Jeff McMahan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548668
- eISBN:
- 9780191721045
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548668.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more ...
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Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more permissive in a state of war? This book argues that conditions in war make no difference to what morality permits and that the justifications for killing people are the same in war as they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defence. This view is radically at odds with the traditional theory of the just war and has implications that challenge common sense views. It implies, for example, that it is wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause, that those who fight in a just war are not legitimate targets of attack, and that some civilians may, in principle if not in practice, be morally liable to suffer certain harms in war.Less
Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more permissive in a state of war? This book argues that conditions in war make no difference to what morality permits and that the justifications for killing people are the same in war as they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defence. This view is radically at odds with the traditional theory of the just war and has implications that challenge common sense views. It implies, for example, that it is wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause, that those who fight in a just war are not legitimate targets of attack, and that some civilians may, in principle if not in practice, be morally liable to suffer certain harms in war.
Laurie Shrage
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153095
- eISBN:
- 9780199870615
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515309X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As ...
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This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.Less
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.
Anna Wierzbicka
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195137330
- eISBN:
- 9780199867905
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195137337.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
This chapter is devoted to the great antitheses of the “Sermon on the Mount” and tries to identify, in simple words, the meaning of some of Jesus’ key sayings, including “whoever is angry with his ...
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This chapter is devoted to the great antitheses of the “Sermon on the Mount” and tries to identify, in simple words, the meaning of some of Jesus’ key sayings, including “whoever is angry with his brother. . . ,” “whoever divorces his wife. . .,” “whoever looks at a woman to lust for her,” “let your yes be yes, and your no, no,” “turn the other cheek,” and “love your enemies.” By relying exclusively on simple and universal human concepts, it manages to identify Jesus’ teaching in all these areas more clearly and unambiguously than do commentaries relying on complex and culturally shaped concepts like “coveting,” “lust,” “aggression,” “violence,” “nonviolence,” “resistance,” “retaliation” or “submission.” For example, the chapter shows how Jesus’ injunction to “turn the other cheek” is compatible with self‐defense or defense of other people. It also shows how Jesus’ injunctions differed from that of the stoics and the cynics, with which it has often been confused in recent scholarly literature, and it brings into sharper focus the originality of Jesus’ ethical teaching.Less
This chapter is devoted to the great antitheses of the “Sermon on the Mount” and tries to identify, in simple words, the meaning of some of Jesus’ key sayings, including “whoever is angry with his brother. . . ,” “whoever divorces his wife. . .,” “whoever looks at a woman to lust for her,” “let your yes be yes, and your no, no,” “turn the other cheek,” and “love your enemies.” By relying exclusively on simple and universal human concepts, it manages to identify Jesus’ teaching in all these areas more clearly and unambiguously than do commentaries relying on complex and culturally shaped concepts like “coveting,” “lust,” “aggression,” “violence,” “nonviolence,” “resistance,” “retaliation” or “submission.” For example, the chapter shows how Jesus’ injunction to “turn the other cheek” is compatible with self‐defense or defense of other people. It also shows how Jesus’ injunctions differed from that of the stoics and the cynics, with which it has often been confused in recent scholarly literature, and it brings into sharper focus the originality of Jesus’ ethical teaching.
Meredith Baldwin Weddle
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195131383
- eISBN:
- 9780199834839
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513138X.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Beyond soldiering, individual Quakers faced other issues relevant to the peace testimony, such as self‐defense and offering sanctuary to others. To seek protection in a garrison house, for example, ...
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Beyond soldiering, individual Quakers faced other issues relevant to the peace testimony, such as self‐defense and offering sanctuary to others. To seek protection in a garrison house, for example, raised several questions: might it betray a lack of faith in God's protection; should one go in armed, or unarmed; as a site of potential violence, should one avoid it altogether? The records show a range of behavior, from Nathaniel Sylvester's scrupulous avoidance of garrison houses to William Coddington's contorted legalism. Would offering sanctuary to wounded English soldiers be a loving act, or would it be an unconscionable support of military activity? The peace testimony, with the exception of the Rhode Island Testimony, did not appear in disciplinary admonitions until the 1690s among New England Quakers, suggesting that its parameters were too unsettled, its complexities too great.Less
Beyond soldiering, individual Quakers faced other issues relevant to the peace testimony, such as self‐defense and offering sanctuary to others. To seek protection in a garrison house, for example, raised several questions: might it betray a lack of faith in God's protection; should one go in armed, or unarmed; as a site of potential violence, should one avoid it altogether? The records show a range of behavior, from Nathaniel Sylvester's scrupulous avoidance of garrison houses to William Coddington's contorted legalism. Would offering sanctuary to wounded English soldiers be a loving act, or would it be an unconscionable support of military activity? The peace testimony, with the exception of the Rhode Island Testimony, did not appear in disciplinary admonitions until the 1690s among New England Quakers, suggesting that its parameters were too unsettled, its complexities too great.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195314311
- eISBN:
- 9780199871780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314311.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative ...
