Albert Casullo
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195115055
- eISBN:
- 9780199786190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195115058.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The leading arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge are addressed. The opposing arguments fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept ...
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The leading arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge are addressed. The opposing arguments fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge and allege that no cases of knowledge satisfy the conditions in the analysis; radical empiricist arguments, which offer radical empiricist accounts of knowledge of propositions alleged to be knowable only a priori; and incompatibility arguments, which maintain that a priori knowledge is incompatible with epistemic naturalism. This chapter contends that the negative arguments fail: the conceptual arguments impose implausible conditions on a priori knowledge; the radical empiricist accounts do not establish that the propositions in question are not also known a priori; and the incompatibility arguments fail to show that a priori knowledge is incompatible with either of the two leading forms of epistemic naturalism: philosophical and scientific.Less
The leading arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge are addressed. The opposing arguments fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge and allege that no cases of knowledge satisfy the conditions in the analysis; radical empiricist arguments, which offer radical empiricist accounts of knowledge of propositions alleged to be knowable only a priori; and incompatibility arguments, which maintain that a priori knowledge is incompatible with epistemic naturalism. This chapter contends that the negative arguments fail: the conceptual arguments impose implausible conditions on a priori knowledge; the radical empiricist accounts do not establish that the propositions in question are not also known a priori; and the incompatibility arguments fail to show that a priori knowledge is incompatible with either of the two leading forms of epistemic naturalism: philosophical and scientific.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199652365
- eISBN:
- 9780191740718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
This chapter contrasts two methodologies for thinking about the nature of self, neither of which are fully satisfactory. The method of philosophical naturalism, which affirms a continuity between ...
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This chapter contrasts two methodologies for thinking about the nature of self, neither of which are fully satisfactory. The method of philosophical naturalism, which affirms a continuity between philosophy and natural science, leads to a conception of self as at best a reducible entity, reducible either simply to the body (Materialism) or else to an interconnected flow of mental particulars (the Humean view). Diametrically opposed to philosophical naturalism is an approach to the study of the self that rests on the use of imagination and intuition. Exercises of imagination lead to the discovery of a different kind of self, a self which consists essentially in thinking. The heart of the method is that if something can be imagined as separated from something else without being destroyed, then that other thing cannot be a part of its essence. This chapter then describes formulations of the cogito in the Islamic philosopher Ibn Sina and the Jaina Prabhācandra (both born in the year 980 ce). We learn from the Indian materialist Payāsi that any temptation to provide an explanation of the behaviour of the self by analogy with the behaviour of some physical entity or phenomenon is a trap, for such an attempt invariably ends up making the self sound like a mysterious crypto‐physical being, a recherché denizen in the physical world.Less
This chapter contrasts two methodologies for thinking about the nature of self, neither of which are fully satisfactory. The method of philosophical naturalism, which affirms a continuity between philosophy and natural science, leads to a conception of self as at best a reducible entity, reducible either simply to the body (Materialism) or else to an interconnected flow of mental particulars (the Humean view). Diametrically opposed to philosophical naturalism is an approach to the study of the self that rests on the use of imagination and intuition. Exercises of imagination lead to the discovery of a different kind of self, a self which consists essentially in thinking. The heart of the method is that if something can be imagined as separated from something else without being destroyed, then that other thing cannot be a part of its essence. This chapter then describes formulations of the cogito in the Islamic philosopher Ibn Sina and the Jaina Prabhācandra (both born in the year 980 ce). We learn from the Indian materialist Payāsi that any temptation to provide an explanation of the behaviour of the self by analogy with the behaviour of some physical entity or phenomenon is a trap, for such an attempt invariably ends up making the self sound like a mysterious crypto‐physical being, a recherché denizen in the physical world.
Jennifer Radden (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195149531
- eISBN:
- 9780199870943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195149531.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter outlines the origins of reductionism and its connection to the unity of science and to philosophical naturalism. It explores its motivation for philosophers of mind and of mental ...
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This chapter outlines the origins of reductionism and its connection to the unity of science and to philosophical naturalism. It explores its motivation for philosophers of mind and of mental disorder, and sketches out the backlash against it that emerges from a reappropriation of a prescientific revolution worldview.Less
This chapter outlines the origins of reductionism and its connection to the unity of science and to philosophical naturalism. It explores its motivation for philosophers of mind and of mental disorder, and sketches out the backlash against it that emerges from a reappropriation of a prescientific revolution worldview.
Keith B. Miller
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520257580
- eISBN:
- 9780520943711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520257580.003.0008
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Both traditional creationists and intelligent design (ID) advocates argue that the methodological limitation of science to the study of natural agents and processes is equivalent to the denial of the ...
