Sandra F. Joireman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199782482
- eISBN:
- 9780199897209
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782482.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Governments, farmers, homeowners, and academics around the world agree that property rights are important. But what happens when the state fails to enforce them? This book describes how a variety of ...
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Governments, farmers, homeowners, and academics around the world agree that property rights are important. But what happens when the state fails to enforce them? This book describes how a variety of non-state actors define and enforce property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa when the state is weak or absent. Examining the roles played by traditional leaders, entrepreneurial bureaucrats, NGOs, and specialists in violence, this text argues that organic institutions can be helpful or predatory, depending on their incentives and context. Because organically developed institutions are not assumed to be either good or bad, the book develops a set of measurement criteria to assess which types of property regimes and enforcement mechanisms are helpful and which are harmful to social welfare. It focuses on the politics of property rights enforcement in both rural and urban communities in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda. Describing what happens in specific communities, the book provocatively challenges the fallacy of legalism—the idea that changes in property law will lead to changes in property rights on the ground—arguing instead that states which change their property laws face challenges in implementation when they do not control the authority structures in local communities. The book provides new information about competitors to state power in Sub-Saharan Africa and the challenges of providing secure and defensible property rights.Less
Governments, farmers, homeowners, and academics around the world agree that property rights are important. But what happens when the state fails to enforce them? This book describes how a variety of non-state actors define and enforce property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa when the state is weak or absent. Examining the roles played by traditional leaders, entrepreneurial bureaucrats, NGOs, and specialists in violence, this text argues that organic institutions can be helpful or predatory, depending on their incentives and context. Because organically developed institutions are not assumed to be either good or bad, the book develops a set of measurement criteria to assess which types of property regimes and enforcement mechanisms are helpful and which are harmful to social welfare. It focuses on the politics of property rights enforcement in both rural and urban communities in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda. Describing what happens in specific communities, the book provocatively challenges the fallacy of legalism—the idea that changes in property law will lead to changes in property rights on the ground—arguing instead that states which change their property laws face challenges in implementation when they do not control the authority structures in local communities. The book provides new information about competitors to state power in Sub-Saharan Africa and the challenges of providing secure and defensible property rights.
You‐tien Hsing
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199568048
- eISBN:
- 9780191721632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568048.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy
Chapter 3 examines two types of grassroots resistance in Beijing triggered by inner‐city redevelopment. One concerns property rights protests launched by pre‐Revolution private ...
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Chapter 3 examines two types of grassroots resistance in Beijing triggered by inner‐city redevelopment. One concerns property rights protests launched by pre‐Revolution private homeowners; the other focuses on residents' rights protests by long‐term inner‐city residents displaced by redevelopment projects. The homeowners succeeded in recovering their pre‐Revolution homeownership, and their protests quickly escalated to challenge the more fundamental issue of the state's exclusive claim over land and land rents. The displaced residents, on the other hand, framed their grievances and demands not as property owners, but as residents whose livelihood is rooted in the inner city. While both groups used legalistic and territorial strategies to negotiate with the state and to expand mobilization networks, the expansion of their demands from property rights to residents' rights is particularly meaningful in the pursuit of citizenship rights.Less
Chapter 3 examines two types of grassroots resistance in Beijing triggered by inner‐city redevelopment. One concerns property rights protests launched by pre‐Revolution private homeowners; the other focuses on residents' rights protests by long‐term inner‐city residents displaced by redevelopment projects. The homeowners succeeded in recovering their pre‐Revolution homeownership, and their protests quickly escalated to challenge the more fundamental issue of the state's exclusive claim over land and land rents. The displaced residents, on the other hand, framed their grievances and demands not as property owners, but as residents whose livelihood is rooted in the inner city. While both groups used legalistic and territorial strategies to negotiate with the state and to expand mobilization networks, the expansion of their demands from property rights to residents' rights is particularly meaningful in the pursuit of citizenship rights.
Max H. Boisot, Ian C. MacMillan, and Kyeong Seok Han
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199250875
- eISBN:
- 9780191719509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199250875.003.0007
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Knowledge Management
With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lawrence Lessig has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to ...
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With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lawrence Lessig has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. This chapter looks at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space, to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, this chapter deploys an agent-based modelling approach to the issue of IPRs. It takes the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, it takes the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then, it simulates the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.Less
With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lawrence Lessig has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. This chapter looks at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space, to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, this chapter deploys an agent-based modelling approach to the issue of IPRs. It takes the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, it takes the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then, it simulates the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.
