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Normative Concepts

Matti Eklund

in Choosing Normative Concepts

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198717829
eISBN:
9780191787331
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

What is it for a concept to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected, among them that a concept is normative if it ascribes a normative property. The positive answer defended is ... More


Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties

Bart Streumer

in Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199604678
eISBN:
9780191759062
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This paper defends Frank Jackson’s argument against irreducibly normative properties from attacks by Jonathan Dancy and other non-naturalist moral realists. Jackson argues that since normative ... More


Normative Properties

Matti Eklund

in Choosing Normative Concepts

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198717829
eISBN:
9780191787331
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

What is it for a property to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected in this chapter, among them that a property is normative if it is ascribed by some normative concept. A ... More


Irreducibly Normative Properties

Chris Heathwood

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780198738695
eISBN:
9780191802515
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what ... More


Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities

Stephanie Leary

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
July 2017
ISBN:
9780198805076
eISBN:
9780191843174
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose ... More


Normative Judgements and Properties

Bart Streumer

in Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198785897
eISBN:
9780191848070
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785897.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter first characterizes normative judgements, normative properties, and descriptive properties. It notes that these characterizations are compatible with different views about what makes a ... More


Further Views

Bart Streumer

in Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198785897
eISBN:
9780191848070
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785897.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses several further views about normative judgements and properties. It argues that cognitivist expressivism and descriptive fictionalism face the symmetry objection, that Kantian ... More


Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter resolves the disagreements which arose in the previous chapter. Metaphysical naturalists believe that there are no ontologically weighty non-natural normative properties and truths. But ... More


How to Be a Moral Platonist

Knut Olav Skarsaune

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780198738695
eISBN:
9780191802515
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Contrary to popular opinion, non-natural realism can explain both why normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, and why this pattern is analytic. The explanation proceeds by positing ... More


Efficiency

Martine Quinzii

in Increasing Returns and Efficiency

Published in print:
1993
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780195065534
eISBN:
9780199855063
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195065534.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

Once the concept of equilibrium has been defined, it might seem natural to apply the standard procedure of Arrow-Debreu theory, first analyzing existence and then the optimality of equilibrium. ... More


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