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Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

David J. Chalmers

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Philosophers have reacted in different ways to the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an ... More


Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint

Joseph Levine

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter raises a problem for the phenomenal concept strategy. The problem is framed partly in terms of the explanatory gap, which is roughly the claim that the existence or nature of phenomenal ... More


Physicalism and the Appeal to Phenomenal Concepts

Michael Tye

in Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262012737
eISBN:
9780262255172
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the phenomenal-concept strategy and to show some serious difficulties that it encounters. Physicalists have thought that they were wedded to phenomenal ... More


Phenomenal truths are entailed logico-conceptually, but not a priori

Robert Kirk

in The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199669417
eISBN:
9780191748769
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669417.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Phenomenal truths cannot be inferred a priori from P – or not with proper understanding. Yet the distinctness of physical-functional and phenomenal concepts does not prevent P from entailing mental ... More


The Crucible of Consciousness: An Integrated Theory of Mind and Brain

Zoltan Torey

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262512848
eISBN:
9780262255189
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262512848.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? Philosophical materialists have ... More


Real Acquaintance and Physicalism

Philip Goff

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

‘Real acquaintance’ is a special kind of intimate relationship subjects bear to their phenomenal qualities, in virtue of which: (i) a psychologically normal subject can know the real nature of one of ... More


Introduction

Michael Tye

in Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262012737
eISBN:
9780262255172
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This book is primarily aimed at showing that “the phenomenal-concept strategy” for defending materialism is a flawed strategy. This strategy posits that we are possessors of a range of concepts for ... More


Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Michael Tye

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262012737
eISBN:
9780262255172
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical ... More


Phenomenal Qualities: What They Must Be, and What They Cannot Be

Howard Robinson

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

An extremely modest and, hence, uncontentious version of the transparency of experience entails that phenomenal qualities are amongst the fundamental building blocks of our, lived, manifest or ... More


Revelation and the Transparency Argument

Philip Goff

in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780190677015
eISBN:
9780190677046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190677015.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter complete the argument against physicalism. The chapter defends the thesis of Revelation, roughly the thesis that we stand in a special epistemic relationship to our conscious states such ... More


Demonstrative Thought

Joseph Levine

in Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and Modality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780198800088
eISBN:
9780191839863
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198800088.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In this paper I develop a model of what it is to entertain a demonstrative thought, whether about an individual or a property. The primary question I investigate is the mechanism responsible for ... More


The Knowledge Argument

Philip Goff

in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780190677015
eISBN:
9780190677046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190677015.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The first half of the book argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness and hence must be false. One of the most well-known arguments that tries to show this is Frank Jackson’s form of ... More


The Conceivability Argument

Philip Goff

in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780190677015
eISBN:
9780190677046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190677015.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses the conceivability argument against physicalism. David Chalmers’ “two-dimensional” version of the conceivability argument is rejected on the grounds that it relies on a highly ... More


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