López Ramón and Michael A. Toman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199298006
- eISBN:
- 9780191603877
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199298009.003.0014
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Tropical forest conservation and sustainable natural forest management both imply benefits and invoke considerable costs. The spatial and temporal mismatch of such benefits (which might not ...
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Tropical forest conservation and sustainable natural forest management both imply benefits and invoke considerable costs. The spatial and temporal mismatch of such benefits (which might not materialize until far in the future and could be shared by many parties) and costs (which often occur at a local scale and must be borne in the short term) prevents an efficient forest management at the national level. While the international community has developed a variety of instruments to align global and national incentives, the implementation of such policies needs to take into account national property right regimes and the recent trend towards the devolution of rights and responsibilities to communities and private individuals, which has a significant impact on the relative importance of different types of market failures and policy effects. This paper summarizes existing literature on the causes of deforestation and the magnitude of various forest benefit components, discusses the usefulness of forest valuation exercises for guiding policy choices regarding forest management and conservation, and highlights the key role of market failure in tropical forest conservation. It explores the various policy options that exist for the rest of the world to address market failure, and concludes with conditions necessary for improving current systems.Less
Tropical forest conservation and sustainable natural forest management both imply benefits and invoke considerable costs. The spatial and temporal mismatch of such benefits (which might not materialize until far in the future and could be shared by many parties) and costs (which often occur at a local scale and must be borne in the short term) prevents an efficient forest management at the national level. While the international community has developed a variety of instruments to align global and national incentives, the implementation of such policies needs to take into account national property right regimes and the recent trend towards the devolution of rights and responsibilities to communities and private individuals, which has a significant impact on the relative importance of different types of market failures and policy effects. This paper summarizes existing literature on the causes of deforestation and the magnitude of various forest benefit components, discusses the usefulness of forest valuation exercises for guiding policy choices regarding forest management and conservation, and highlights the key role of market failure in tropical forest conservation. It explores the various policy options that exist for the rest of the world to address market failure, and concludes with conditions necessary for improving current systems.
Randy E. Barnett
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297291
- eISBN:
- 9780191598777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297297.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The liberal conception of justice is introduced and refined in light of the need to address the first‐order problem of knowledge. ‘Justice’ is respect for the rights of individuals and associations. ...
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The liberal conception of justice is introduced and refined in light of the need to address the first‐order problem of knowledge. ‘Justice’ is respect for the rights of individuals and associations. These rights include: (1) The right of several property specifies a right to acquire, possess, use, and dispose of scarce physical resources—including their own bodies. While most property rights are freely alienable, the right to one's person is inalienable. (2) The right of first possession specifies that property rights to unowned resources are acquired by being the first to establish control over them. (3) The right of freedom of contract specifies that a rightholder's consent is both necessary (freedom from contract) and sufficient (freedom to contract) to transfer alienable property rights.Less
The liberal conception of justice is introduced and refined in light of the need to address the first‐order problem of knowledge. ‘Justice’ is respect for the rights of individuals and associations. These rights include: (1) The right of several property specifies a right to acquire, possess, use, and dispose of scarce physical resources—including their own bodies. While most property rights are freely alienable, the right to one's person is inalienable. (2) The right of first possession specifies that property rights to unowned resources are acquired by being the first to establish control over them. (3) The right of freedom of contract specifies that a rightholder's consent is both necessary (freedom from contract) and sufficient (freedom to contract) to transfer alienable property rights.
Peter Ho
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280698
- eISBN:
- 9780191602528
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928069X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Studying institutional change regardless of whether it is focused on transitional or developing economies, may prove most fruitful when focused on its structuring of the means of production—land, ...