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Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.Less
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.
Shawn Leigh Alexander
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813032320
- eISBN:
- 9780813039084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813032320.003.0022
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
This chapter presents the editorial, “Segregation and Neighborhood Agreements,” where Fortune acknowledges that the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley, in which the Court upheld the ...
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This chapter presents the editorial, “Segregation and Neighborhood Agreements,” where Fortune acknowledges that the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley, in which the Court upheld the practice of restrictive covenants, and the recent race riots and denial of African Americans' rights in Arkansas and Michigan were signs that African American social and political rights have not improved. He argued, in fact, that the nation has not grown since the Taney Court and its Dred Scott ruling. The community, according to Fortune, may have no recourse but to resort to the “primitive law of self-defense.” Such a condition should not “prevail in any civilized country,” he argued, but getting “mobcrats to understand they will be met with violence in the same way and as often as they resort to it” may again be the only option for the African American citizen.Less
This chapter presents the editorial, “Segregation and Neighborhood Agreements,” where Fortune acknowledges that the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley, in which the Court upheld the practice of restrictive covenants, and the recent race riots and denial of African Americans' rights in Arkansas and Michigan were signs that African American social and political rights have not improved. He argued, in fact, that the nation has not grown since the Taney Court and its Dred Scott ruling. The community, according to Fortune, may have no recourse but to resort to the “primitive law of self-defense.” Such a condition should not “prevail in any civilized country,” he argued, but getting “mobcrats to understand they will be met with violence in the same way and as often as they resort to it” may again be the only option for the African American citizen.
Saul Cornell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195147865
- eISBN:
- 9780199788644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195147865.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter focuses on the change in the nature of American gun culture during the early decades of the next century. Americans began carrying weapons primarily for personal self-defense. The ...
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This chapter focuses on the change in the nature of American gun culture during the early decades of the next century. Americans began carrying weapons primarily for personal self-defense. The expanding economy of this century also resulted in a staggering array of these personal weapons being made readily available to consumers. America's first gun control movement, judging the right to bear arms, and the Second Amendment in Antebellum constitutional commentaries, the abolitionist theory of the right to bear arms, and the right to bear arms mid-century are discussed.Less
This chapter focuses on the change in the nature of American gun culture during the early decades of the next century. Americans began carrying weapons primarily for personal self-defense. The expanding economy of this century also resulted in a staggering array of these personal weapons being made readily available to consumers. America's first gun control movement, judging the right to bear arms, and the Second Amendment in Antebellum constitutional commentaries, the abolitionist theory of the right to bear arms, and the right to bear arms mid-century are discussed.
Price V. Fishback
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195067255
- eISBN:
- 9780199855025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195067255.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Bituminous coal mining was notorious for prolonged labor strikes and for the violence that marred some strikes. This chapter compares the strike activity in bituminous coal mining and other ...
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Bituminous coal mining was notorious for prolonged labor strikes and for the violence that marred some strikes. This chapter compares the strike activity in bituminous coal mining and other industries and assesses the pecuniary costs and benefits of strikes. Coal miners gave up earnings during the strike to achieve improvements in wages and working conditions. Unless the strike was over union recognition, the loss in earnings while on strike exceeded the gains from obtaining a higher wage rate. In union recognition strikes, the gains from unionization had to last several years before the expected gain from the strike exceeded the lost earnings in the course of the strike. Although most strikes were settled peacefully, the coal industry became infamous for a series of violent episodes, some that developed into full-scale warfare. Rather than trying to fix blame on one side or the other, this chapter argues that both miners and employers armed themselves in self-defense.Less
Bituminous coal mining was notorious for prolonged labor strikes and for the violence that marred some strikes. This chapter compares the strike activity in bituminous coal mining and other industries and assesses the pecuniary costs and benefits of strikes. Coal miners gave up earnings during the strike to achieve improvements in wages and working conditions. Unless the strike was over union recognition, the loss in earnings while on strike exceeded the gains from obtaining a higher wage rate. In union recognition strikes, the gains from unionization had to last several years before the expected gain from the strike exceeded the lost earnings in the course of the strike. Although most strikes were settled peacefully, the coal industry became infamous for a series of violent episodes, some that developed into full-scale warfare. Rather than trying to fix blame on one side or the other, this chapter argues that both miners and employers armed themselves in self-defense.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price ...
