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The Basic Measurement‐Theoretic Account

Robert J. Matthews

in The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199211258
eISBN:
9780191705724
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter develops a characterization of the empirical structure of the attitudes, using the conceptual resources developed in the previous chapter. It begins by developing a characterization of ... More


Elaboration and Explication of the Proposed Measurement‐Theoretic Account

Robert J. Matthews

in The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199211258
eISBN:
9780191705724
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The proposed measurement-theoretic account takes seriously — in a way that the Received View does not — the notion that propositional attitude attributions are natural language representations of ... More


The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Robert J. Matthews

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199211258
eISBN:
9780191705724
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book provides a sustained critique of a widely held representationalist view of propositional attitudes and their role in the production of thought and behaviour. On this view, having a ... More


Troubles with the Received View

Robert J. Matthews

in The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199211258
eISBN:
9780191705724
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

There are two general arguments in support of the Received View. First, it is argued that if propositional attitudes, cognitive capacities, and cognition were the sort of things (and processes) that ... More


Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation

Alan Millar

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199254408
eISBN:
9780191719721
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This book shows that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions are normative in that they have normative implications. Since there is no more to believing something and intending something than meeting ... More


A Prospective Introduction

Robert J. Matthews

in The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199211258
eISBN:
9780191705724
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the emergence of a Received View, which holds that common-sense psychology has it right when it takes beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes to be the causes of ... More


Introduction

Alan Millar

in Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199254408
eISBN:
9780191719721
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The rationality assumption is to the effect that having propositional attitudes is inextricably tied to rationality in that there are limits to how incoherent our attitudes can be, which are imposed ... More


The Received View

Robert J. Matthews

in The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199211258
eISBN:
9780191705724
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter begins with a discussion of the eight basic tenets of the Received View, which taken together firstly present reductive metaphysical claims about the nature of propositional attitudes, ... More


Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowing how and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence

John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett

in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780195389364
eISBN:
9780199932368
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Some of our actions manifest states or qualities of mind, such as intelligence and skill. But what are these states or qualities, and how are they manifested in action? We articulate and examine ... More


Are Propositional Attitudes Relations?

Robert J. Matthews

in The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199211258
eISBN:
9780191705724
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter challenges the presumption that the relational nature of propositional attitudes can simply be read off the logical form of the sentences by which we report propositional attitudes. It ... More


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