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more permissive in a state of war? This book argues that conditions in war make no difference to what morality permits and that the justifications for killing people are the same in war as they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defence. This view is radically at odds with the traditional theory of the just war and has implications that challenge common sense views. It implies, for example, that it is wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause, that those who fight in a just war are not legitimate targets of attack, and that some civilians may, in principle if not in practice, be morally liable to suffer certain harms in war.
Laurie Shrage
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153095
- eISBN:
- 9780199870615
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515309X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As ...
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This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.Less
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.
Anna Wierzbicka
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195137330
- eISBN:
- 9780199867905
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195137337.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
This chapter is devoted to the great antitheses of the “Sermon on the Mount” and tries to identify, in simple words, the meaning of some of Jesus’ key sayings, including “whoever is angry with his ...
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This chapter is devoted to the great antitheses of the “Sermon on the Mount” and tries to identify, in simple words, the meaning of some of Jesus’ key sayings, including “whoever is angry with his brother. . . ,” “whoever divorces his wife. . .,” “whoever looks at a woman to lust for her,” “let your yes be yes, and your no, no,” “turn the other cheek,” and “love your enemies.” By relying exclusively on simple and universal human concepts, it manages to identify Jesus’ teaching in all these areas more clearly and unambiguously than do commentaries relying on complex and culturally shaped concepts like “coveting,” “lust,” “aggression,” “violence,” “nonviolence,” “resistance,” “retaliation” or “submission.” For example, the chapter shows how Jesus’ injunction to “turn the other cheek” is compatible with self‐defense or defense of other people. It also shows how Jesus’ injunctions differed from that of the stoics and the cynics, with which it has often been confused in recent scholarly literature, and it brings into sharper focus the originality of Jesus’ ethical teaching.Less
This chapter is devoted to the great antitheses of the “Sermon on the Mount” and tries to identify, in simple words, the meaning of some of Jesus’ key sayings, including “whoever is angry with his brother. . . ,” “whoever divorces his wife. . .,” “whoever looks at a woman to lust for her,” “let your yes be yes, and your no, no,” “turn the other cheek,” and “love your enemies.” By relying exclusively on simple and universal human concepts, it manages to identify Jesus’ teaching in all these areas more clearly and unambiguously than do commentaries relying on complex and culturally shaped concepts like “coveting,” “lust,” “aggression,” “violence,” “nonviolence,” “resistance,” “retaliation” or “submission.” For example, the chapter shows how Jesus’ injunction to “turn the other cheek” is compatible with self‐defense or defense of other people. It also shows how Jesus’ injunctions differed from that of the stoics and the cynics, with which it has often been confused in recent scholarly literature, and it brings into sharper focus the originality of Jesus’ ethical teaching.
Meredith Baldwin Weddle
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195131383
- eISBN:
- 9780199834839
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513138X.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Beyond soldiering, individual Quakers faced other issues relevant to the peace testimony, such as self‐defense and offering sanctuary to others. To seek protection in a garrison house, for example, ...
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Beyond soldiering, individual Quakers faced other issues relevant to the peace testimony, such as self‐defense and offering sanctuary to others. To seek protection in a garrison house, for example, raised several questions: might it betray a lack of faith in God's protection; should one go in armed, or unarmed; as a site of potential violence, should one avoid it altogether? The records show a range of behavior, from Nathaniel Sylvester's scrupulous avoidance of garrison houses to William Coddington's contorted legalism. Would offering sanctuary to wounded English soldiers be a loving act, or would it be an unconscionable support of military activity? The peace testimony, with the exception of the Rhode Island Testimony, did not appear in disciplinary admonitions until the 1690s among New England Quakers, suggesting that its parameters were too unsettled, its complexities too great.Less
Beyond soldiering, individual Quakers faced other issues relevant to the peace testimony, such as self‐defense and offering sanctuary to others. To seek protection in a garrison house, for example, raised several questions: might it betray a lack of faith in God's protection; should one go in armed, or unarmed; as a site of potential violence, should one avoid it altogether? The records show a range of behavior, from Nathaniel Sylvester's scrupulous avoidance of garrison houses to William Coddington's contorted legalism. Would offering sanctuary to wounded English soldiers be a loving act, or would it be an unconscionable support of military activity? The peace testimony, with the exception of the Rhode Island Testimony, did not appear in disciplinary admonitions until the 1690s among New England Quakers, suggesting that its parameters were too unsettled, its complexities too great.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195314311
- eISBN:
- 9780199871780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314311.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative ...
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Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.Less
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.
Shawn Leigh Alexander
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813032320
- eISBN:
- 9780813039084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813032320.003.0022
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
This chapter presents the editorial, “Segregation and Neighborhood Agreements,” where Fortune acknowledges that the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley, in which the Court upheld the ...