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Studying institutional change regardless of whether it is focused on transitional or developing economies, may prove most fruitful when focused on its structuring of the means of production—land, labour, and capital. This book does exactly that: it singles out land as an object of study and places it in the context of one of the world’s largest and most populous countries undergoing institutional reform, the People’s Republic of China. The book argues that private property protected by law, the principle of ‘getting-the-prices-right’, and the emergence of effectively functioning markets can not be imposed, but are the outcome of a society’s historical development and institutional fabric. In other words, the creation of institutions that are trusted and perceived as ‘credible’ in the eyes of social actors hinges in part on choice and timing in relation to the constellation of socio-economic and political parameters. It is demonstrated that disregarding these might result in the establishment of ‘empty institutions’ that have little effect on social actors’ actions, and can even cause rising inequality, bad land stewardship, and social conflict. The book concludes that the key to understanding China’s successes in rural reforms lies in the state’s hands-off approach and upholding an intentional institutional ambiguity that allowed for local, credible institutions to arise.Less
Studying institutional change regardless of whether it is focused on transitional or developing economies, may prove most fruitful when focused on its structuring of the means of production—land, labour, and capital. This book does exactly that: it singles out land as an object of study and places it in the context of one of the world’s largest and most populous countries undergoing institutional reform, the People’s Republic of China. The book argues that private property protected by law, the principle of ‘getting-the-prices-right’, and the emergence of effectively functioning markets can not be imposed, but are the outcome of a society’s historical development and institutional fabric. In other words, the creation of institutions that are trusted and perceived as ‘credible’ in the eyes of social actors hinges in part on choice and timing in relation to the constellation of socio-economic and political parameters. It is demonstrated that disregarding these might result in the establishment of ‘empty institutions’ that have little effect on social actors’ actions, and can even cause rising inequality, bad land stewardship, and social conflict. The book concludes that the key to understanding China’s successes in rural reforms lies in the state’s hands-off approach and upholding an intentional institutional ambiguity that allowed for local, credible institutions to arise.
López Ramón and Michael A. Toman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199298006
- eISBN:
- 9780191603877
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199298009.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter examines evidence on the four ways in which a nation’s political system and its natural resource use are linked. First, when property rights to resources are weak, competition to acquire ...
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This chapter examines evidence on the four ways in which a nation’s political system and its natural resource use are linked. First, when property rights to resources are weak, competition to acquire resources can be wasteful and characterized by rent-seeking and violent conflict. Weak ownership claims are most likely in countries where the rule of law is not well-established. Second, when a country’s political system is unstable or non-representative, the individual’s claim to a resource stock’s future return can be rendered insecure, reducing the payoff to natural resource conservation. Third, when a country’s natural resources are capable of generating significant rents but institutions of democratic governance and the rule of law are not well-established, corruption by government officials responsible for resource management can encourage rent-seeking, dissipating the benefits those resources would otherwise confer. Fourth, the mix of private vs. public good outputs produced by a nation’s natural resources (e.g., forests) can be affected by its political system. When a country’s government does not represent the interests of the entire population, the use of resource stocks to provide public good amenities, as opposed to salable products, may be under-emphasized.Less
This chapter examines evidence on the four ways in which a nation’s political system and its natural resource use are linked. First, when property rights to resources are weak, competition to acquire resources can be wasteful and characterized by rent-seeking and violent conflict. Weak ownership claims are most likely in countries where the rule of law is not well-established. Second, when a country’s political system is unstable or non-representative, the individual’s claim to a resource stock’s future return can be rendered insecure, reducing the payoff to natural resource conservation. Third, when a country’s natural resources are capable of generating significant rents but institutions of democratic governance and the rule of law are not well-established, corruption by government officials responsible for resource management can encourage rent-seeking, dissipating the benefits those resources would otherwise confer. Fourth, the mix of private vs. public good outputs produced by a nation’s natural resources (e.g., forests) can be affected by its political system. When a country’s government does not represent the interests of the entire population, the use of resource stocks to provide public good amenities, as opposed to salable products, may be under-emphasized.
Federico Varese
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297369
- eISBN:
- 9780191600272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829736X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
An account is given of the transition from a state-run to a market economy in Russia, since the crucial argument presented in the book is that the Russian Mafia emerged as a consequence of an ...