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This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $320 000 for the house. In this case, I make a deliberate false statement about my intentions and bargaining position. Despite the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception in commercial transactions, lying and deception in negotiations can sometimes be justified on the ground of “self‐defense” if others are engaging in lying/deception and thereby gaining an advantage over one.Less
This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $320 000 for the house. In this case, I make a deliberate false statement about my intentions and bargaining position. Despite the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception in commercial transactions, lying and deception in negotiations can sometimes be justified on the ground of “self‐defense” if others are engaging in lying/deception and thereby gaining an advantage over one.
Jeff McMahan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548668
- eISBN:
- 9780191721045
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548668.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter analyzes and criticizes the currently orthodox theory of the just war, according to which it is permissible for combatants on both sides in a war to fight, irrespective of whether their ...
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This chapter analyzes and criticizes the currently orthodox theory of the just war, according to which it is permissible for combatants on both sides in a war to fight, irrespective of whether their war is just or unjust, provided that they obey the rules governing the conduct of war. The argument of the chapter is that the traditional view — that all combatants are legitimate targets while no civilians are — has no coherent moral foundation. It argues that it is impossible for acts of war by combatants who lack a just cause to satisfy the requirement of proportionality. It concludes by advancing a revisionist criterion of moral liability to attack in war.Less
This chapter analyzes and criticizes the currently orthodox theory of the just war, according to which it is permissible for combatants on both sides in a war to fight, irrespective of whether their war is just or unjust, provided that they obey the rules governing the conduct of war. The argument of the chapter is that the traditional view — that all combatants are legitimate targets while no civilians are — has no coherent moral foundation. It argues that it is impossible for acts of war by combatants who lack a just cause to satisfy the requirement of proportionality. It concludes by advancing a revisionist criterion of moral liability to attack in war.
Hiroshi Nakanishi
- Published in print:
- 1953
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781479889389
- eISBN:
- 9781479830893
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479889389.003.0011
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
This chapter argues that the 2009-2011 period, under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan, was a watershed for postwar Japanese security policy. The economic depression after the Lehmann ...
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This chapter argues that the 2009-2011 period, under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan, was a watershed for postwar Japanese security policy. The economic depression after the Lehmann shock, Chinese military pressure over Senkaku islands, and the Great East Japan Earthquake transformed the Japanese public’s mindset on security. This attitudinal change is the backdrop of a series of defense policy changes such as the new Defense Program Guideline announced in late 2010. The Yoshida Doctrine has been greatly revised, if not discarded completely, and the changes shaped the security policy framework of Japan for years to come, including the security policy adapted by the second Abe Cabinet.Less
This chapter argues that the 2009-2011 period, under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan, was a watershed for postwar Japanese security policy. The economic depression after the Lehmann shock, Chinese military pressure over Senkaku islands, and the Great East Japan Earthquake transformed the Japanese public’s mindset on security. This attitudinal change is the backdrop of a series of defense policy changes such as the new Defense Program Guideline announced in late 2010. The Yoshida Doctrine has been greatly revised, if not discarded completely, and the changes shaped the security policy framework of Japan for years to come, including the security policy adapted by the second Abe Cabinet.
Christine Chinkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199781577
- eISBN:
- 9780199932887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199781577.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The chapter assesses the concepts of legitimacy and legality in the context of three exercises of Western power over the past decade: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. None of these cases was ...