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This chapter presents the editorial, “Segregation and Neighborhood Agreements,” where Fortune acknowledges that the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley, in which the Court upheld the practice of restrictive covenants, and the recent race riots and denial of African Americans' rights in Arkansas and Michigan were signs that African American social and political rights have not improved. He argued, in fact, that the nation has not grown since the Taney Court and its Dred Scott ruling. The community, according to Fortune, may have no recourse but to resort to the “primitive law of self-defense.” Such a condition should not “prevail in any civilized country,” he argued, but getting “mobcrats to understand they will be met with violence in the same way and as often as they resort to it” may again be the only option for the African American citizen.Less
This chapter presents the editorial, “Segregation and Neighborhood Agreements,” where Fortune acknowledges that the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley, in which the Court upheld the practice of restrictive covenants, and the recent race riots and denial of African Americans' rights in Arkansas and Michigan were signs that African American social and political rights have not improved. He argued, in fact, that the nation has not grown since the Taney Court and its Dred Scott ruling. The community, according to Fortune, may have no recourse but to resort to the “primitive law of self-defense.” Such a condition should not “prevail in any civilized country,” he argued, but getting “mobcrats to understand they will be met with violence in the same way and as often as they resort to it” may again be the only option for the African American citizen.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price ...
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This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $320 000 for the house. In this case, I make a deliberate false statement about my intentions and bargaining position. Despite the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception in commercial transactions, lying and deception in negotiations can sometimes be justified on the ground of “self‐defense” if others are engaging in lying/deception and thereby gaining an advantage over one.Less
This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $320 000 for the house. In this case, I make a deliberate false statement about my intentions and bargaining position. Despite the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception in commercial transactions, lying and deception in negotiations can sometimes be justified on the ground of “self‐defense” if others are engaging in lying/deception and thereby gaining an advantage over one.
Jeff McMahan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548668
- eISBN:
- 9780191721045
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548668.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter analyzes and criticizes the currently orthodox theory of the just war, according to which it is permissible for combatants on both sides in a war to fight, irrespective of whether their ...
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This chapter analyzes and criticizes the currently orthodox theory of the just war, according to which it is permissible for combatants on both sides in a war to fight, irrespective of whether their war is just or unjust, provided that they obey the rules governing the conduct of war. The argument of the chapter is that the traditional view — that all combatants are legitimate targets while no civilians are — has no coherent moral foundation. It argues that it is impossible for acts of war by combatants who lack a just cause to satisfy the requirement of proportionality. It concludes by advancing a revisionist criterion of moral liability to attack in war.Less
This chapter analyzes and criticizes the currently orthodox theory of the just war, according to which it is permissible for combatants on both sides in a war to fight, irrespective of whether their war is just or unjust, provided that they obey the rules governing the conduct of war. The argument of the chapter is that the traditional view — that all combatants are legitimate targets while no civilians are — has no coherent moral foundation. It argues that it is impossible for acts of war by combatants who lack a just cause to satisfy the requirement of proportionality. It concludes by advancing a revisionist criterion of moral liability to attack in war.
Saul Cornell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195147865
- eISBN:
- 9780199788644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195147865.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter focuses on the change in the nature of American gun culture during the early decades of the next century. Americans began carrying weapons primarily for personal self-defense. The ...
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This chapter focuses on the change in the nature of American gun culture during the early decades of the next century. Americans began carrying weapons primarily for personal self-defense. The expanding economy of this century also resulted in a staggering array of these personal weapons being made readily available to consumers. America's first gun control movement, judging the right to bear arms, and the Second Amendment in Antebellum constitutional commentaries, the abolitionist theory of the right to bear arms, and the right to bear arms mid-century are discussed.Less
This chapter focuses on the change in the nature of American gun culture during the early decades of the next century. Americans began carrying weapons primarily for personal self-defense. The expanding economy of this century also resulted in a staggering array of these personal weapons being made readily available to consumers. America's first gun control movement, judging the right to bear arms, and the Second Amendment in Antebellum constitutional commentaries, the abolitionist theory of the right to bear arms, and the right to bear arms mid-century are discussed.
Kerstin Fisk (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781479857531
- eISBN:
- 9781479880997
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479857531.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
More so than in the past, the US is now embracing the logic of preventive force: using military force to counter potential threats around the globe before they have fully materialized. From the war ...
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More so than in the past, the US is now embracing the logic of preventive force: using military force to counter potential threats around the globe before they have fully materialized. From the war in Iraq to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, outside of recognized war zones, this US re-interpretation of rightful self-defense raises critical questions about the wisdom of preventive force strategy: To what extent does preventive force enhance future security? Are the perceived benefits worth the potential costs? Is the US setting a dangerous international precedent? Although this volume focuses on the most currently used, yet relatively limited, use of preventive force—targeted killings—it has important implications for preventive force more broadly. This book thus offers a comprehensive resource that speaks to the contours of preventive force as a security strategy, as well as to practical, legal and ethical considerations concerning its implementation.Less
More so than in the past, the US is now embracing the logic of preventive force: using military force to counter potential threats around the globe before they have fully materialized. From the war in Iraq to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, outside of recognized war zones, this US re-interpretation of rightful self-defense raises critical questions about the wisdom of preventive force strategy: To what extent does preventive force enhance future security? Are the perceived benefits worth the potential costs? Is the US setting a dangerous international precedent? Although this volume focuses on the most currently used, yet relatively limited, use of preventive force—targeted killings—it has important implications for preventive force more broadly. This book thus offers a comprehensive resource that speaks to the contours of preventive force as a security strategy, as well as to practical, legal and ethical considerations concerning its implementation.