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Both traditional creationists and intelligent design (ID) advocates argue that the methodological limitation of science to the study of natural agents and processes is equivalent to the denial of the existence and action of God. This is a reflection of their false claim that science as currently practiced is inherently atheistic. It is a fundamental confusion of methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism or materialism. ID proponents see methodological naturalism not as a description of the limitations of scientific inquiry, but as an arbitrary and unjustified prescription that prevents scientists from including supernatural action in their scientific explanations. Probably one of the best case studies illustrating how the nature of science has come under attack in recent years is the widely reported effort of young-Earth creationists and ID advocates in Kansas to rewrite the state science standards. In their more recent challenges to Kansas science education, ID advocates have explicitly attacked methodological naturalism as a description of the nature and limitations of science.Less
Both traditional creationists and intelligent design (ID) advocates argue that the methodological limitation of science to the study of natural agents and processes is equivalent to the denial of the existence and action of God. This is a reflection of their false claim that science as currently practiced is inherently atheistic. It is a fundamental confusion of methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism or materialism. ID proponents see methodological naturalism not as a description of the limitations of scientific inquiry, but as an arbitrary and unjustified prescription that prevents scientists from including supernatural action in their scientific explanations. Probably one of the best case studies illustrating how the nature of science has come under attack in recent years is the widely reported effort of young-Earth creationists and ID advocates in Kansas to rewrite the state science standards. In their more recent challenges to Kansas science education, ID advocates have explicitly attacked methodological naturalism as a description of the nature and limitations of science.
P. M. S. Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674824
- eISBN:
- 9780191761287
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674824.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
It has been remarked that the distinctive development in philosophy over the past thirty-five years has been a naturalist turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception ...
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It has been remarked that the distinctive development in philosophy over the past thirty-five years has been a naturalist turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. This is a reversion to the conception of philosophy advanced by Russell in the 1910s. The most august modern originator of such naturalism in contemporary philosophy was Quine. He advanced three forms of naturalism: naturalized epistemology, ontological naturalism, and philosophical naturalism. This chapter shows the errors and confusions that inform all three. The programme of naturalized epistemology is incoherent, and its claim to be an enlightened substitute for epistemology unwarranted. Quine's occasional forays into epistemology are examined and found wanting.Less
It has been remarked that the distinctive development in philosophy over the past thirty-five years has been a naturalist turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. This is a reversion to the conception of philosophy advanced by Russell in the 1910s. The most august modern originator of such naturalism in contemporary philosophy was Quine. He advanced three forms of naturalism: naturalized epistemology, ontological naturalism, and philosophical naturalism. This chapter shows the errors and confusions that inform all three. The programme of naturalized epistemology is incoherent, and its claim to be an enlightened substitute for epistemology unwarranted. Quine's occasional forays into epistemology are examined and found wanting.
David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012560
- eISBN:
- 9780262255202
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to ...
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Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis (sometimes known as the “Canberra Plan” because many of its proponents have been associated with the Australian National University in Canberra) is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in everyday discourse. This book gathers work from a range of prominent philosophers who are working within this tradition, offering important new work as well as critical evaluations of the methodology. Its centerpiece is an important posthumous work by David Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility.” The chapters first address issues of philosophy of mind, semantics, and the new methodology’s a priori character, then turn to matters of metaphysics, and finally consider problems regarding normativity.Less
Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis (sometimes known as the “Canberra Plan” because many of its proponents have been associated with the Australian National University in Canberra) is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in everyday discourse. This book gathers work from a range of prominent philosophers who are working within this tradition, offering important new work as well as critical evaluations of the methodology. Its centerpiece is an important posthumous work by David Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility.” The chapters first address issues of philosophy of mind, semantics, and the new methodology’s a priori character, then turn to matters of metaphysics, and finally consider problems regarding normativity.
Brian L. Keeley
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190844073
- eISBN:
- 9780190909611
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0029
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
Where does entertaining (or promoting) conspiracy theories stand with respect to rational inquiry? According to one view, conspiracy theorists are open-minded skeptics, being careful not to accept ...
