David Hyder and Hans-Jorg Rheinberger (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756044
- eISBN:
- 9780804772945
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756044.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last ...
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This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the Crisis, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the “life-world” of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of qualia, naïve science, and the fact–value distinction. The chapters included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this “crisis” and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and “worlds,” the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault.Less
This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the Crisis, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the “life-world” of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of qualia, naïve science, and the fact–value distinction. The chapters included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this “crisis” and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and “worlds,” the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault.
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226902029
- eISBN:
- 9780226902050
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226902050.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter sums up the key findings of this study about computer simulation and the philosophy of science. It explains that computer simulation has not attracted the immediate interest of ...
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This chapter sums up the key findings of this study about computer simulation and the philosophy of science. It explains that computer simulation has not attracted the immediate interest of philosophers of science because these philosophers have had a bias in favor of the proposition that the philosophically interesting action in the sciences occurs when new theories are proposed. The chapter suggests that philosophers might find as good philosophical fodder by examining the details of how scientists model complex phenomena within existing theories as they do by looking to novel fundamental theories.Less
This chapter sums up the key findings of this study about computer simulation and the philosophy of science. It explains that computer simulation has not attracted the immediate interest of philosophers of science because these philosophers have had a bias in favor of the proposition that the philosophically interesting action in the sciences occurs when new theories are proposed. The chapter suggests that philosophers might find as good philosophical fodder by examining the details of how scientists model complex phenomena within existing theories as they do by looking to novel fundamental theories.
Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226051796
- eISBN:
- 9780226051826
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? This book seeks to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue ...
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What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? This book seeks to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue has a long history in philosophy, stretching as far back as the early twentieth century and the work of Karl Popper. But by the late 1980s, scholars in the field began to treat the demarcation problem as impossible to solve and futile to ponder. However, the chapters here make a case for the unequivocal importance of reflecting on the separation between pseudoscience and sound science. Moreover, the demarcation problem is not a purely theoretical dilemma of mere academic interest: it affects parents' decisions to vaccinate children and governments' willingness to adopt policies that prevent climate change. Pseudoscience often mimics science, using the superficial language and trappings of actual scientific research to seem more respectable. Even a well-informed public can be taken in by such questionable theories dressed up as science. Pseudoscientific beliefs compete with sound science on the health pages of newspapers for media coverage and in laboratories for research funding. Now more than ever the ability to separate genuine scientific findings from spurious ones is vital, and this book provides ground for philosophers, sociologists, historians, and laypeople to make decisions about what science is or isn't.Less
What sets the practice of rigorously tested, sound science apart from pseudoscience? This book seeks to answer this question, known to philosophers of science as “the demarcation problem.” This issue has a long history in philosophy, stretching as far back as the early twentieth century and the work of Karl Popper. But by the late 1980s, scholars in the field began to treat the demarcation problem as impossible to solve and futile to ponder. However, the chapters here make a case for the unequivocal importance of reflecting on the separation between pseudoscience and sound science. Moreover, the demarcation problem is not a purely theoretical dilemma of mere academic interest: it affects parents' decisions to vaccinate children and governments' willingness to adopt policies that prevent climate change. Pseudoscience often mimics science, using the superficial language and trappings of actual scientific research to seem more respectable. Even a well-informed public can be taken in by such questionable theories dressed up as science. Pseudoscientific beliefs compete with sound science on the health pages of newspapers for media coverage and in laboratories for research funding. Now more than ever the ability to separate genuine scientific findings from spurious ones is vital, and this book provides ground for philosophers, sociologists, historians, and laypeople to make decisions about what science is or isn't.
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226902029
- eISBN:
- 9780226902050
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226902050.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter examines the source of credibility of computer simulation models. It suggests that the practice of using fictions in building credible simulations is worthy of closer scrutiny by ...
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This chapter examines the source of credibility of computer simulation models. It suggests that the practice of using fictions in building credible simulations is worthy of closer scrutiny by philosophers of science interested in the various arguments for and against scientific realism. The chapter analyzes two examples of fictions from the field of computational fluid dynamics—so-called artificial viscosity and vorticity confinement—arguing that these kinds of model-building techniques are counterexamples to the doctrine that success implies truth.Less
This chapter examines the source of credibility of computer simulation models. It suggests that the practice of using fictions in building credible simulations is worthy of closer scrutiny by philosophers of science interested in the various arguments for and against scientific realism. The chapter analyzes two examples of fictions from the field of computational fluid dynamics—so-called artificial viscosity and vorticity confinement—arguing that these kinds of model-building techniques are counterexamples to the doctrine that success implies truth.