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An account is given of the transition from a state-run to a market economy in Russia, since the crucial argument presented in the book is that the Russian Mafia emerged as a consequence of an imperfect transition. The chapter explores the extent to which the post-Soviet Russian state emerged either as an impartial protector of rights or, on the other hand, as an erratic, predatory, and non-impartial supplier of protection. The first section of the chapter looks briefly at the emergence of the legal and tax systems, and the rise in crime and corruption, and the second discusses property rights and the growing demand for protection. The last section presents the main actors involved in the transition – enterprise managers, industrial ministers, workers, and local governments and Boris Yeltsin’s reform team, and attempts to see which of these lobbies were best positioned to engage in collective action to determine some aspects of the transition, and the final outcome.Less
An account is given of the transition from a state-run to a market economy in Russia, since the crucial argument presented in the book is that the Russian Mafia emerged as a consequence of an imperfect transition. The chapter explores the extent to which the post-Soviet Russian state emerged either as an impartial protector of rights or, on the other hand, as an erratic, predatory, and non-impartial supplier of protection. The first section of the chapter looks briefly at the emergence of the legal and tax systems, and the rise in crime and corruption, and the second discusses property rights and the growing demand for protection. The last section presents the main actors involved in the transition – enterprise managers, industrial ministers, workers, and local governments and Boris Yeltsin’s reform team, and attempts to see which of these lobbies were best positioned to engage in collective action to determine some aspects of the transition, and the final outcome.
Mark A. Hall and Kevin A. Schulman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195390131
- eISBN:
- 9780199775934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390131.003.008
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
Who owns a patient's medical information? The patient, the provider, or the insurer? All of the above? None of the above? In the emerging era of electronic medical records, no legal question is more ...
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Who owns a patient's medical information? The patient, the provider, or the insurer? All of the above? None of the above? In the emerging era of electronic medical records, no legal question is more critical, more contested, or more poorly understood. Ownership was never much in doubt in an age of paper-based records, but now that information can be easily digitized and freed from any particular storage medium, confusion reigns. How this issue is resolved can determine how or whether massive anticipated developments in electronic health records will take shape. The respective property rights of patients, providers, and insurers will strongly influence, if not determine, what form of electronic health-record interchange will predominate. And, whether rights to access and use of medical information can be commercialized may determine whether effective, comprehensive medical information networks can emerge at all in the absence of an overt government mandate. This chapter analyzes property rights in medical information from the perspective of network economics. It proposes that patients be allowed to monetize their access and control rights by assigning them to a trusted and regulated intermediary who may then place those rights in a stream of commerce that determines their value and best use. The funds generated can then be distributed both to patients and providers in order to encourage their creation and use of interconnected electronic records.Less
Who owns a patient's medical information? The patient, the provider, or the insurer? All of the above? None of the above? In the emerging era of electronic medical records, no legal question is more critical, more contested, or more poorly understood. Ownership was never much in doubt in an age of paper-based records, but now that information can be easily digitized and freed from any particular storage medium, confusion reigns. How this issue is resolved can determine how or whether massive anticipated developments in electronic health records will take shape. The respective property rights of patients, providers, and insurers will strongly influence, if not determine, what form of electronic health-record interchange will predominate. And, whether rights to access and use of medical information can be commercialized may determine whether effective, comprehensive medical information networks can emerge at all in the absence of an overt government mandate. This chapter analyzes property rights in medical information from the perspective of network economics. It proposes that patients be allowed to monetize their access and control rights by assigning them to a trusted and regulated intermediary who may then place those rights in a stream of commerce that determines their value and best use. The funds generated can then be distributed both to patients and providers in order to encourage their creation and use of interconnected electronic records.
Krister Andersson and Diego Pacheco
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199204762
- eISBN:
- 9780191603860
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199204764.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
How can formal, national-level policies be structured so that they enhance rural people’s capabilities for sustained improvements of their quality of life? This paper analyses this question in the ...
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How can formal, national-level policies be structured so that they enhance rural people’s capabilities for sustained improvements of their quality of life? This paper analyses this question in the rural context, drawing upon first-hand observations of the consequences from a recent public policy reform in Bolivia’s forestry sector. It examines the effect the new legislation on forest users’ incentives to invest in forestry activities as compared to other production alternatives. Data from six smallholder communities in the tropical lowlands showed that although formalized forestry activities can be relatively profitable for smallholders, complicated acquisition rules and traditional policy bias against agricultural activities often make forestry a less attractive land use alternative.Less
How can formal, national-level policies be structured so that they enhance rural people’s capabilities for sustained improvements of their quality of life? This paper analyses this question in the rural context, drawing upon first-hand observations of the consequences from a recent public policy reform in Bolivia’s forestry sector. It examines the effect the new legislation on forest users’ incentives to invest in forestry activities as compared to other production alternatives. Data from six smallholder communities in the tropical lowlands showed that although formalized forestry activities can be relatively profitable for smallholders, complicated acquisition rules and traditional policy bias against agricultural activities often make forestry a less attractive land use alternative.
