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 How Long Is Forever

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter explores the meaning and interpretation of an infinitely repeated game. It examines finitely repeated games and infinitely repeated games with declining discount factors, and the ... More


Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

Oliver Hart

Published in print:
1995
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198288817
eISBN:
9780191596353
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198288816.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are ... More


The New Politics of the Welfare State

Paul Pierson (ed.)

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198297567
eISBN:
9780191600104
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198297564.001.0001
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

The welfare states of the affluent democracies now stand at the centre of political discussion and social conflict. In this book, which grew out of two conferences held at the Center for European ... More


Coping With Permanent Austerity Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies

Paul Pierson

in The New Politics of the Welfare State

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198297567
eISBN:
9780191600104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198297564.003.0014
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

This concluding chapter argues that the contemporary politics of the welfare state takes shape against a backdrop of both intense pressures for austerity and enduring popularity. In this context, ... More


Decreasing Liability Contracts and the Assistant Interest

Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat

in Getting Incentives Right: Improving Torts, Contracts, and Restitution

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691151595
eISBN:
9781400850396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691151595.003.0009
Subject:
Law, Comparative Law

This chapter proposes a novel mechanism to solve the promisee's incentive problem: decreasing liability contracts. Compared to constant liability, a decreasing liability contract typically improves ... More


A Framework for Reversible Agreements

Debraj Ray

in A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199207954
eISBN:
9780191709104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter develops a theory of coalition formation under the assumption that existing agreements can be costlessly renegotiated and reversed, with the consent of all participating agents. It sets ... More


Reversible Agreements Without Externalities

Debraj Ray

in A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199207954
eISBN:
9780191709104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter analyzes reversible commitments in two steps. First, it studies reversible commitments in situations without externalities across coalitions. It shows that any equilibrium of this game ... More


Reversible Agreements With Externalities

Debraj Ray

in A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199207954
eISBN:
9780191709104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter takes the second step in the study of reversible commitments by extending the framework given in Chapter 9 to cover situations with externalities across coalitions. Matters are quite ... More


The Blocking Approach in Real Time

Debraj Ray

in A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199207954
eISBN:
9780191709104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter studies reversible agreements under the blocking framework. It presumes that negotiations can open and reopen over an indefinite period of time. As before, a study of this phenomenon ... More


The Property Rights Approach

Oliver Hart

in Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

Published in print:
1995
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198288817
eISBN:
9780191596353
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198288816.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

The neoclassical, principal‐agent and transaction costs theories cannot by themselves explain firm boundaries. This chapter describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights ... More


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