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The chapter assesses the concepts of legitimacy and legality in the context of three exercises of Western power over the past decade: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. None of these cases was unambiguously legal under existing international law and international institutions offered little assistance in determining the legality or legitimacy of these coercive actions. Various legal arguments have been offered in support of the military action in each case, including intervention on humanitarian grounds, legal responses to terrorist acts, self-defence, the right to remove an undemocratic regime that commits human rights abuses against its own people and Security Council authorization (implied or transferred). Although different weight has been given to the various legal arguments (and by different protagonists), the justifications have become merged, especially in the context of Iraq. It concludes that language and legal concepts have been hi-jacked and international legality claimed regardless of compliance with formal legal requirements while assessments of legitimacy are conditional.Less
The chapter assesses the concepts of legitimacy and legality in the context of three exercises of Western power over the past decade: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. None of these cases was unambiguously legal under existing international law and international institutions offered little assistance in determining the legality or legitimacy of these coercive actions. Various legal arguments have been offered in support of the military action in each case, including intervention on humanitarian grounds, legal responses to terrorist acts, self-defence, the right to remove an undemocratic regime that commits human rights abuses against its own people and Security Council authorization (implied or transferred). Although different weight has been given to the various legal arguments (and by different protagonists), the justifications have become merged, especially in the context of Iraq. It concludes that language and legal concepts have been hi-jacked and international legality claimed regardless of compliance with formal legal requirements while assessments of legitimacy are conditional.
Jeffrie G. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195178555
- eISBN:
- 9780199850129
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178555.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the ...
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We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue for harsher penalties for criminals. Do we have a right to hate others for what they have done to us? This book has a skeptical view when it comes to our ideas on both emotions. The book proposes that vindictive emotions (anger, resentment, and the desire for revenge) actually deserve a more legitimate place in our emotional, social, and legal lives than we currently recognize, while forgiveness deserves to be more selectively granted. The book grounds the views expressed herein on careful analysis of the nature of forgiveness, a subtle understanding of the psychology of anger and resentment, and a fine appreciation of the ethical issues of self-respect and self-defense. It also uses examples from law, literature, and religion to make various points.Less
We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue for harsher penalties for criminals. Do we have a right to hate others for what they have done to us? This book has a skeptical view when it comes to our ideas on both emotions. The book proposes that vindictive emotions (anger, resentment, and the desire for revenge) actually deserve a more legitimate place in our emotional, social, and legal lives than we currently recognize, while forgiveness deserves to be more selectively granted. The book grounds the views expressed herein on careful analysis of the nature of forgiveness, a subtle understanding of the psychology of anger and resentment, and a fine appreciation of the ethical issues of self-respect and self-defense. It also uses examples from law, literature, and religion to make various points.
Kerstin Fisk (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781479857531
- eISBN:
- 9781479880997
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479857531.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
More so than in the past, the US is now embracing the logic of preventive force: using military force to counter potential threats around the globe before they have fully materialized. From the war ...
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More so than in the past, the US is now embracing the logic of preventive force: using military force to counter potential threats around the globe before they have fully materialized. From the war in Iraq to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, outside of recognized war zones, this US re-interpretation of rightful self-defense raises critical questions about the wisdom of preventive force strategy: To what extent does preventive force enhance future security? Are the perceived benefits worth the potential costs? Is the US setting a dangerous international precedent? Although this volume focuses on the most currently used, yet relatively limited, use of preventive force—targeted killings—it has important implications for preventive force more broadly. This book thus offers a comprehensive resource that speaks to the contours of preventive force as a security strategy, as well as to practical, legal and ethical considerations concerning its implementation.Less
More so than in the past, the US is now embracing the logic of preventive force: using military force to counter potential threats around the globe before they have fully materialized. From the war in Iraq to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, outside of recognized war zones, this US re-interpretation of rightful self-defense raises critical questions about the wisdom of preventive force strategy: To what extent does preventive force enhance future security? Are the perceived benefits worth the potential costs? Is the US setting a dangerous international precedent? Although this volume focuses on the most currently used, yet relatively limited, use of preventive force—targeted killings—it has important implications for preventive force more broadly. This book thus offers a comprehensive resource that speaks to the contours of preventive force as a security strategy, as well as to practical, legal and ethical considerations concerning its implementation.
David Sussman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195327939
- eISBN:
- 9780199852444
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins by admitting how strongly Kant does seem to denounce lying and, indeed, self-deception. It further elaborates Kant's attacks on lying, including his famous claim that truthfulness ...
