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Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons

Ulrike Heuer

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199599325
eISBN:
9780191741500
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the ... More


Freedom as Constraint: The Morality of Autonomy

Katerina Deligiorgi

in The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199646159
eISBN:
9780191741142
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

Chapter 4 draws some of the broader consequences of the anti-naturalist assumptions of the theory of autonomy defended here, by looking both at alternative readings of Kant and at broader questions ... More


Moral Realism: A Defence

Russ Shafer-Landau

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199259755
eISBN:
9780191601835
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ... More


Reasons Internalism

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism: A Defence

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199259755
eISBN:
9780191601835
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259455.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Discusses the varieties of internalism about reasons, and argues against the most powerful arguments on its behalf, including those offered by Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard. Provides two ... More


Williams on Practical Reason

John Deigh

in From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780190878597
eISBN:
9780190878627
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190878597.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Bernard Williams’s controversial view about reasons for action is the topic of this essay. The essay explains Williams’s internalist account of reasons for action as an improvement on Donald ... More


Two New Versions of Skeptical Theism

Andrew Cullison

in Skeptical Theism: New Essays

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199661183
eISBN:
9780191785566
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0018
Subject:
Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter defends two new versions of skeptical theism that avoid the “Reasoning About God Problem.” Traditional skeptical theists appeal to an epistemic principle to argue that one cannot infer ... More


Parentheticalism and Normative Reasons

Tim Henning

in From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198797036
eISBN:
9780191860850
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Parentheticalism is put to use as an explanation of the (otherwise puzzling) ubiquity of sentences involving “believe” and “want” in normative reasons specifications. It is shown that ... More


Parentheticalism and Action Explanation

Tim Henning

in From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198797036
eISBN:
9780191860850
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses the nature of action explanation. Against so-called psychologist accounts, it is argued that the reasons cited as explanantia are usually not mental states but worldly states ... More


Empirical Evidence against a Cognitivist Theory of Desire and Action

Timothy Schroeder

in The Nature of Desire

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
June 2017
ISBN:
9780199370962
eISBN:
9780199370986
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter considers T. M. Scanlon’s (1998) theory of action as a specific instance of cognitivist theories of action. It raises an unusual sort of objection to Scanlon’s cognitivism and its ... More


Metareasoning: Thinking about Thinking

Michael T. Cox and Anita Raja (eds)

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262014809
eISBN:
9780262295284
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262014809.001.0001
Subject:
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence

The capacity to think about our own thinking may lie at the heart of what it means to be both human and intelligent. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have investigated these matters for many ... More


The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason

Errol Lord

in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198758709
eISBN:
9780191818622
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions ... More


Hume’s Proof of the Insufficiency of Moral Sentiments

Kenneth R. Westphal

in How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198747055
eISBN:
9780191809200
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747055.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Hume’s theory of justice reveals the basic deficiencies in his own sentiment-based ethical theory. Because Hume’s ethics is widely used as a model or inspiration for contemporary forms of moral ... More


Conclusions

David Tobis

in From Pariahs to Partners: How parents and their allies changed New York City's child welfare system

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780195099881
eISBN:
9780199344772
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195099881.003.0008
Subject:
Social Work, Children and Families

The conclusion, Chapter 8, analyzes why these changes came about and have in many instances been sustained. It reviews the impact of parents who have been ensnared in the child welfare system working ... More


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