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Where does entertaining (or promoting) conspiracy theories stand with respect to rational inquiry? According to one view, conspiracy theorists are open-minded skeptics, being careful not to accept uncritically common wisdom, exploring alternative explanations of events no matter how unlikely they might seem at first glance. Seen this way, they are akin to scientists attempting to explain the social world. On the other hand, they are also sometimes seen as overly credulous, believing everything they read on the Internet, say. In addition to conspiracy theorists and scientists, another significant form of explanation of the events of the world can be found in religious contexts, such as when a disaster is explained as being an “act of God.” By comparing conspiratorial thinking with scientific and religious forms of explanation, features of all three are brought into clearer focus. For example, anomalies and a commitment to naturalist explanation are seen as important elements of scientific explanation, although the details are less clear. This paper uses conspiracy theories as a lens through which to investigate rational or scientific inquiry. In addition, a better understanding of the scientific method as it might be applied in the study of events of interest to conspiracy theorists can help understand their epistemic virtues and vices.Less
Where does entertaining (or promoting) conspiracy theories stand with respect to rational inquiry? According to one view, conspiracy theorists are open-minded skeptics, being careful not to accept uncritically common wisdom, exploring alternative explanations of events no matter how unlikely they might seem at first glance. Seen this way, they are akin to scientists attempting to explain the social world. On the other hand, they are also sometimes seen as overly credulous, believing everything they read on the Internet, say. In addition to conspiracy theorists and scientists, another significant form of explanation of the events of the world can be found in religious contexts, such as when a disaster is explained as being an “act of God.” By comparing conspiratorial thinking with scientific and religious forms of explanation, features of all three are brought into clearer focus. For example, anomalies and a commitment to naturalist explanation are seen as important elements of scientific explanation, although the details are less clear. This paper uses conspiracy theories as a lens through which to investigate rational or scientific inquiry. In addition, a better understanding of the scientific method as it might be applied in the study of events of interest to conspiracy theorists can help understand their epistemic virtues and vices.
Jonathan Israel
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- November 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806837
- eISBN:
- 9780191844379
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806837.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
Israel argues that Spinoza’s biblical criticism revolutionized the discipline by combining a historical-critical approach with a philosophical demonstration. It eradicated supernatural agency and ...
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Israel argues that Spinoza’s biblical criticism revolutionized the discipline by combining a historical-critical approach with a philosophical demonstration. It eradicated supernatural agency and miracles from the historical process. Spinoza’s new hermeneutics scrupulously distinguished authorial intention from truth of fact. Taken together with his philosophical naturalism, this challenged the essential reconcilability of reason and faith, of science and religion, which was to become the groundwork of the edifice of the Enlightenment erected by Locke, Newton, Leibniz, and Wolff. Thus Spinozism undermined the claim that theology, science, and philosophy form a single harmonious whole. Standard accounts of the Enlightenment and early modern history fail to grasp the full scope of Spinoza’s critique of religion. Ironically, Spinozism became the intellectual origin of a revolutionary consciousness that threatened the political and religious state of affairs because it was publicized and reinforced by apologetic eighteenth-century observers, who excoriated Spinoza’s legacy.Less
Israel argues that Spinoza’s biblical criticism revolutionized the discipline by combining a historical-critical approach with a philosophical demonstration. It eradicated supernatural agency and miracles from the historical process. Spinoza’s new hermeneutics scrupulously distinguished authorial intention from truth of fact. Taken together with his philosophical naturalism, this challenged the essential reconcilability of reason and faith, of science and religion, which was to become the groundwork of the edifice of the Enlightenment erected by Locke, Newton, Leibniz, and Wolff. Thus Spinozism undermined the claim that theology, science, and philosophy form a single harmonious whole. Standard accounts of the Enlightenment and early modern history fail to grasp the full scope of Spinoza’s critique of religion. Ironically, Spinozism became the intellectual origin of a revolutionary consciousness that threatened the political and religious state of affairs because it was publicized and reinforced by apologetic eighteenth-century observers, who excoriated Spinoza’s legacy.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198757405
- eISBN:
- 9780191817304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198757405.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This postscript discusses the nature and ambitions of cross-cultural philosophy. It distinguishes cross-cultural philosophy from an older project of comparative philosophy, and argues that philosophy ...
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This postscript discusses the nature and ambitions of cross-cultural philosophy. It distinguishes cross-cultural philosophy from an older project of comparative philosophy, and argues that philosophy should be a cosmopolitan undertaking. A cross-cultural philosophy claims that it is methodologically essential to consider theories from a plurality of cultural locations if one’s ambition is to discover a fundamental theory true of the human mind as such. So philosophy should be ‘borderless’, straddling geographical and cultural divisions. To think across cultures and languages is somewhat akin to perceiving with two eyes rather one, in that one gains a depth of vision not available in monocular sight.Less
This postscript discusses the nature and ambitions of cross-cultural philosophy. It distinguishes cross-cultural philosophy from an older project of comparative philosophy, and argues that philosophy should be a cosmopolitan undertaking. A cross-cultural philosophy claims that it is methodologically essential to consider theories from a plurality of cultural locations if one’s ambition is to discover a fundamental theory true of the human mind as such. So philosophy should be ‘borderless’, straddling geographical and cultural divisions. To think across cultures and languages is somewhat akin to perceiving with two eyes rather one, in that one gains a depth of vision not available in monocular sight.