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This chapter begins by admitting how strongly Kant does seem to denounce lying and, indeed, self-deception. It further elaborates Kant's attacks on lying, including his famous claim that truthfulness is an unconditional duty, and goes on to argue that although the conclusions of Kant's “A Supposed Right to Lie” are “wildly implausible”, they do have substantial motivation within Kant's practical philosophy. For Kant, this chapter argues, defensive lies presuppose a principle at odds with the “quasi-contractual commitments” that are the “necessary preconditions of any social order”.Less
This chapter begins by admitting how strongly Kant does seem to denounce lying and, indeed, self-deception. It further elaborates Kant's attacks on lying, including his famous claim that truthfulness is an unconditional duty, and goes on to argue that although the conclusions of Kant's “A Supposed Right to Lie” are “wildly implausible”, they do have substantial motivation within Kant's practical philosophy. For Kant, this chapter argues, defensive lies presuppose a principle at odds with the “quasi-contractual commitments” that are the “necessary preconditions of any social order”.
Alan Strudler
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195327939
- eISBN:
- 9780199852444
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter addresses the tough question of what makes lying wrong. Using Bernard Williams's idea that deception is wrong because it involves a breach of trust, or it is a manipulation of the dupe ...
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This chapter addresses the tough question of what makes lying wrong. Using Bernard Williams's idea that deception is wrong because it involves a breach of trust, or it is a manipulation of the dupe by the deceiver, it offers an analysis rich with thought experiments to argue that not all manipulation in deception involves a breach of trust, and that deception that involves a breach of trust may involve a wrong that is distinguishable from that which occurs in other deception. It argues that deception is often a form of legitimate self-defense, and in those instances should be governed by those norms.Less
This chapter addresses the tough question of what makes lying wrong. Using Bernard Williams's idea that deception is wrong because it involves a breach of trust, or it is a manipulation of the dupe by the deceiver, it offers an analysis rich with thought experiments to argue that not all manipulation in deception involves a breach of trust, and that deception that involves a breach of trust may involve a wrong that is distinguishable from that which occurs in other deception. It argues that deception is often a form of legitimate self-defense, and in those instances should be governed by those norms.
Hugo Adam Bedau
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195108774
- eISBN:
- 9780199852888
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195108774.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses the fictional case of explorers stuck in a cave after a landslide with no way out and little food. One group member, Roger Whetmore, suggests casting lots and killing and ...
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This chapter discusses the fictional case of explorers stuck in a cave after a landslide with no way out and little food. One group member, Roger Whetmore, suggests casting lots and killing and eating the loser, and the group agrees to proceed with the plan, even when Whetmore decides to withdraw. Whetmore loses the dice throw, and is killed and eaten. The lower court finds the spelunkers guilty of murder, and the Supreme Court must rule on this verdict. The author focuses on the moral issues the killing raises, the reasoning for the outcome of the case, and other possible outcomes, and discusses principles such as self-defense, self-preservation, and the rights principle. He concludes that survival should not be paramount, and that choosing to die, rather than killing to survive, would mean living and dying with greater dignity.Less
This chapter discusses the fictional case of explorers stuck in a cave after a landslide with no way out and little food. One group member, Roger Whetmore, suggests casting lots and killing and eating the loser, and the group agrees to proceed with the plan, even when Whetmore decides to withdraw. Whetmore loses the dice throw, and is killed and eaten. The lower court finds the spelunkers guilty of murder, and the Supreme Court must rule on this verdict. The author focuses on the moral issues the killing raises, the reasoning for the outcome of the case, and other possible outcomes, and discusses principles such as self-defense, self-preservation, and the rights principle. He concludes that survival should not be paramount, and that choosing to die, rather than killing to survive, would mean living and dying with greater dignity.
E. Thomas Sullivan and Richard S. Frase
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195324938
- eISBN:
- 9780199869411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195324938.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Numerous constitutional and subconstitutional limitations on criminal liability embody one or more proportionality principles. Limiting retributive liability principles underlie constitutional rules ...
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Numerous constitutional and subconstitutional limitations on criminal liability embody one or more proportionality principles. Limiting retributive liability principles underlie constitutional rules prohibiting punishment without fair notice that the conduct is criminal. Such principles are also implicit in the prohibition of status crimes (such as “being an addict”), and retributive or other proportionality principles may underlie the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Proportionality principles are also reflected in numerous subconstitutional rules governing criminal liability, including the rule of lenity; limits on the imposition of strict liability; voluntary-act requirements; limits on the availability of self defense and other affirmative defenses; and the grading of offenses according to offender culpability and harm. This chapter first examines constitutionalized proportionality limits, then subconstitutional ones, and it argues that much of the uncertainty and controversy surrounding some of these doctrines results from the failure to recognize and clearly articulate the underlying proportionality principles being applied.Less
Numerous constitutional and subconstitutional limitations on criminal liability embody one or more proportionality principles. Limiting retributive liability principles underlie constitutional rules prohibiting punishment without fair notice that the conduct is criminal. Such principles are also implicit in the prohibition of status crimes (such as “being an addict”), and retributive or other proportionality principles may underlie the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Proportionality principles are also reflected in numerous subconstitutional rules governing criminal liability, including the rule of lenity; limits on the imposition of strict liability; voluntary-act requirements; limits on the availability of self defense and other affirmative defenses; and the grading of offenses according to offender culpability and harm. This chapter first examines constitutionalized proportionality limits, then subconstitutional ones, and it argues that much of the uncertainty and controversy surrounding some of these doctrines results from the failure to recognize and clearly articulate the underlying proportionality principles being applied.
Jeff McMahan
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195079982
- eISBN:
- 9780199833443
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195079981.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Discusses abortion, infanticide, and the infliction of prenatal injury. It argues that early abortion is morally comparable to contraception and that late abortion can be justified in many cases ...
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Discusses abortion, infanticide, and the infliction of prenatal injury. It argues that early abortion is morally comparable to contraception and that late abortion can be justified in many cases because of the comparative weakness of the fetus's interest in continuing to live. The permissibility of abortion is not threatened either by considerations of potential or by claims about the sanctity of human life. Because there is no significant intrinsic difference between a late‐term fetus and a newborn infant, infanticide can also be permissible in a limited range of cases for the same reasons that abortion can be justified. Abortion cannot be justified, however, by appealing to a pregnant woman's right of self‐defense.Less
Discusses abortion, infanticide, and the infliction of prenatal injury. It argues that early abortion is morally comparable to contraception and that late abortion can be justified in many cases because of the comparative weakness of the fetus's interest in continuing to live. The permissibility of abortion is not threatened either by considerations of potential or by claims about the sanctity of human life. Because there is no significant intrinsic difference between a late‐term fetus and a newborn infant, infanticide can also be permissible in a limited range of cases for the same reasons that abortion can be justified. Abortion cannot be justified, however, by appealing to a pregnant woman's right of self‐defense.
Laura Jockusch
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199764556
- eISBN:
- 9780199979578
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764556.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History, Historiography
This chapter compares Jewish responses to the anti-Jewish violence of the early twentieth century to postwar efforts by survivors to document the Holocaust. Looking at victim testimony collection ...
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This chapter compares Jewish responses to the anti-Jewish violence of the early twentieth century to postwar efforts by survivors to document the Holocaust. Looking at victim testimony collection projects that emerged in the wake of the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, World War I, the Ukrainian pogroms of 1917-1921, and the Holocaust itself (as exemplified by Emanuel Ringelblum’s Oyneg Shabes archives in the Warsaw ghetto), it argues that the historical commissions and documentation centers perpetuated a unique genre of popular history writing—khurbn-forshung (destruction research)—that eastern European Jews had already developed decades before World War II. These precursors shared the goals of communal self-defense and legal, material, and moral redress and saw documenting atrocities as a way to mourn and commemorate the dead. Although the research techniques developed by earlier documenters bear direct similarities to those used later and provide a frame of reference, local conditions in the countries where survivors found themselves after the war played an equally important role.Less
This chapter compares Jewish responses to the anti-Jewish violence of the early twentieth century to postwar efforts by survivors to document the Holocaust. Looking at victim testimony collection projects that emerged in the wake of the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, World War I, the Ukrainian pogroms of 1917-1921, and the Holocaust itself (as exemplified by Emanuel Ringelblum’s Oyneg Shabes archives in the Warsaw ghetto), it argues that the historical commissions and documentation centers perpetuated a unique genre of popular history writing—khurbn-forshung (destruction research)—that eastern European Jews had already developed decades before World War II. These precursors shared the goals of communal self-defense and legal, material, and moral redress and saw documenting atrocities as a way to mourn and commemorate the dead. Although the research techniques developed by earlier documenters bear direct similarities to those used later and provide a frame of reference, local conditions in the countries where survivors found themselves after the war played an equally important role.
